INTERSTICES 13

JOURNAL OF ARCHITECTURE AND RELATED ARTS

TECHNICS, MEMORY AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF HISTORY



Technics, Memory and the Architecture of History

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Cover design based on Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528) "Melencolia I".

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Contents

Introduction: Technics, Memory and the Architecture of History

Stephen Loo

Albrecht Dürer (1514). *Melancholia I* [Wikimedia Commons]

In the light of massive catastrophes – the earthquakes near Sendai and Christchurch, the tsunamis of Aceh, and Katrina's devastation of New Orleans – the question of urban and architectural reconstruction invokes the question of remembering. What is this "past" that we remember and on which we base our future reconstructions? What *images* of the past do we call upon in our decisions to rebuild or not to build – and how do they negotiate the terrain between memory and history, and in corollary, between nature and culture, technology and sustainability, planning and responding, tradition and innovation, foundations and interstices?

To Bernard Stiegler, the image that we recall in/as history is not an "image in general" (2002: 147). The "mental image" of what has passed in/as history is inseparable from the "image-objects" associated with that history, constructed in architecture, film, photography, art or the media. Image-objects themselves therefore possess a technical history. While mental images and image-objects are phenomenologically imbricated, a temporal difference exists between the two. Mental images are fleeting and their length of retention varies depending on individual circumstance and physiological capacities, whereas image-objects persist as material abstractions indexical to the development of technological devices.

While it is difficult to fathom an image-object without a mental image, Stiegler's more remarkable claim is that there has never been a mental image which is not, in some way, the *return* – a re-collection – of an image-object (2002: 148). We can

extrapolate to say that the image-objects of history are *given* to us: we "inherit" them, they are *imposed* on us, we make them our own in the construction of our mental images, in our practices of remembering. The images of memory possess a *technics*, and they carry with them traces of their construction, their architecture.

In Aristotle's categorisation, humans are the only beings who possess the "noetic" soul, of a higher order from the "vegetative" and the "sensitive" souls. Noeticity, or the ability to *think*, is a specific power that leads humans to know themselves, making them the only species who can exteriorise. Thinking confers to human beings a peculiar status as an organic creature "that has no defining characteristic except for the fact that he *knows* that he is human" (Van Camp 2009: 4). As Carl Linnaeus contends, "man is the animal that must recognize itself as human to be human" (cited in Agamben 2004: 26). Through language as a means for expression, bodily gestures as a means of communication, and tool or object-making as a means of "designing" the future, the capacity of the noetic soul is inextricably linked to the "outward" transduction of internal conditions.

This process of human self-definition through exteriorisation – since its origin, or more accurately in efforts to postulate its origin, its history – has always relied upon technical prostheses, an exterior realm of tools, techniques, language, inscription and representation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fathom the evolution of what is called – or what is sensed, or in fact what *is* - the human away from the evolution of "technics", an exterior organised realm of technical inorganic matter, in which the internal conditions of being human is supported by technical or artificial apparatus (1998: 18). Stiegler posits that technical artefacts make possible, or in fact *are*, the retention of human experience and memory.

Arguing through a reconfiguration of Husserl's categorisation of the three thresholds of memorisation, Stiegler considers technics as a *tertiary* level of memory retention, a retention by objects, tools and concepts exterior to the human being, that supports the retention of sense perception of temporal objects such as a melody, a written text or behavioural patterns, namely primary memory; and the conventional sense of retention of an experience or sensation which is "remembered" as the past, namely secondary memory. Primary memory is configured in a sequential temporality of present and immediate conscious perception, while secondary memory requires a selective imagination and a capacity for differentiation in which the past is recalled, modifying the experience of the temporal object currently in experience. Therefore technics as tertiary memory both makes possible and is constitutive of primary conscious perception as well as the imagination in secondary recollection. Stiegler proposes that perception is akin to cinematic "post-production", where consciousness montages disparate elements from the senses, imagination and technologically "retained" memory (2010: 29).

Following this line of argument, the individuation of the historian would consist of the imbrication of interior psychic and exterior technical collective dimensions, which are in effect two sides of the same coin. That is, what is perceived as if from the position of an interior is an effect of exteriorisation. The past is made up of both deeply personal inheritances that arrive without being called for, with events that we did not choose to participate in; and where we find ourselves addressed by a language imposed on us. Jean Laplanche argues that the address of this "otherness" can be conceived as a demand, one whose indeterminate origin pressures – or "drives", as he says, appropriating a Freudian concept – the workings of the unconscious (1999: 33). The alien-ness of history as an image-object arriving form

the outside is something that the internal self cannot fully assimilate because it was never fully experienced, processed or translated, but yet it drives us to think and act in relation to it.

The task of the historian becomes more complex in the light of such *mnemotechnics*. Recalling the past is an action that does not separate mental images from image-objects and their associated technics of construction and dissemination. In the extreme circumstances of catastrophe, the mutuality of image-objects and mental images is made markedly evident. The imaginary of catastrophic collapse and associated reconstruction is governed by images, narratives and myth conditioned by media and constructed by historiography. The extreme circumstances of catastrophe highlight the contribution of the tertiary machinery of externalisation on perception, which on one hand governs the way we can apprehend the unspeakability of the catastrophe, and on the other influences the ways in which we can image reconstruction, all of which make survival possible.

Tertiary memory as externalisation means the act of remembering is always situated and therefore spatially bounded. There is an architecture of historical memory that produces an *already-there* of the past that is not lived but imposed, thus rendering problematic historical accounts of civic values and democratic processes that allude to fundamental truths. This condition also challenges the status of personal testimony, witnessing and autobiography in epistemology and the politics of knowledge (Code 2006: 172).

Contributors to this volume of *Interstices* were asked to contemplate history and historiography in architecture, design and art in terms of memory and the various temporal ruptures implicate with it. It asked what alternative mechanisms of memorialising the past are imaginable: narratival, conversational, oral, gestural? Similarly, it asked what image-objects are "inherited" by the historian and what are the ontological conditions surrounding their construction and dissemination, and their effects on remembering the past?

Jeff Malpas frames the overarching theme of memory through a philosophical demonstration of how human memory is inextricably connected to places and built form beyond a purely subjectivist position or as temporal-experiential additions to them. The act of remembering is always situated and thus topological because meaning depends on those who remember objects and entities in the external world. Moreover place is itself what is orientated in and by memory. The weave of memory and of meaning is therefore accomplished in the built form of house, street, and city, rather than in the inner sanctum of the mind. That is, the question of memory becomes a question of the externalisation of the mind. Jane Madsen follows on with the recollection of un-building or collapse brought about by the earthquake disaster which turned the philosopher Kant from natural to critical philosophy; and writer-poet Heinrich von Kleist, upon reading Kant's account of earthquakes, from empirical to critical writing. The essay demonstrates the locatedness of memory and the imagination – through the author's personal recollection of Portland, through the medium of film – as it plays on the fibrillation between immanent spiritual and social collapse with material and actual collapse.

In the arch that remains after collapse is a building simultaneously present and absent. Michael Tawa shows that this interstice is a zone of indiscernibility that yields passage into other dimensions and worlds. Through Tarkovsky's cinema and Lewerentz's architecture, Tawa demonstrates how at the interstices,

architecture in encountering the uncanny and its deconstitution, reveals that the apparatus of memory resists being defined by re-presentation, and attends instead to memory as the making-place for recollection. In that space of difficulty we find barely-there images - fragile yet laborious memories. This is the space of writing for Linda Marie Walker, whose writing in this volume attends to its (and writing's) quiet potential to form and un-form, impose and puzzle, in the interstices of things and events, disaster and celebration. Writing is a technique of the self, which means that writing turns around to contemplate the self, it is a practice of turning the self in the company of materials, to condition what-it-*is*-to-know (and *be)*: literally to re-collect oneself, one's self, oneselves.

Continuing the resistance of architecture and the built environment to being a predeterminable stage for memory, Michael Chapman's essay describes how architecture is a found, rather than intentional, context against which creative acts and works in Surrealism and Dada are projected and reconstructed. The production of the avant-garde proceeded from the negation of architecture through both time and function, through strategies of the readymade, collage, montage, drawing and photography. Surrealism developed a radicalised architecture, and concomitantly a radicalised idea of memory that connects the visual and the lived. The result is a psychophysical understanding of place and memory, transacted by material, space, emotions, affects and bodies. Peg Rawes provides a philosophical account of such geometries through Spinoza. Spinoza's geometrical philosophy, firmly constituted in the sensory and sensible realm, provides a description of the myriad of human, living and natural subjects constructed through living ecological relations, and through these ethical relations. Spinoza's geometry is not technical in a reductive sense as is the convention in architectural form-making, but a technics of biological and material diversification, imbricated in lived habits and habitats, whether architectural, economic, social, or cultural. Memory in Spinoza's geometrical ecology is not an internal condition of the unified human, but is part of the constitution of a durational reality without recourse to an instrumental anthropological account of life.

In this issue, we invited a paper by William Taylor who provides an account of architecture as mnemotechnics through an investigation into novel appropriations of historical building forms in the face of future natural disasters or climatic variations. Architecture becomes an externalisation of the remembered past in order to predict or forestall a catastrophic future. Typologies of architectural form retain the traces of hopes, desires, affect, and attitudes to risk. Memory is therefore architectural, formed by the relations between discursive and non-discursive conditions, between interiorities of the psychic subject and externalisations of the material practice.

Hannah Lewi opens the non-peer reviewed section with "Deranging Oneself in Someone Else's House", a meditation on intimate occupations of memorialised modern houses – in this case the former home of Australian historian Manning Clark in Canberra, designed by architect Robin Boyd in 1952. In "Birth, Death and Rebirth: Reconstruction of Architecture in Ruskin's Writings", Anu Chatterjee finds in John Ruskin's critique of the restoration of historical building fabric a renovation of the "tectonic language of architecture" by a "language of tailoring and upholstering", one that paradoxically aims at a compensatory male self-engenderment. Japan-based architect and academic Tom Daniell considers responses to the March 11, 2011 earthquake and the precarious hold architecture and infrastructure ambition in the face of overwhelming natural force in "After the Aftershocks".

Andrew Barrie interviews renowned Japanese architect Taira Nishizawa during his New Zealand visit in 2012 to participate in a lecture and seminar programme. Marianne Calvelo similarly interviews acclaimed Portuguese architect Manuel Aires Mateus while he was at The University of Auckland, School of Architecture and Planning in the winter semester of 2012. Sean Pickersgill reviews *Architecture and Violence* (2012), edited by Bechir Kenzari. John Walsh similarly reviews *My Desk is My Castle* (2011) edited by Uta Brandes and Michael Erlhoff. Lastly, Tom Daniell reports on "Familial Clouds", an installation by Simon Twose and Andrew Barrie in the *Traces of Centuries & Future Steps* exhibition held at the Palazzo Bembo in Venice, Italy as collateral event of the 13th International Architectural Exhibition, *La Biennale di Venezia*.

While these contributions speak in their own ways about the relationship between mnemotechnics and the architecture of history, all demonstrate the various modalities of the spatialisation and temporalisation of the image-object and its absorption into the spheres of production in architectural practice and theory, and the indeterminacy of images that carry the technics of inter-human relations. These essays invoke the theatre of the historian's individuation alongside history's *mnemotechnics* that organise the world which appear whenever memory is invoked.

Abandoned vessel near Kookynie, Western Australia (Photo: Stephen Loo)

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Refereed papers

Building Memory

Jeff Malpas

Introduction: architecture and ontology

What is the ontology of architecture? One way to understand this question is to take it as asking after the basic elements of architectural practice – the basic elements of design or construction. Yet the question of the ontology of architecture can be viewed in another way also, as directed at an understanding of the being of architecture, at uncovering its proper limits and grounds (see Malpas 2012a). It is in this latter sense that I wish to put the question here. Moreover, when taken in this sense, it seems there can be only one answer: more so than any other mode of human activity, architecture has its being in the human engagement with *place*, and more specifically, in the engagement with place as opened up through *building*. I say "place" rather than space, because it is place, as I note below, that is the more basic concept here. Moreover, in talking about architecture as founded in an engagement with place, I do not mean that architecture is simply to be understood as "place-making" – architecture is as much a *response* to place, a *conversation* with place, as it is a *making* of place.

Although the claim might surprise some, it seems to me that the question concerning the ontology of architecture is not often raised. Much contemporary reflection on architecture, when it goes beyond technical and professional concerns, remains at the level of architectural narrations that are more concerned with the deployment and elaboration of metaphorical and metonymic constructions than with the analysis of the ontological underpinnings to architectural practice. The proliferation of architectural discourse around notions of "criticality" (see e.g. Hays 1984), or "post-criticality" (see e.g. Somol & Whiting 2002, and Baird 2004), has little to do with ontology in either of the senses I have invoked here, being focussed instead on the political and discursive positioning of architecture. Such discourse may well be productive in a variety of ways, but it has little directly to do with any increased insight into matters ontological. The tendency that is exemplified here is not restricted to discussions of "criticality" and "post-criticality" alone. For the most part, and in spite of some notable exceptions, when contemporary architectural discourse extends beyond practical design concerns, it seems characterised by a preoccupation with contingent discursive and rhetorical formation, in particular a concern with architecture's own discursive self-formation and self-representation – especially as this is bound up with the character of modernity (what the German term *Neuzeit* understands as "the time of the new") – rather than with questions concerning architecture's enduring grounds or limits.

What happens when we turn back to the ontology of architecture, and especially when we try to understand architecture in terms of the engagement with place through building? What underpins this engagement and in what is it founded? It is my contention that any such inquiry must pay special attention to the connection of place, and hence also building, with *memory*. The connection of memory with place is not peripheral nor is it contingent. Place and memory are integrally connected such that one cannot understand one without reference to the other. Any inquiry into the ontology of architecture that attends to the character of architecture as an engagement with place must, therefore, give special attention to memory. Indeed, one might say that architecture cannot itself be understood unless its own connection to memory is acknowledged and articulated, and so the inquiry into the ontology of architecture must take the form of an inquiry into

the relation between memory and place. The argument that I will advance here can thus be simply stated: there is no place without memory; no memory without place; and since there is no architecture that is not engaged with place, neither is there architecture that is not engaged with memory. What matters, however, are the considerations that support and articulate this set of claims (as well as the consequences that follow from them), and the most important considerations concern the connection between memory and place, so let me begin there.

Memory and place – place and memory

There is a long tradition that connects place to memory. It is a connection famously exemplified in the *ars memorative* – the art of memory – and the associated "method of *loci*" according to which memory is enabled through the connecting of particular images or ideas to be remembered with specific locations (see Yates 1974). It is also a connection that appears in the work of many twentieth-century thinkers. In the work of Gaston Bachelard (1969), for instance, memory is explored as it is given in the intimacy of domestic places; in the writings of Walter Benjamin, memory appears in its embeddedness in the materiality of things, and especially in the materiality of the city, in its buildings and streets (see Malpas 2007). The exploration of memory is also central to the work of Marcel Proust (1995) and, more recently, W. G. Sebald (1998) – the one surely standing in an essential relation to the other, both as it arises in the form of public history and private recollection, and as it is formed in and through specific locations and locales from Combray to Paris, from Norfolk to Vienna. Yet although the connection of memory to place is clear in these thinkers and writers (and in the work of many others, including those working within what is now known as "material culture studies" – see for instance Hicks & Beaudry 2010), the exact nature of that connection, and whether it is a necessary or a contingent one, often remains much less clear. Moreover, in spite of the work of writers and thinkers like Proust, Sebald, Bachelard, Benjamin, and others, there is also a common tendency to assume that because memory is of the past, so memory is primarily a *temporal* phenomenon rather than having any connection to the *topographic*, that is, to place.

Even if memory were taken to have a special relation to time, still this would not itself imply the priority of that relation over the relation of memory to place. The reason is simple: time does not stand apart from place any more than does space. Indeed, both time and space, even while they may be opposed to one another, should both be understood as grounded in place, and perhaps even as abstractions from it (see Malpas 2012b). Nonetheless, the tendency to think of memory as primarily temporal is undoubtedly one of the factors that encourage a forgetfulness of the essentially topographical character of memory. This tendency is in turn underpinned by what I refer to as the "temporalist" prejudice within modern thought, according to which subjectivity is itself understood as essentially temporal in character (see Malpas 2010a & 2013). Temporality, and so also memory, is thus viewed as tied to the subjective interiority of human existence whilst spatiality is associated with objective exteriority. There is a much longer story to tell here, but if we retain the focus on memory alone, and especially on the idea that memory might be tied primarily to time rather than place, then even if we leave aside the complication that consists in the dependence of time on place, the prioritisation of the temporal still gives rise to a problematic conception of memory. Edward Casey makes the point that the focus on temporality leaves out the need for embodiment, and embodiment requires emplacement (2000: 182), but, more fundamentally, I would argue that, as memory is *meaningful* or *contentful*, so memory is only constituted through the embeddedness of the one who remembers in place, while

the necessary interdependence that obtains between self and place, coupled with the essential role of memory in the formation of the self, means that memory and place are thereby also brought into intimate relation (see Malpas 1999).

Put briefly, the argument at issue here is one that looks to the holistic constitution of meaning or content as this applies to memory no less than it does to beliefs, desires, actions and so forth. As meaningful or contentful memories are embedded within networks of memories and attitudes, so those networks are also embedded in, and inter-related with, the objects and entities in the world that cause them and that are also their objects. The very idea of meaning or content thus depends essentially on the connectedness of those who remember – and who also act, think, believe, and experience – to the world, and so to objects and entities in the world. On this basis one might say that the "mind" is itself externalised, and meaning and content have to be understood, not as given in some separate, "inner" realm, but only in the space of worldly engagement. Inasmuch as the self is constituted through the dynamic integration, even if always impartial and incomplete, of memories, beliefs, actions and the rest, so the self also turns out to be constituted through its worldly involvement – *who* and *what* we are is thus dependent on *where* we are. Memory cannot be prised away from the world any more than can the self, but more than this, memory is also given *in* the world, in the concrete materiality of things, since it is there that self and identity, meaning and content, are jointly constituted and articulated (see Malpas 2010b).

Memory is thus only to be found through the placed materiality of the world and this is equally true of both private and public memory. Understood more explicitly in relation to place, one can say that place is precisely that which gathers self, others, and things in a way that opens them both to the world and to each other. The placed materiality of memory that appears here has a number of consequences – although they are consequences that go against some established and taken-for-granted assumptions in many contemporary treatments of memory. First, memory is not "subjectively" determined nor does it belong to the "subject" alone. By this I mean that memory is not something that is to be understood as merely a product of subjective experience. Certainly memory is an essential element in our interior life, but it is not constituted only in terms of such interiority. Memory arises through our interactive engagement with the world in which we find ourselves – an involvement that does not come *after* the formation of the self, but is the very means *by which* the self is formed. In this respect we make ourselves through our engagement in the world, which implies also that we do not wholly make ourselves, since, as I indicated above, who and what we are is itself a function of the world in which we are engaged. Second, memory is not socially "constructed", in spite of the prevalence of such social constructivism in contemporary thought. Sometimes, of course, social constructivism entails no more than the idea that what is taken to be constructed in this way arises through a process that necessarily involves the "social" (almost all human activity depends upon language, and since language is intrinsically social, so one might say that almost all human activity is "constructed" socially because it is "constructed" linguistically – although here "construction" seems to be used as a synonym for "shaped through or in relation to". Such constructivism is relatively unproblematic. More often, however, social constructivism, and here we can include the supposedly socially constructed character of memory, involves the stronger idea that memory is *determined* by the social, that it is, in effect, a product of social forces alone. The difficulty, however, is that if the social constructs memory, it is equally true that memory constructs the social – that is, only in and through memory is sociality even possible. More broadly, and given the interconnection of memory with place,

one ought to say, not that memory is determined by either the subjective or the social (or the "intersubjective"), but rather that subjectivity and sociality (and also objectivity – see Malpas 1999) emerge only within the overarching structure of place. Place is just that within which self and the social are reciprocally constituted, and in which they are both constituted in essential relation to the materiality of the world.

Memory, one might say, begins in place, yet so too does place begin in memory. To be in place is already to remember. Place itself never appears other than as it is already taken up in memory, even if the memories that attach to any particular place are fragmentary, associative, or recent. Moreover only on the basis of memory are we oriented, and only as we are oriented are we placed. We thus find ourselves in the world, which means we only find ourselves at all, in and through memory, and although memory is itself only to be approached in and through place, we cannot approach place independently of memory either. It is as remembered that place first appears, and even the experience of place is always suffused with memory, shaped by memory, directed by memory. There is thus no place without memory; no memory without place (see Malpas 2013).

In an important and often overlooked sense, memory is always *nostalgic* – and so always *melancholic*. This is so, not in the sense that memory involves a desire to regain what cannot be regained (what is sometimes termed "restorative nostalgia"), but rather in the sense that memory always involves a sense of loss (hence the melancholia) – to remember is to attend to what is past, what is no longer present as it was, but if present still, is present in a different way. To attend to what is remembered is thus to attend to the dynamically unfolding character of place. The nostalgia that is associated with memory – and as genuinely nostalgic so it combines a sense of 'home' (for the loss at issue here is also a loss directly related to the self) together with the pain that comes from the inevitable estrangement from home – is thus an essential feature of human engagement in the world. It cannot be escaped any more than we can escape the world or ourselves (see Malpas 2012a). The nostalgic is that which marks the dynamic opening of the world in place in terms of both freedom *and* limit – and so too in terms of our own character as active beings and yet also as possessed of an existence that is finite and fragile. From an ethical perspective, it is here that the idea of responsibility has its essential origin.

Bachelard asserts, and Casey repeats the claim, that memories do not move (Casey 2000: 214-215). Yet even if this is so, memory is always at the beginning of movement, containing the possibility of movement within it. Casey argues that the supposed immobility of memory is given through its connection to place. Thus places *fix* memory (Casey 2000: 215). Yet as it is only in and through places that memories have form, so places are themselves given form only in and through memory. The idea that places fix memory seems to presuppose an asymmetry in which it is place that has determinacy and fixity. Yet neither memory nor place has a fixity that belongs to either of these alone – memory always carries multiple possibilities that accord with the multiple possibilities of the places memory opens up and in which memory is itself opened. This point is an important one, since it is often assumed that memory and place possess, if not a fixity, then a perduring character or even a determinacy that is alien to both. Precisely because of the relationality that characterises memory and place, as well as the self, none of these have an absolute determinacy either over time or at a time. Place, and memory and the self with it, are dynamic structures – neither we nor our memories are fixed in place like insects in amber, and places are not static structures that stand as the unmoving backdrops to our lives.

The latter is one reason to be wary of some appropriations of Heideggerian thought that emphasise the character of place as a source of authentic and enduring rootedness – if we do indeed look to Heidegger, we should attend to his own emphasis on the character of homecoming as always a return to the indeterminate and the questionable. This does not mean that there is nothing at issue in the idea that there is a human "need for roots", as Simone Weil put it (1971; see also Améry 1998), but only that this is a need that demands a more careful and complex examination than it is usually accorded. Moreover, although home is a place primarily characterised in terms of the possibility of rest and repose, of internality and intimacy, it is never wholly so – its "homely" character is never secure and may contain within it the very deepest melancholy. One might thus be led to claim that home is always "uncanny", but we have to be careful about what this is taken to mean. The "uncanny" has become such a common term with which to conjure the spirits of modernity – and perhaps nowhere more so than in relation to architecture – that the term is in danger of losing any real meaning. The "uncanny" is now used – as in Anthony Vidler's (1992) nevertheless intriguing discussion of "the modern unhomely" – to encompass a wide range of different, even if related, moods, attitudes, tropes, and dispositions. Moreover, not all of these are specific only to the modern – and here the tendency to view the modern as in some sense "exceptional" (as indeed "new") is indicative of the same disregard of ontological considerations as that to which I alluded above. Certainly the modern is different, but its difference has to be understood against the background of that which is constitutive of the possibility of historical existence as such. Inasmuch as "home" contains within itself the capacity for its own disruption *as* home, then this does not show that home is therefore "unhomely", but rather that home is indeed a mode of *place*, and as such, contains an essential indeterminacy and openness within it, even an essential fragility and tendency towards loss – home is never *just* home, just as no place remains utterly self-enclosed within its boundaries.

Memory is impossible without forgetting, just as the salience of place is impossible without its withdrawal. As the coming into salience of something within the space opened up in place is also for other things to withdraw into the background (a phenomenon familiar from phenomenological analysis as well as studies of sensory perception), so memory and forgetting are not separate, but two sides of the one process. To forget is to remember, and to remember is to forget. This is one reason why the idea of an "absolute" or "complete" memory in which there is no forgetting – the sort of "memory" that one finds exemplified and explored in Borges (1962), as well as Luria (1987) – is perhaps best understood, not as memory in any genuine sense at all, but rather as a distorted form of memory in which all that is left is a debilitating retentiveness that undermines the capacity for action and the sense of self.

No memory is completely private, because all memory is placed, and the placed character of memory means that every memory has some dimension that is accessible to others, even as it also has a dimension that resists such access. In part this reflects the fact that memories are related differently to different modes of human identity and narrative – to identity and narrative as personal and as collective. Memory is also given in ritual and event – it is performed – and the performance of memory connects modes of personal and collective life. We see this in forms of collective celebration – both those celebrations and festive occasions where we celebrate collectively as well as when we celebrate in the same or similar ways among family, with friends, or within other groups. Once again the performative character of memory relates directly to the dynamic and indeterminate character of place as well as memory, and so also, one might say, to the performativity

of built form. If place is not static, but dynamic, then neither is the built. Indeed, it is largely through the dynamic and performative character of place, memory, and building that these are bound together. The ontology that appears here is thus an essentially relational and dynamic one, and it is this ontology that belongs to place, to memory, to building, and to architecture. It is moreover an ontology that remains irrespective of whether or not it is recognised or represented. What grounds and limits existence is often just that which is forgotten, or even denied, within existence.

The memory of the built

This view of the relation between memory and place that I have sketched here is one that I have sometimes characterised as a form of "romantic materialism". It is *romantic* in that it holds that materiality appears as material only through being taken up in and through the meaningful and the remembered, whilst it is *materialist* in that it holds that meaning and memory are, in turn, given in the very materiality of things. If we turn back to architecture, and particularly to a consideration of the built form of the architectural (since my concern here is with the materiality of memory as given in and through place), then such "romantic materialism" suggests that we should think of buildings not as inert structures that stand apart from remembrance, from felt experience, sentiment, or affect, but as constituted *romantically* and *materially* at one and the same time. In terms of memory, buildings carry memory as an essential and inevitable part of what they are, and they do this in several ways.

The very sensory properties of built forms – their shapes, structures, and materials – have a memorial character. This is not only true of the sensory properties of buildings as they may be given visually (although this is certainly important), but also in terms of other modes of sensory presentation. The smell of a building, the touch of its surfaces and shapes, the acoustic properties of its spaces – all of these contribute to memory, but also serve as the carriers and triggers for remembrance. Sometimes the relation to memory may be direct – this particular angle of a wall, this juxtaposition of doorway and window, this fall of light, may immediately evoke a memory of our own. Sometimes the relation to memory may be via certain archetypal forms or schemas that are typically felt and recognised through generalised modes of bodily engagement and responsiveness. The complex interplay of memory in building, as well as the role of the body here, is given explicit recognition in Peter Zumthor's work and writing, so much so that, for Zumthor, architecture might be seen to be constituted in terms of bodily remembrance (see Zumthor 1999). (Zumthor is particularly attentive to the remembrance of certain archetypal forms, hollows, mounds, caves, platforms, nests and tents, as exemplified in the womb-like interior space of his recent Bruder Klaus Chapel.) Memory is given, not only in the felt or sensed qualities of a building – in the concrete qualities of its presencing – but also in its symbolic and semiotic elements, whether they belong to the particularities of site, orientation, ornament or style. In one sense, such elements are not strictly the material of memory – at least not insofar as they remain at the level of the abstract or generic – but since they are invariably embedded in, and evocative of, collective as well as personal history and remembrance, and so also given specific materiality, so they never stand wholly apart from the memorial, and from the shared understanding of forms and structures that are part of materialised cultural memory and tradition. Often the forms of memory that are at work here are so mundane and commonplace that they are readily overlooked – the remembered narratives that are encoded in the floor plan of a building and the arrangement of rooms within it or that differentiate different

aspects of a building's relation to the street play a basic role in the functioning of buildings and in our ability to engage with them. Memory is given too in the inscriptive and dynamic elements of building – in the effects of weathering, decay and renewal, of extension and re-use (see Leatherbarrow & Mostafavi 1993). The ruin, or the evocation of ruination, provides an extreme instance of this mode of presentation of the built as the concretisation of its own history, and so of the history of a place, as well as of building as itself the operation of the historical.

Built form is always *remembered* form. The opening up of place through building that occurs in the architectural engagement with place is thus also an opening up of memory. Consequently memory is itself formed in and through building. The infusing of building with memory and memory with building means that building is never just "objective", and never just "subjective" either – it always operates between the two and in the space in which both are themselves opened up. At the level of Australian domestic architecture, Richard Leplastrier's "Lovett Bay House" at Pittwater, New South Wales, built on the site of an earlier dwelling destroyed by wild fire, provides a striking illustration of a mode of architectural practice that consciously draws on memory, building memory into the forms it constructs, allowing memory to emerge in and through the site – and doing so on a multiplicity of levels (see Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 *Lovett Bay House, Richard Leplastrier.* [Photo: Leigh Woolley, 1998 – thanks to Richard Leplastrier for allowing the image to be reproduced.]

Here memory also means a memory of continuity of settlement – the memory of a belonging that is not and cannot be proprietorial. As Leplastrier writes:

> … the house continues a history of simple living on the site, which I suspect has continued for thousands of years: small shells that litter the place give testament to that fact. The form of the building is simple – its central core room restrains a broad cantilever roof that surrounds the building, the lack of columns allowing the line of the landscape to continue unbroken. Being inside the house is like sitting under a strong over-hanging tree. (Quoted in Lehtimaki & Neuvonen 2004: 18)

For all this, however, much of the contemporary practice of building, and of architecture, often remains enmeshed in a "presentism" that refuses memory as it

frequently ignores place. Such "presentism" can be discerned in a particular way in the material forms of many modern and contemporary buildings. If memory is given in and through sensory quality, which means through the materiality of things, a materiality that is always evident in surface, and depth of surface, then one of the features of many modern and contemporary buildings is their tendency towards the effacement or loss of such materiality and depth of surface. The use of glass is one of the ways this is sometimes manifest (although glass also has "surface effects" of its own), but it is evident too in the widespread use of a range of homogenous and homogenising materials, from colour-bonded steel and rendered finishes to pre-cast concrete panels. Often the use of such materials is driven by concerns of efficiency or cost, but sometimes their use is also the result of stylistic and aesthetic considerations that are indeed geared to certain conceptions of the modern and the new. Moreover, the loss of depth in surface materiality might also be seen to give a heightened emphasis to more formal properties of built structures, so that the building comes close to being itself almost an abstraction, an "idea", rather than a materialised "thing". Within modernist architecture, one can sometimes discern a tension between the tendency to prioritise such abstracted form in the built and a continued concern with material quality – even in the work of such a committed modernist as Mies van der Rohe who emphasises formal structure on the one hand and yet still makes use of marble and other materials with a high "depth of surface" on the other (although these comments only touch on a much larger set of issues that are relevant here – see especially Andrew Benjamin 2006).

Partly because of the tendency toward the loss of surface depth, and partly because of the associated tendency towards a certain form of abstraction, so contemporary buildings often seem designed to appear more as images of buildings than as the real buildings they nonetheless are - images of buildings that come from nowhere and belong to no-one. If such buildings evoke the uncanniness so often said to characterise the built forms of modernity, then this is largely because of the way in which they appear as their own doubles – refusing to allow that there is any building other than the one that is imagined or represented. As is the case with so much of modernity's own self-representation, the uncanniness that appears here is actually a form of forgetting – a forgetting that, in its more sophisticated forms, has become almost wilful, extolling its own forgetfulness as now a virtue.

The idea of the building as its own image, its own representation, or that its character as a building may be submerged in its imagistic or representational character, itself constitutes another form of architectural presentism – and here the architectural tendency to engage in 'story-telling' returns. There can be no doubt that story and memory are related – as are narrative and place – but there are stories and stories, and not every story secures or is secured by memory, just as not every story told about a place belongs to it. Many (although certainly not all) of the stories told about buildings and the designs that supposedly underpin them seem to depend on taking the built form as something other than it is – not as a concrete form that does indeed engage with a certain place, but rather as almost a piece of text, carrying a script that is to be read in one way and one way only. Understood thus, the building as "text" (or as "image") is no longer constituted by its materiality, but rather becomes that which determines its own materiality through being inscribed into it. It is thus that the materiality of so much built form recedes, in modernity, in the face of the primacy of the image, the text, the representation. There is indeed nothing outside the representational, and the representation has become the form of the architectural.

The dominance of what I have here called 'story-telling', but which is actually the dominance of a certain form of narrativist textualism or representationalism, and the problematic character of that dominance, should not be confused with the centrality of narrative form in meaning production in general. There could be no design, no building, no engagement with place, were it not for the narrative. Yet, to repeat: there are narratives and narratives. The centrality, even indispensability, of narrative does not licence any and every narrative or any and every narrative practice. The question to be asked of every narrative is the extent to which it is indeed embedded in that which it also aims to narrate – to what extent does the story belong to the material and the material to the story. In many cases, the connection at issue is tenuous at best, and the materiality of the built is lost in the narrated fabric with which it is clothed.

The materiality that is obscured or forgotten in so many architectural narrations is not only the materiality of the built as it evades any and every narrative (even as it also comes to appearance in and through narrative), but also the materiality of the built as it contains and sustains memory. In this respect, however, the fabricated narrative that has no genuine foundation in the material and concrete is unlikely itself to be remembered. There is something especially ironic here, since often the design intention that is encoded in a particular architectural narrative is one that it is usually expected will continue to shape the life of the building even after construction. In some cases, this can signify another form of architectural presentism in terms of the idea that a present narrative (regardless of the strength of its embeddedness in the materiality of a building) might be able to determine the future narratives, and so the future uses and meanings, accruing to a particular built form. Yet the only narrative that can reliably continue to have power in the life of a building is the narrative that the building itself remembers, that the building itself embodies and contains – the narrative that is given in the singular materiality of a specific built form and the place it occupies (a point that follows from the general character of the relation between creative intention and creative work – see Malpas 2011).

The ontology of building and the ethics of memory

The implication of memory with building concerns the very nature of building, as well as of the human. It provokes a number of questions. How, for instance, is one to build in a way that acknowledges the implication with memory? What memories and forms of memories pertain to different forms of building? What difference would it make to the built environment if memory were to become an explicit element in architectural thinking and making? These seem to me to be important questions even though they are not commonly asked or addressed. Just as much of my account here has remained at the level of a sketch rather than a fully realised study (and nowhere more so than when it comes to matters of architectural practice), so I have not the time or space to try to respond to these questions here – although some indication of the direction in which I might move should be evident by my comments above. There is, however, another matter that comes to the fore once one begins to take seriously the connection of place with memory, and of both with building as well as architecture: the matter, not only of ontology, but of ethics. As I use it here, ethics is not about some theory of the "good" or the "just". Instead it essentially concerns our attentiveness to the remembered place and the placed memory – our attentiveness to the placedness of the human and the human-ness of place. Once we understand the essential interconnection of the

concepts at issue here, and once we understand the materialised, placed character of human being, then the task of building, and of architectural design, becomes a task from which the ethical can never be excluded, and that is fundamentally tied to matters concerning the very formation of the human.

When we build we do indeed build memory, and every building carries memory within it. What this means, however, is that when we neglect the memorial character of building, and so the way memory must also enter into building construction and design, we neglect an essential element in what it is to build. We thereby misunderstand building, and we also misunderstand ourselves. The implication of the self in architectural practice is, of course, part of a larger hermeneutic structure of self-implication that characterises all modes of understanding, inquiry, and creation. Yet such self-implication takes on a particular form in architecture, since the working out of the self that occurs in architecture is also externalised and concretised – it is a reciprocal shaping of self and built form as that occurs in and through the engagement with place. Here is the real reason for the importance of the investigation into the ontology of architecture: that investigation cannot but force us back to an investigation of the properly human context of architectural practice, since that is what is at issue when we inquire into the character of architecture as an engagement with place. The engagement with place is also, by its very nature, an engagement with the human. The human dimension of architecture is something that the presentism of modern architectural theory and practice often effaces. That it does so is no accident, for the effacing of memory is indeed an effacing of the human. It is also, by the same token, an effacing of both ontology and of ethics.

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The Space of Collapse: A two-part terrain

Jane Madsen

Introduction

Taking as a starting point Heinrich von Kleist's empirical observation that an arch remains standing because the stones all want to collapse at the same time, this paper analyses ideas of collapse as history, architecture, material and concept. The image of collapse became a recurrent trope in Kleist's writing. After reading Kant's critical philosophy, Kleist made a traumatic transition from empirical to critical thinking. Following the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon, Kant concentrated on inquiry into natural phenomena; this was a decisive moment for the progression of his critical thinking effecting a transition from natural to critical philosophy. Focusing on the site of Portland in Dorset, United Kingdom, and the eighteenth-century ideas of geological mapping used to record it, I read the site as a demonstration of Kleist's notions of immanent and actual collapse. I argue that at Portland the material histories of place and the histories of material are traced on to constructed, empty spaces as a disrupted landscape of collapse. Occurring in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, these two terrains demonstrate collapse as material for modernist thought.

The first terrain

Kant and Kleist: Earthquake and architectures of collapse

> I was walking back to the city, lost in my own thoughts, through an arched gate. Why I asked myself, does this arch not collapse, since after all it has no support? It remains standing, I answered, *because all the stones tend to collapse at the same time*...[1]
>
> Heinrich von Kleist, Berlin November 16, 18, 1800 (1982: 76)

So Kleist wrote to his fiancé, Wilhelmine von Zenge, noting what he thought was an empirical as well as a metaphorical reflection about the optimism he felt early in their betrothal. In this compelling image of the immanently collapsing arch he inadvertently identified a trope that would recur in his writings: that of collapse. This observation by Kleist engenders the unsaid of architecture: that an arch as a technical, engineered, construction is collapse held in temporal abeyance—consequently his remark is provocative and transgressive. Kleist's seemingly empirical reflection holds in it the seeds of its own philosophical, metaphorical and material destruction. Kleist's concept of the immanently collapsing arch appears at a significant historical moment at the turn of the eighteenth century when Europe was riven by war and chaos. The arch is an object in time, it is possible to suggest that the unity of the system may ultimately fail, that it can collapse.

In *Earthquake in Chile* (*Das Erdbeben in Chili*) (1807), Kleist gives literary form to the terrain of collapse where architectural and temporal space is represented as destruction. The opening lines locate it in the real event of the 1647 earthquake in Santiago, Chile. However, the story drew on knowledge derived from accounts of the historical catastrophe of the earthquake in Lisbon sometime after 9 o'clock in the morning on All Saints Day, November 1, 1755. The epicentre was in the Atlantic west of Lisbon; recent seismologists calculate the scale close to magnitude

1 Emphasis in original.

nine. The earthquake, as well as the fires and tsunami that followed, left much of Lisbon and its harbour in ruins, and other places on the Atlantic coast of Portugal and Morocco were also badly affected.[2] There was considerable loss of life; an estimated ten to fifteen thousand perished from a population of about 275,000.[3] The earthquake had serious consequences for Portugal's economy, which was wealthy, but badly regulated and mainly reliant on gold from its colonies in Brazil. The Lisbon earthquake caused the certainties of the Enlightenment to fragment;[4] it was, after all, the destruction of a rich European capital.[5] As the largest natural disaster of the eighteenth century, this event has been described by Dynes as the first "modern disaster", because its outcome disrupted progressive thinking and, importantly, it provoked action by the state to organise disaster relief and reconstruction. (SVEC 2005: 34-39) The Lisbon earthquake, while not the cause of subsequent upheavals in Western Europe, was a substantial historical marker denoting the beginning of a period of uncertainty, disorder, physical, economic and social collapse lasting 60 years – the most far-reaching being the French revolution and Napoleonic wars, which ended in 1815, four years after Kleist's suicide. The best-known representation of the earthquake is Voltaire's *Candide* (1759). Kendrick suggests that *Candide* is a satire on the demise of the "optimistic" thinking advanced by Leibniz, which is characterised by Voltaire as "*tout est bien*" (1956: 119-141).[6] Additionally, the earthquake appeared in the work of "*Sturm und Drang*" writers Jakob Lenz and Johann Uz.

Shortly after making the arch observation, Kleist read Kant's critical writing and his faith in his understanding of the world collapsed. Some literary theorists have over-determined and personalised the link between this incident and the story *Earthquake in Chile*, confusing fiction and Kleist's state of being; for example, Frank states, "Kleist's Kant crisis was for him an intellectual and spiritual earthquake." (SVEC 2005: 268)[7] For Kleist, reading Kant's critical work was a thought-changing event causing great anguish and wretchedness. But to suggest that six years later when he wrote *Earthquake in Chile*, he was unable to integrate that new knowledge underestimates his application and insight into Kant's critical theories. Kleist's tormented transition between empirical and critical thinking became the foundation of his writing. By early 1756 Kant wrote three essays on earthquakes, applying practical scrutiny to observations by Lisbon survivors hypothesising the cause of the calamity.[8] Rather than his later critical work, it is likely Kant's earlier writings on natural phenomena led to the themes explored by Kleist.

Kant's earthquake essays consider the event only as natural philosophy and endeavour to amass scientific knowledge of earthquakes. Reinhardt and Oldroyd note Kant's opinion that in the voids under the earth and sea there was "a considerable amount of material – sulphur and iron – which could 'ferment' when acted upon by water, leading to subterranean conflagrations and upheaval of the Earth's crust" (1983: 249).[9] Kant proposed a chemical explanation. Reinhardt and Oldroyd conclude that while Kant's writings on earthquakes and vulcanism did not contribute much to the development of geological understanding, their importance rests in, "Kant's manner of thinking about nature in his early, pre-critical phase, evidencing his wish to formulate a 'universal natural history'" (1983: 252). The importance of identifying Kant's "pre-critical" thinking suggests the progress of hypotheses about nature was important for his development of autonomous reason. This early "pre-critical" writing has all the hallmarks of an empirical method, and represents a "scientific turn" (Larsen 2006: 362). Kant's intellectual progression from empirical observation to critique was not straightforward or unproblematic. This resonates with Kleist's trajectory after encountering Kant's 'critical' writing. Kant's essays may also be a source for the location of the story:

2 Further evidence that this was Kleist's source is Poirier (2006: 178) who notes there were not devastating fires or tsunami in Santiago in 1647, as there were in Lisbon.

3 Estimates of the fatalities vary wildly – some sources suggest 60,000-70,000 – but approx. 10, 000-15, 000 is generally agreed.

4 See Kendrick 1956; Braun & Radner 2005.

5 In 1755 Lisbon was the fourth largest city in Europe.

6 Frank notes Kendrick's 1956 discussion of *Candide* and the Lisbon earthquake. She notes further references connecting Kleist, Voltaire and Leibnitz by Bourke, Hamacher and Herrath, note 7 (SVEC 2005: 266).

7 Frank discusses analyses of the "Kant crisis" in her scholarly essay on *Earthquake in Chile* (SVEC 2005: 268-27, notes 15-21).

8 Published as: 1756 *Von den Ursachen der Erderschütten bei Gelegenheit de Ungücks, welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen hat* (AK1:417-27) ('Concerning the Causes of the Terrestrial Convulsions on the Occasion of the Disaster which afflicted the Western Countries of Europe towards the End of Last Year'), 1756 *Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der Merwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens* (AK1: 429-61) ('History and Natural Description of the Most Remarkable Occurrences associated with the Earthquake'), 1756 *Fortgesetzte Betractung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen Erdesschütterungen* (AK 1:463-72) ('Further Observation on the Terrestrial Convulsions which have been for Some Time Observed').

9 This idea is advanced by other scientists: see, for example, Nicholas Lémery.

Chile was specifically *not* Lisbon; and therefore perhaps a means for Kleist distancing himself from previous representations, such as *Candide*. For example, Kant says "Peru and Chile are more subject to frequent quakings than all the other countries in the world." (1983: 255) Curiously, proliferation of these rapidly published personal experiences of the Lisbon earthquake did not manifest into a long-lasting collective memory of this catastrophe. The position of the 1755 Lisbon disaster in the annals of cultural history may have been displaced by the 1748 (re-) discoveries of Pompeii and Herculaneum. While more than a millennium aestheticised ancient collapse, the contemporary disaster was too close and tangible to be enshrined in the shared narratives of the time.

For Kleist, there is no special interest in contemplating the ruin as an aestheticised architectural space, but in his writing there is a deep and mordant interest in the ruination of his characters. *Earthquake in Chile* is a grim and violent tale of cruelty, arbitrary disaster and revenge; collapse occurs as an earthquake levels a capital city; and is mirrored in the disorder of social breakdown. Representations of space, place, and displacement, and the disruption of social order are repeating themes for Kleist. In *Earthquake in Chile*, architecture is spatial and political—something that can confine, conceal and be destroyed. In Kleist's writing style a relentless matter-of-factness drives the narrative: there is no concern for inner states of being. The first sentence opens:

> In Santiago, the capital of the Kingdom of Chile, at the moment of the great earthquake of 1647 in which many thousands lost their lives, a young Spaniard called Jerónimo Rugera was standing beside one of the pillars in the prison to which he had been committed on a criminal charge and was about to hang himself. (1983: 51)

When Jerónimo gives up hope and contemplates suicide, a space is created into which imminence the earthquake strikes. Notably, Kleist's first paragraph parallels the opening statements of Kant's first earthquake essay, which speaks of the precariousness of architecture: "We dwell peacefully on ground the foundations of which are battered from time to time. We build unconcernedly on vaults whose pillars sometimes sway and threaten to collapse." (Reinhardt & Oldroyd 1983: 253) Kant's hypotheses on the cause of earthquakes are based on the instability of subterranean materials leading to the possibility of collapse, and similarly as the foundation is uncertain, architecture may also be unstable.

In the story, Jerónimo's predicament occurred as tutor to Doña Josefa, the only daughter of the richest nobleman in the city. He was accused of becoming too close to her and dismissed; she then is forced into a convent, where a chance encounter in the garden allows the lovers to consummate their liaison. Subsequently Josefa has a baby, causing "an extraordinary public stir" (1983: 51). The Archbishop insists they are tried and they are condemned to death. The narrative is spatial and architectural: the father's house, the convent, the cathedral and the prison. These buildings *are* the family, the church and the law. Kleist demonstrates the prurient interest in an aristocratic execution: "In the streets through which the culprit was to be led to her execution the windows were rented, the roofs of the houses were partly dismantled." (1983: 52) The earthquake destroys this morbid and grotesque spectacle. Meanwhile, Jerónimo's desperation is delineated by the insurmountable architecture of his confinement: locks, bars, and walls. He hears the bell toll for Josefa's execution. Time is desperately poised between immanence and advancement, "when suddenly, with a crash as if the very firmament had shattered,

the greater part of the city collapsed, burying every living thing beneath its ruins" (1983: 52). The moment of the earthquake inverts Jerónimo's circumstances from certain death to seizing life:

> ... great cracks appeared in the walls all round him, the whole edifice toppled towards the street and would have crashed down in to it had not its slow fall been met by that of the house opposite, and only the arch thus formed by chance prevented its complete destruction. (1983: 53)

This is simultaneously experienced and observed by the horror-struck Jerónimo as he witnesses the progression of the collapse of the prison: the frightful circumstance of the earthquake has made time stand still. The "arch formed" by the random disaster creates a threshold through which Jerónimo survives and escapes, demonstrating how architecture can be remade by the cataclysm of collapse.

Earthquakes in cities, towns or villages are massive architectural events. Kleist has depicted the consequences of an earthquake on a city and its inhabitants with considerable understanding, which could only come from reading first-hand accounts by survivors. Kleist describes the kind of death and destruction occurring with earthquake, where crushing, entrapment, burning and drowning, cause most of the casualties - circumstances well documented in Lisbon in 1755. Kleist identifies the concept of separate tremors[10] within the earthquake and these become temporal spaces momentarily inhabited by the narrative. Jerónimo darts and weaves through the collapsing Santiago, which is represented as an architecture in turmoil. In the moments following the earthquake, Kleist changes time from the linear movement of the tolling bell, to one of simultaneity. Returning to Kleist's observation concerning the arch which "remains standing ... *because all the stones tend to collapse at the same time*" (1982: 76) the earthquake has caused the city to behave as if it were the arch collapsing, where collapse occurs "*at the same time*". In his essay on the Lisbon earthquake Benjamin quotes an English survivor:

> There was a shattering noise, as if all the buildings in town were collapsing at the same time ... I truly thought my last moment had arrived, for the walls were bursting apart and great stones were falling out of the joints – all the beams seemed to be supported by thin air. (1999: 539)

These comments parallel Kleist's description. In a contemporary German engraving depicting the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 (Fig.1) the background shows the effect of the earthquake on architecture; buildings are without roofs, and among the tidy debris the striking and repeated visual motif is that of the arch shown as both an architectural survivor of the destruction, and as the strange image of half-arches in the air in a state of partial collapse.

Jerónimo reaches the rural outskirts, faints in exhaustion, regains consciousness, and sees Josefa who has escaped execution and rescued their baby from the convent: "She was just about to embrace the Abbess when the latter was ignominiously struck dead by a falling gable, together with nearly all her nuns." (1983: 56) The death of both the merciful Abbess and the Archbishop who condemned them to death, highlights the contradiction that good and bad are killed by the earthquake. The fact that in Lisbon casualties occurred while congregations were worshipping on All Saints Day in 1755 caused consternation for the church, which avowed that the earthquake was God's retribution on a godless city. Following the earthquake, the surviving populace fled the city *en masse*. Kendrick notes that

10 Kant did not deduce the concept of separate shocks from his analysis of Lisbon survivors' accounts.

there was a “desperate scramble to get out of Lisbon by frightened mobs of hysterical people, clutching crucifixes and images of saints, and bits and pieces of belongings, all trying to reach open country” (1956: 36-37). Outside Lisbon, people lived for many months in tents and huts, too frightened to dwell in anything more substantial: the open country offered a sense of safety from precarious architecture. Even the royal family were not exempt from this abject fear, they evacuated into tents for nine months, subsequently moving into a large wooden lodging, itself another provisional structure. In *The Ruin of Lisbon* 1755 (Fig.1) the foreground shows the establishment of a tightly-packed makeshift tent city. Survivors are carrying large bundles to the tents, families are in various states of activity or immobility, people with arms raised are imploring heaven, and one woman is caught as she falls in a faint; in the upper left background of the engraving figures are shown still escaping the devastated city.

Fig. 1 *The Ruins of Lisbon* (1755) German copperplate engraving, artist unknown. [Source: National Information Service of Earthquake Engineering (NISEE), University of California, Berkeley]

While sheltering in the forest, the lovers meet an aristocratic acquaintance of Josefa’s and are taken into Don Fernando’s family. Following the earthquake they hope there might be a “spirit of reconciliation” (1983: 59). At a Mass in the only church left standing, the canon decries the prior “outrage” in the convent garden, declaring the sinners’ souls should be consigned to hell, “pointing to a crack in the wall of the cathedral, he called yesterday’s earthquake a mere foretaste of doom” (1983: 63). The cracked cathedral presages disaster for the church; the damage is architectural and political. The priests stand by as the congregation becomes a vengeful, frenzied mob—Jerónimo's father identifies and kills him, Josefa is slain by her family's cobbler who persists until he “seized one of the infants by its legs after whirling round in the air above his head, dashed it against the edge of one of the pillars of the church” (1983: 67). Thus the deaths of Jerónimo, Josefa, their friends, and mistakenly, the child of Don Fernando are absorbed into the fabric of the church. In this murderous outcome to *Earthquake in Chile*, Kleist identifies the Catholic Church as a social order that can itself collapse. Within days of the earthquake in Lisbon, in order to establish power over a frenzied populace, and to prevent opportunistic looting, the state executed as many as 35 people (Kendrick 1956: 50). A grim demonstration of this can be seen in the middle ground of the *The Ruin of Lisbon* (Fig. 1) where two figures are shown being strung up on a gibbet.

In his 1763 essay, 'The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God' Kant again refers to earthquakes, emphasising:

> ... the wickedness of a city has no effect upon the fires concealed within the bowels of the earth ... the event in question was a misfortune, not a punishment: man's moral conduct cannot be a cause of earthquakes according to a natural law, for there is no connection here between the cause and the effect. (1992: 147)

In *Earthquake in Chile*, Kleist follows Kant's logic, demonstrating that the lovers are not really wicked, do not deserve to be punished by the church, that their moral laxity is not to blame for the earthquake. The random collapse of Santiago created provisional architectures made by the earthquake and, briefly, the disaster provided the protagonists with a means of escaping their fate. The lovers grasp on to life, only to die in the collapse of the society itself. At the centre of this catastrophe Kleist creates a paradox: at the very moment of the collapse of the prison walls an arch is created, and instead of falling down, a structure and a space is made. By considering the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, Kant's earthquake essays and Kleist's story together, the destruction of foundations of thought and space can be linked to the material disruption of collapse.

The second terrain

Portland: material, landscape, collapse

In the second and most substantial of the 1756 earthquake essays Kant clarifies his concern with the material ground affected by earthquake: "We know pretty completely the surface of the earth, when the ampliation* is concerned. But we have under our feet a world still, with which we at present are but little acquainted." (1799: 96)[11]

The question as to what lay beneath has parallels with emerging theories of the earth in the seventeenth century[12] which were revived by the Lisbon earthquake. Kant identifies the limits of knowledge about what exists at a deeper structural and material level. Concurrently, these inquiries began to focus on the substance of the earth. James Hutton (1726-1797) published his first geological observations in 1785, *Theory of the Earth,* identifying geological time by suggesting layers were incrementally formed over vast periods; later geological thinking took a different turn with Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), who proposed the idea of extinction after comparing the anatomy of living and fossilised vertebrates. The cultural context in which Cuvier advanced his hypothesis of "catastrophism" in *Essay on the Theory of the Earth* (1812), lay in the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake and the contemporary turmoil in France. An adherent of Cuvier's catastrophism, William Smith, a West Country surveyor excavating canals, noticed that the layers of fossils in stone could identify strata, and lead to the first geological map of Britain. The fossil material in Jurassic limestone from the Dorset coast was key to his project. Smith's 1815 geological map was the first of its kind; by mapping strata, he charted volume rather than surface and consequently, he mapped space and time.

Portland, on the Dorset coast, is a landscape of disruption, a site made by architecture's uses, and as such demonstrates images of collapse in space, time,

11 Translator's note: Enlargement of knowledge, in contradistinction to exactness; extension opposed to intension. (1799: 96)

12 Kant wasn't proposing a theory of the earth as advanced in the seventeenth century. See Burnet 1635-1715; Leibniz *Protogaea* 1693; Hooke's second lecture series 1667–1668; Oldroyd 2006: 25, 30, 36.

material and topography. Portland's landscape materialises Kleist's vision of collapse. Malpas and Thiel identify the spaces and boundaries of Kantian geography: "The manner in which Kant characterizes the idea of boundary invokes the geographical ... but Kant's characterization is also explicitly topographical inasmuch as the idea of boundary is directly connected with the idea of a location or place." (2011: 198)

The volumes of fossils that comprise Portland stone are also boundaries of chthonian histories, dead creatures falling to the bottom of a warm sea as life collapses in time. Recurrent costal landslips exposed the strata of Portland's Jurassic limestone, showing its potential as architectural material. Four centuries of quarrying have left Portland scarred by dislocation and absence. Portland's landscape has been created by the removal of its stone: it is a built environment made from the voids left by quarrying. This site has been studied as an unstable space of collapse giving material, architectural, historical and literary representations of these eighteenth-century ideas suggested by Kleist and Kant.

Fig. 2 *Portland : London*
(Cheyne Weare/Greenwich Hospital)
[Photos: author, 2011]

> ... he sometimes cast his eye across the Thames to the wharves on the south side, and to that particular one whereat his father's tons of freestone were daily landed from the ketches of the south coast. He could occasionally discern the white blocks lying there, vast cubes so persistently nibbled by his parent from his island rock in the English Channel that it seemed as if in time it would be nibbled all away (1997: 41).

In *The Well-Beloved* (1897), Thomas Hardy describes stone arriving from his fictional Portland, 'Isle of Slingers'. Hardy captures the incremental disappearance and shrinkage of the island, as the stone is carted away piece by piece the island may collapse in on itself, buried under leftover rubble, becoming its own cenotaph. Portland is characterised as an uncertain place, always changing as another absence is made. Portland has been a working, industrial site since the late seventeenth century, pre-dating the Industrial Revolution; the quarrymen have worked to provide stone for the architect, artist and artisan. The spaces left behind by quarrying are a reminder that taking material in order to build or fabricate is in itself not only an act of construction but also the generation of surplus.

A distinctive feature of Portland's landscape is the collapsed material from the cliffs, called "weares". Brunsden et al noted that "27% of Portland is affected by landslips (*c.* 317 ha out of a total area of *c.*1130 ha) this includes most of the coastal fringe", adding that there have been 72 landslips since the earliest recorded landslip in 1615. Their study points out that Portland's coast has the greatest number of landslides in Britain (1996: 214). Distinct horizontal sedimentary layers with vertical joints characterise limestone; this is both advantageous and dangerous for

quarrying, as the joints can facilitate the removal of stone, but are also unstable. A proportion of existing buildings on the island have structural problems. Brunsden et al outline how the geomorphology of Portland further adds to the propensity for the joints or "gullies" in the limestone to enlarge and weaken, causing coastal collapse. This geology of landslip links with Paul Carter's thoughts on the study of coasts:

> The coast was primarily conceived as an arena of intellectual inquiry; in this form it was the line that enabled the scientist to draw other lines.... Its very disarray, the mimic resemblance of its productions to the specimens arranged in a *cabinet de curiosités* ... suggested a museum in the making. (2002: 132)

Carter creates an evocative picture of the relationship of science to the delineation of coasts as both real and abstract, suggesting that coasts, as edges under constant battering by the sea, elude fixity. Portland as a site is contradictory: an island that is not an island, there is a paradox in the durability of the stone against the instability of the cliffs. Portland is a terrain of scars; quarrying has irretrievably changed the topography of the island. The term "weares" also applies to layers of debris at the quarries, and used as partial infill across the island. The "weares" look as though something has collapsed, that disaster has occurred, like a battlefield; but the "weares" are also constructed, the abandoned rubble making unintended, random sculptures, abstract arrangements from the piles of stone.

Architects chose Portland stone for its durability as a fine-grained oolitic limestone. Inigo Jones chose Portland stone to stand in for the whiteness of classicism, whereas Christopher Wren used it for its intrinsic qualities. A series of significant historical disasters accelerated the wholesale requisition of Portland stone: best known is the reconstruction after the Great Fire of London in 1666. Using Portland stone as the primary material, Wren rebuilt more than 50 churches, as well as St Paul's Cathedral completed in 1710. A large coastal landslide in 1636 made the stone workable from Portland's northeast cliff and Wren took six million tons of stone for the rebuilding of London. Less acknowledged is the use of Portland stone for war memorials following the First and Second World Wars; it was the principal material for gravestones and memorials for the missing dead because it was reliable, cheap, and—importantly—British. The process of quarrying created a series of double absences: where quarries were constructed absences and the use of stone for architecture and memorials was a manifestation of absence made material. In order to commemorate the absent body, absence was created by the removal of the stone. Distributed in foreign fields around the world, there are between 700,000 and 800,000 grave markers of Portland stone.

Fig. 3 *Portland : London* (Independent Quarry/St Pauls Cathedral) [Photos: author 2011]

The landscape of the quarries is a built environment constructed from the voids of absent stone: it is the negative space of architecture, but there are no architects or builders present in their construction. The walls of the quarries—scarred by drills, cutters and saws—show the history of quarrying, and the geological strata exposed evoke the levels of a building. At the abandoned and working quarries space is a remainder: a history, it is both the absent material and the material absence and, as such, space becomes something; at the quarries space is *made*. This slightly diverges from Kant:

> One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them. (1998: 158)

And rather than the immanence of "appearances" an image is suggested here from the "possibility" of absences. Kant suggests that space is the outward appearance of possibility, of something impending, that in the future something might come into being; however, this does not necessarily have to be an actual form, though this is not absolutely ruled out. The sheer scale of the space left behind compels the viewer of the quarry to re-imagine the stone that has been taken, to re-build the landscape out of the absent blocks of free stone, looking into these big, dusty voids and debris it is possible to generate images of architecture over the emptiness, to make images and objects in the spaces of the quarries and to trace in the absent blocks of stone.



Fig. 4 *Portland: London* (Independent Quarry/Waterloo Bridge) [Photos: author 2011]

Conclusion

The theme of collapse suggests a premise for tracing a route towards modernist thought. Kleist's observation that an arch is only held in place because all the stones want to collapse at the same time is a compelling image—that the arch only stands because it wants to collapse. For Kleist collapse also came about by reading Kant's critical writing and the loss of the certainty of empirical observation. In *Earthquake in Chile*, Kleist turned to the historical event of the disastrous 1755 Lisbon earthquake, using this source to represent disruption and collapse of architecture and social order. Kant's response to the earthquake was a defining moment and contributed to the foundation of his critical thinking. The Lisbon earthquake revived research questioning what is beneath the earth's surface and why it may fail—leading to critical developments in geology and the history of science. Focussing on the site of Portland as one of convergent histories of architecture, geology,

and material in the eighteenth century, I argued that this disrupted landscape demonstrates Kleist's notion of immanent and actual collapse. In the histories of the fragmentation and reconfiguration of European thought at the end of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, Kleist's image of collapse generates a recognisable image of modernity.

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Being (in the Midst of) Two: Interstice and deconstitution in cinema and architecture

Michael Tawa

Woodland Crematorium, Stockholm (Asplund and Lewerentz 1935-1940)/Maldives
[All photographs are by the author]

Not knowing the way out or the way in, wonder dwells in a between, between the most usual, beings, and their unusualness, their 'is.' It is wonder that first liberates this between as the between and separates it out. Wonder–understood transitively–brings forth the showing of what is most usual in its unusualness. Not knowing the way out or the way in, between the usual and the unusual, is not helplessness, for wonder as such does not desire help but instead precisely opens up this between, which is impervious to any entrance or escape, and must constantly occupy it. (Heidegger 1994: 145)

We are human beings because we are outbound (*en partance*), disposed towards a departure about which we can and must know that no definitive arrival is possible or promised. It is in this impulse (*élan*), in the obligation of departure, since we cannot do otherwise, and in this risk-taking (*prise du risque*), in the wager of departure, that we can live a life worth living. (Nancy 2011: 29-30)

Interval

Sydney/Rajasthan

The story I wish to put to you today is simple. I would like to begin with the beginning of architecture, which is also the beginning of the possibility of life–that is, the *interval* which makes space and time possible, which gives us room to be and to breathe. I want to extend this sense of the interval into a common trope, commonly misconstrued–that is, *duality*, the duality between the interval and the walls it spaces-out: in other words, the duality between the limit and the limited, or in architectural terms, between inside and outside, private and public. I would like to suggest that this duality does not logically, factually or existentially exist.

Duality arises from the incapacity to hold two conditions simultaneously–light and dark, for example, grief and humour, or self and other. As such it arises when time is conceived diachronically or chronologically as a succession of instants. Classical narrative, whether cinematic or spatial/architectural, is founded on the disassociation, in sequential time and linear space, of what is in reality coincident and synchronic. If duality is recast as a condition of *being-two*, that is of being-simultaneously-dual–private and public, inside and outside, on screen and off screen, now and then, here and there, virtual and actual–then what first appears ambiguous in its oppositional indeterminacy turns out, for a moment, to eclipse the antinomical in favour of something more complex, indistinguishably interfolded or inwardly-concatenated.

Beings and worlds are folded, woven or felted out of beings within beings, worlds within worlds, scales within scales and rhythms within rhythms. As such they are states of what Gilbert Simondon called "surfused" or "supersaturated metastability" that take their fabric (psychosomatic, filmic, tectonic) to a threshold of *crisis* at which two things happen: the fabric reaches a limit of compaction or intensity and it begins to dilate and unravel (Simondon 2007: 16). This unraveling produces a new state or emergent condition that could not have been planned or predicted. The function of a work (a text, a film, a building) is to frame and provide situations in which such emergence is enabled. Such framing and providing is a matter of care or solicitude. It is properly speaking a technics, a manner of doing something and the know-how that attends to it, a *mnemotechnics* that is also *mnemoethics*–a watching and waiting, being-with and being-for that solicits the coming-into-presence of something: a mood, an atmosphere, an emotion, an insight, an exchange, an idea, a project, a melody, a word, a phrase, an expression, a recollection, a person, a place. This is what any work (text, film, building) is made-*for*.

Entr'acte: *in medias res* (in the midst of things)

Woodland Chapel (Asplund 1918-1920)/ Mosque, Cordoba (7-10thC)]

Jean-Luc Godard's thinking of the *entr'acte*, of cinema as the interstitial transition between shots and scenes, situates the cinematographic work as a process of joining images and their traces–that is, as a properly technological (*techne*) concern (Tawa 2010: 136, 165-7, 290-3). Greek *techne* is equivalent to Latin *ars*, and means to

connect, to articulate, to weave, to create a nexus–all of which are tactics constitutive of a technics; a *taxis* that refers as much to tectonic assemblage as it does to the tact of an ethical and the tactility of an oneiric practice. This in-between, interstitial site of *praxis* is neither void nor neutral. It is a terrain with a topography that can be charted and investigated. The milieu is not an intermediate terrain vague, an empty pause or chasm–it is itself a world, or a whorl of worlds within worlds. The mythological tradition is full of such *intermittent* middle-places–*Midgard* (middle-yard/enclosure), *Mittelerde* (middle-earth) and Greek *oikomene* (ecumene, household economy) all refer to the intermediate world of human existence, poised between giants and dwarfs, gods and demons, heaven and hell. The interstice, or the gape at the core of every junction, is what makes possible the strength of a connection, the capacity of a space and the rotation of a wheel. Yet the gap is also a site of deconstruction. Deconstitution or deconstruction is fundamentally a process that takes place at the *joints*–where analysis loosens (Latin: *ana-lusis* = to loosen apart) and liquidates the knots that constitute an assemblage. The shuttle has the same function in weaving. It moves in the gaps and interstices of warp and weft, infiltrates the hollows and fuses or names-together-across (*diakrinomen*) warp and weft into an interconnected network to weave (*sumploxe*) the fabric. The nexus is therefore a site of both strength and weakness–a pivot of assemblage and disassemblage, construction and destruction, creation and catastrophe.

Whorls of worlds

The Mirror (Tarkovski, 1979) [All drawings from the film are by the author]

I would like to interpret a sequence from Andrei Tarkovsky's *The Mirror* (1979) in line with the main narrative I am relaying, proceeding from the deconstitution of the subject, of space and time through intensification and crisis to emergence and solicitude.[1] By a systematic concatenation of interstitial discontinuities, Tarkovsky builds up and conjugates a series of images that function like resonant metaphors. The film achieves such an intensity of overlay that the coordinates and logics of space and time become undecidable and fold into complex worlds within worlds. Simultaneously, the compaction of images and metaphors, paralleling an overlap of reminiscences for the narrator, densify the semantic materiality of the image to such a degree that its consistency begins to develops fault lines, to falter and threaten collapses. In this extraordinary sequence, the narrator remembers himself as a child before his mother's dressing table mirror. As he looks into it, the scene shifts to the past and to his young mother washing her hair, framed within a dark space glistening with reflections from oil-black walls, wet skin, clothing and mirrors dissimulated into the background. As she stands, dripping, the entire room begins to weep water from all surfaces and collapse. The scene then shifts to a dark room, presumably the same room at a later time, in which the author's now elderly mother approaches the glass. The mirror doubles a window set alongside it,

1 The autobiographical and political registers of the film have been much commented on, as has its concern for aligning Tarkovsky's personal reminiscences and poetic reflections with specific instances of Russian history. See Dunne (2008), Le Fanu (1987), Jónsson and Óttarsson (2006). Here I limit myself to the primary sources of the film and Tarkovsky's own text to frame a reading of the film's existential and compositional dimensions and show how its tectonic and material qualities are used to foreground the role of the interstice and discrepancy in the operation of memory and recollection (see Tarkovsky 2006). My focus precludes literature that deals with other aspects of Tarkovsky's work—for example his concern with space and temporality, evidenced notably in *The Mirror*, *Stalker* (1979) and *The Sacrifice* (1986) by tracking shots through enfilades of architectural interiors which double with the interiority of his subjects; by a concern for the relationship between the spaces and objects that furnish human dwelling and "absorb" its traces; or by the deterioration of world and subject leaving behind apocalyptic conditions of subsistence. See for example the extended treatment of Tarkovsky's use of tracking shots in Martin (2011), and "spatio-temporal lapse" and discontinuity across Tarkovsky's work as described by Skakov (2011).

suggesting a black night outside. It is unframed and so does not read as an opening in a wall like the window beside it, but as pure surface and pure aperture.



The mirror's position in the room is ambiguous and it appears suspended in space rather than fixed to the wall. Its transparent immateriality reflects multiple overlaid images–a painted twilight landscape of clouds, earth or sea, tree and open fire; reflections of a ceiling cornice and floral wallpaper patterns in the room behind; images of the remaining cornice and wallpaper behind its surface; a floating plane like a table that reinforces the threshold; reflections of the arched window and the mother nearing the mirror's surface, as if from its other side. She raises her hand and places it on the glass. This gesture not only validates but also produces the duality of the two sides and the filmic boundary that separates them. She looks into the mirror as if questioning the materiality of its surface, as if it were on the verge of yielding and giving access to the multiple spatialities and temporalities of memory. The surface of a mirror operates in several ways, but always as a cipher of cinema itself. It is a filmic screen onto which images are projected–but from both directions–and exchanged into both of the spaces that front onto its surface. It is a frame which delimits and veils compossible worlds; a translucent doorway connecting places and times; an apparatus of memory, recollection and projection and a surface of monstration.

The collapse of the room marks a crisis in the concrete reality and existential milieu of the scene. The actual time of the sequence is left ambiguous since multiple temporalities are simultaneously fielded. There is clearly a looking back to the author's childhood in the early scenes. The old mother might herself be looking back, looking forward, returning from the dead or returning to meet her younger self. The question is less a matter of conveying chronological accuracy than of showing the circulation of real and imagined, actual and virtual, remembered and projected places, times and events within a single setting made possible by and within this interstitial rupture. The implausibility of the event amplifies this condition of crisis, enabling the images to convey more *realistically* what an experience of this rupture might feel like. It is not only the room that collapses but also the spatial, temporal and subjective coordinates of concrete existence. The moment triggers a disorientation in the subject and an avalanche of images which had welled up, to only now break through the resistance of forgetfulness–just as water violates the architectural skin and takes with it all guarantee of stability, shelter and safety. The sequence works metaphorically to convey, through a monstrous architectural catastrophe, the exposure of consciousness to a surfeit of the repressed memory and potentiality of the subject.

Maldives/Sydney

These instances parallel a constitutive condition of remembering and a defining characteristic of the apparatus of memory: that remembering and memorialisation–or monumentalisation, since the idea is cognate–is not a matter of attaining or evidencing accurate or even adequate reminiscence. Rather, it is fundamentally about making a place for the difficulty and impossibility of remembering; a space in which we can be with memory as it fades and withdraws or evades our grasp, and yet remains *just there*, on the tip of the tongue; an experience of that moment betwixt remembrance and forgetfulness when a memory withdraws into oblivion at the same time as it presents itself with the highest certainty of delineation. Memory is poised on forgetting and remembrance is in fact the iterative, rhythmic play between appearance and disappearance, recollection and oblivion, presence and absence. This is why the proper field and operation of memory is not conditioned by the antinomy of light and dark, but by *the gloaming*–an ambiguous and precarious, interstitial condition or shade of darkness wherein delineations fluctuate and become indeterminate. The experience might be like awaking from a dream that, at the same time as it is present to us as sharp recollection, fades and withdraws into uncertainty. Each time we try to remember, the narrative is dismantled into incoherence. Or the experience might parallel one's presence and attentiveness to the systematic withdrawal of another in death; of one who is palpably present and with us while simultaneously fading and absenting themselves. Such moments require delicacy and care. They call for a kind of disengaged solicitude that watches, wakes and waits; that cultivates a countenance of being-with and being-for whatever eventuates. This is the ethical power of the interstice that architecture remains to confront.

To accommodate or furnish a space for this calls for a technics of resistance where the materiality of the field we happen to be working (in)–light, time and narrative for cinema, space, time and materiality for architecture; or the gravity of thought and the weight of words for language–plays an impressive, constitutive and formal role. I wish to make the point that the workings of memory are not virtual or insubstantial. They are deeply and intricately material, even as the traces they leave seem evanescent. As Lyotard notes, after Bergson, "mind is matter that remembers" its origins, interactions, transactions and immanence (1992: 40)–a reading supported by the common linguistic basis of an extensive lexicon: human, man, mind, mnemonic, memory, memorial, monument, moon, month, measure, metre, matter and mother, through the etymons *MEN = to think and *MA/ME = to measure, weigh up, consider, reflect.



Bullring, Ronda/Kangaroo Island

That is to say human being is fundamentally *mnemonic* and recollective (Greek: *anamnesis* = without-forgetting). Photography and film might be the preeminent arts of recollection, but cinema differs in that it shows the traces of memory passing, it shows the process of their withdrawal and erasure into oblivion. With cinema we witness time and all that it conditions pass us by and depart from us–personalities, families, communities, peoples, narratives, histories, landscapes, creatures, emotions, melodies, airs, tones, rhythms, beats, ideas, theories, phrases, words, voices, whispers. These all have material being and they affect and impress us materially. Consequently we are ourselves *mnemotechnical*. To use Bernard Stiegler's phrasing, we are "retentional apparatuses" that register and record the passage of what has passed us by (2008: 122-3). We are archives and museums, laboratories and studios of recreation and renewal. Since architecture is fundamentally a technical undertaking, its key function must be to operate as a mnemotechnical apparatus or infrastructure which tracks, frames and unclenches traces and recollections–of self, of place, of moments, of encounters. How might architecture do this?

Following his assertion that the proper concern of cinema is not to "realistically" convey the factuality of events but to capture their "reality", Tarkovsky makes a telling observation about the way imagination, dreams and recollections can be conveyed in cinema:

> How is it possible to reproduce what a person sees within himself, all his dreams, both sleeping and waking? ... It is possible, provided that dreams on the screen are made up of exactly these same observed, natural forms of life. Sometimes directors shoot at high speed, or through a misty veil ... But that mysterious blurring is not the way to achieve a true filmic impression of dreams or memories. The cinema is not, and must not be, concerned with borrowing effects from the theatre. What then is needed? First of all we need to know what sort of dream our hero had. We need to know the actual material facts of the dream; to see all the elements of reality which were refracted in that layer of the consciousness which kept vigil thorough the night ... And we need to convey all of that on screen precisely, not misting it over and not using elaborate devices. Again, if I were asked, what about the vagueness, the opacity, the improbability of a dream?–I would say that in cinema 'opacity' and 'ineffability' do not mean an indistinct picture, but the particular impression created by the logic of the dream: unusual and unexpected

combinations, and conflicts between, entirely real elements. These must be shown with the utmost precision. By its very nature, cinema must expose reality, not cloud it. (2006: 72)



Lighthouse lens/Red Fort Delhi

For Tarkovsky this is not to be sought in special effects or literal translation, but in the focused and intensified working of the materials and technologies of film itself, paying close attention to the inherent logic of the moment being conveyed. Cinematographers achieve this quality in very different ways–in Tarkovsky's *The Mirror* by intensifying the material conditions of the image and the time it takes to pass; in Nicolas Roeg's *Bad Timing* (1980) by switching between multiple timeframes with great velocity; in David Lynch's *Lost Highway* (1996) by disestablishing psychic and concrete spatialities and temporalities to produce radically altered, parallel states of being; in Carlos Reygadas' *Silent Light* (2007) by turning the cinematic frame to pure attention and watching-out-for whatever comes; and in Jean-Luc Godard's *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* (1988-1998) by montage which juxtaposes, multiplies and densifies narrative texture.

In every case, the strategies and tactics of manipulating temporality are deployed entirely within the fundamental limits of cinematic production–the 24-per-second frame-rate limit of image projection–rather than by adopting practices that lie outside the tectonics of cinema. This suggests that a work will persuasively engage with the real only by intensively working its fundamental limits, rather than by eliminating or escaping them. What implications might there be for architecture of this cinematic eclipse of time within time itself? How might the agency of cinema allow architecture to conceptualise a parallel eclipsing of space within space itself, and how might this deterritorialise architecture, opening it up to the strange and the unfamiliar?

Sydney

Much current architectural theory and practice declares an urgency for engaging with contemporary realities in which certainty and stasis no longer hold, where universals have no purchase, where fluctuation and interminable variation condition experience, and where the disconnected and fragmented are commonplace. In response, architects look to formal systems and modes of working which privilege the dynamic and the ambiguous. Attracted to so-called non-Euclidean geometries and rhizomatic networks, embedding design in the diagramming of fluctuations in global markets, political deterritorialisations or other kinds of statistical analyses and parametric modeling, architects look for relevance in the conditions, needs and demands of a contemporary world in a state of crisis. As a result, architecture becomes a mimetic and formal representation of the dynamic, fluctuating, unsettled, unpredictable and catastrophic lineaments of that crisis. But in doing so, it merely trades one form of *mimesis*–the imitation or reification of transcendent permanent realities–for another: the imitation of immanent impermanent fluxion. It continues to adhere precisely to the literalness that Tarkovsky warned against. It is not a question of finding "elaborate devices" to represent certain conditions or to displace certain accepted modes of working. Rather, it is a question of remaining and working with(in) the foundational and familiar existential characteristics, elements and processes of reality in order to convey and amplify its unsettling and uncanny dimensions. The implication for architecture is that the most unsettling, the most unfamiliar and extraordinary experiences happen to take place precisely in the midst of the most ordinary and mundane of circumstances.

A musical example of how the uncanny might be produced by working within and through the tectonic conditions of music and into the texture of time itself might be Arvo Pärt's *Festina Lente* (1988-90). In this composition the same melody is played simultaneously by three groups of instruments at three different time scales–slow, natural and fast. The instruments begin together but the disjunction in tempo causes the three streams to immediately diverge. During the piece, these three will develop radically different dynamic and harmonic relationships as they separate, cross over or align with each other. This simple structural and procedural system results in a disassociated assemblage that sometimes magnifies and sometimes fractures the melodic and rhythmic material. The resulting affects range from resonance and concord to complete discord and chaotic deconstruction of the melody, from dynamic alignment, up-gathering and amplification to extreme opposition and cancellation of energy. *Festina Lente* is an investigation of music as the logical playing out of interstitial difference within a tectonics of time. The contradiction in the music's title–*festina lente* means "to hurry slowly"–also defines its ambit. By overlaying one melodic pattern with its accelerated and decelerated variations, Pärt constructs an enigmatic image of time in the process

of unraveling and decompressing–where the present is put into tension and stress by the antagonistic of a propellant future and a restraining past. The piece thus moves from stable regular organisation to irregular coagulations of multiple layers; then inexorably towards deconstitution as the texture of the piece disentangles into broad horizontal sheets of sound decreasing in proximity, separated by intervals growing in distance, eventually fading to an indefinitely deferred and infinitely finishing end.

A similar enigmatic quality, spatial this time, is evident in the architecture of Sigurd Lewerentz. Colin St John Wilson reads the enigma in terms of Lewerentz' own guiding motto: "*Mellanspel*"–meaning a playing (*spel*) between (*mellan*). He contends that Lewerentz sets up then plays out various antinomical, oppositional themes to create discrepancy, ambiguity, indeterminacy and obliquity within an apparently simple spatial setup. From that results a sense of inexplicability or "mystery" that St John Wilson implies might be proper to the experience of a sacred building (St John Wilson 2001: 21). The discrepancies that Lewerentz installs in the geometry and materiality of the Church of St Peter, Klippan (1963-66), confirm this reading. The plan is square rather than basilican, therefore centralised rather than linear. In an ideal square no single direction predominates. But Lewerentz carefully and forcefully differentiates between several axes that constitutively bisect the space. The single column appears central but is in fact asymmetrical in both north-south and east-west directions within a space that is exactly square (north is uppermost in the plans). The column's axis of symmetry is offset from the geometric centre and axis of symmetry of the room. The altar is not centralised but located just to one side of this axis. These discrepant axial symmetries produce an extremely charged space.



St Peter Klippan. (Lewerentz 1963-66) Floor plan and brick paving plan of the main chapel. [Drawings by the author]

Lewerentz works further geometrical alignments, directions and dynamics into the space to contest the apparent simplicity of the square, distort its rational order and install a strange dislocation with tectonic, experiential, theological and liturgical registers. The vaulted ceiling billows in uneven waves due to the alternating pattern of ribs, which expand and contract in plan as well as slope slightly towards the centre of the space from each side. The undulating brick ceiling is read against a pair of deep steel beams that span the full width of the space. These are supported on a primary beam, almost imperceptibly asymmetrical to the single column that supports it. The asymmetry of the column is reinforced by the offset

assembly of beams–the two major cross beams also having the effect of countering the orientation of the vaults. This steel assembly effectively subdivides the square chapel into four smaller regions. The altar is marginally offset to the south of the central axis of the room and placed in the quadrant opposite the entry door. The baptismal font is in the quadrant closest to the entry. In both cases this is in accordance with normal liturgical practice. The lectern and organ occupy the third quadrant and the major portion of the congregation occupies the fourth. None of the windows or doors is symmetrical to or aligned with the geometric axes of the whole space, or with the quadrants in which they are located. The combined effect of this highly complex but barely perceptible setup, made of very slight nuanced geometrical shifts and overlays, is considerable.

St Peter. Main chapel, brick floor, steel framing and brick vaults.

In terms of directionality and dynamics, the ceiling vaults run west-east towards the altar to emphasise a processional direction. At the same time, they rise from each side to a north-south pitching ridge above the column assembly. The combined effect is to stretch the west-east dimension and to gather, centralise and raise the space upward. This tension between two tendencies holds the space in suspense, in an indiscernible state somewhere between stability and dissolution. In the brick floor the bed joints run north-south, but at an angle to the square plan. Within this linear pattern Lewerentz inserts several areas of paving at other angles–like rugs or patches set within a larger web. Despite reading more like a woven multidirectional surface than a linear array, the heterogeneous patterning of the floor counters the orthogonal alignment of the overall space and the altar, as well as the walls. The directionality of the paving resists and decelerates that of the vaults. These contrasting shifts in pattern and geometry create disjunctions and incommensurabilities in the spatial order of the room.

St Peter. Main chapel brick floor and baptistery

This intricate juxtaposition of geometries, spatial directions, tensions and proportions tends to overburden, materialise and condense the space: but also to mobilise

its materiality, causing it to fluctuate, alternate and oscillate–but quietly, slowly and in a minor key. Tectonic implications exceed any semantic, metaphorical or symbolic readings that could be ventured for the building. The central armature that supports the roof may evoke the cross on Calvary but it also zones the space to frame a differentiated collectivity. It produces a weighty, grave ambience that matches the simultaneous grief and joy of reflection, prayer and celebration that define the Protestant mass. It turns an abstract spatial structure into a world or place, calibrated to specific modes of being, being-with and -without others and being-with-otherness. The multiple interstices between geometric systems within what appears to be a simple, resolved space produce a disturbance and uncanny presence that parallels the theological condition of a God who is neither immanent nor transcendent, but has effectively withdrawn and abandoned human beings who must henceforth both mourn His departure and await His return. Lewerentz does not achieve this architectural metaphor of a complex metaphysical circumstance through formal complexity, large-scale compositional tropes or unusual geometries. The scale of tectonic endeavour is extremely modest yet every move carries considerable weight and enduring affect. He does not abandon architecture's foundational tectonic dimensions or remit but critically crafts the tectonic by subjecting it to significant strain and working at it until it yields.

In each example from cinema, music and architecture, the interstice or gap plays a key role in conveying meaning and narrative. The interstice is produced in the midst of each work, in their very structure and fabric, by arranging component parts so that discrepancies arise to contest the overall order. In Pärt's *Festina Lente* the discrepancy is durational and due to three coexisting time signatures or temporalities. These three play out simultaneously to produce disjunctions that sometimes build and amplify and sometimes deconstruct the rhythmic and melodic texture of the music. Pärt uses the tectonic potential of music to convey the ambiguous, wavering and enigmatic condition of "hurrying slowly"–as the title of the composition suggests. In *The Mirror*, the discrepancy is found between narrative and image, due to a disjunction between the narrative and temporal conditions of linking scenes. The resulting sequence produces disjunctions in time, in the content of the narrative and subject matter of the images and in the existential state of the subjects who appear to exist across multiple timeframes. The coexistence of these disjunctions with the smooth and often slow filmic sequence produces a discordant texture in the film to convey a limit point with crisis or emergency in the protagonist's experience of recollection. Finally, with Lewerentz' Church of St Peter, numerous discrepancies are used to disturb the stability of an apparently centralised, masonry building to create an entirely interstitial fabric. The geometric order is built of unaligned centres, axes and symmetries, while the building's material density and weight is systematically given over to undulation and levitation–for example, in the sloped, heaving floor and the alternating rhythms of the vaulted ceiling that seems to billow above the space. These tectonics parallel a theological motif central to the Christian experience–the discrepancy between human and divine that worship is made to address. At the same time, the interstitial discrepancies lead to ambiguous, undecidable spatial and material systems whose incommensurabilities develop a wavering, shimmering quality that eclipses the space's geometric and material limits–producing tectonic parallels to the mysterious and transformative dimensions of worship.

As a result of the deconstitutive interstice, musical time is no longer solely linear and diachronic but also circular and synchronic. It no longer solely advances but also folds back and returns into itself. Cinematic time is no longer solely limited by the disassociation of past, present and future but can also enable these to coexist

and affect each other. Architectural order is no longer solely limited to singular harmonised spatial systems but can also incorporate multiple, unaligned systems to produce indeterminate and ambiguous orders. Likewise, masonry is no longer solely compounded by its material weight but can also convey immateriality and levity. Such enigmatic qualities are realisable because of the interstice, because of the disassociative capacity of the interstice to enable multiple systems to coexist, to come into productive contact and consequently to fundamentally disturb and challenge the prevailing order. Such disturbances are not destructive but productive. They enable complex, nuanced systems of order to coexist within a single assemblage, but without recourse to expanded fields or practices that might seek to eclipse a given art form or discipline. The production of simultaneously consilient and discrepant conditions, mobilised and structured by the interstice and achieved entirely by working the foundational material, tectonic opportunities and tactics inherent to cinema, music and architecture, creates assemblages in which nothing is as it seems and everything remains open to investigation, interpretation and uncanny, emergent potential.

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Writing (Lines) Alive

Linda Marie Walker

First half, four scenarios

Scenario one

Where to be – personally, as a person, as a living-creature, or how to-be, how to hold oneself physically, mentally, emotionally, when writing a text, this one, now – is the thought this writing begins with, that initiates, or initialises, this collection of words, and temperamentally affects further thoughts as they come to mind. This makes writing, in its making (and in public form), propositional; propositional in its sense, its language, its relation, or reticence perhaps, toward (its blows upon) the body (like weather, voices, health, sleep) – and in its incapacity, or tenderness, to do what writing's supposed to do, or meant to achieve. Two "difficulties" arise, whose images, as ideas, may crinkle-up what comes after their vague descriptions. "Difficulty" though is already contestable, as in "difficulty" lies a type of work; this is work that paves the way for ease, or so as to come to ease, to "doing" and "making" inside "difficulty" itself. Nevermind, and, in fact, this "technic" of the-difficult may only suggest a "plying", a way of working, handling, weaving, constructing, joining, a "going-on" into the medium (or material – of fibers, cell, words, memories, forests, etc), of cracks, fissures, knots, holes, splits.[1] Difficulty splits: *di* = apart (or not) and *facilis* = doable, makeable, yieldable (and then "facilitate", to make easier); and so *difficult* (caulked) gives: apart from (or not) easily doable.

The first *"di-facilis"* is: I take care of who or what I am in the scenario of the writing; the second *"di-facilis"* is: I easily (facilitate) slip and fall and cause a scenario that will have to be taken care of too, or will in some unknown way help or hinder me and the writing (I can fall apart, seize up, require repair (maybe even caulk up the crack)). Where does one put oneself, or leave oneself, to write a text about "something" even though, simultaneously "something" has to-do with one's self (being one's time, and thought, and labour); nevertheless, it is the "topic of something" that the writing is usually used for, the "topic" is the "about" of the writing, or so it seems, and one's self is not the "about" of the writing (or not announced as such). Writing takes fits and starts, bits and pieces, adding and subtracting, scratching and scribbling, glue, sticky tape; time is the heart of the process, the passing of life, the life-span. The time of life comes into writing, and writing comes into the life of time, into the taking-to-heart (or, taking-into-heart) of living: at what point in life is the person-state, and what "governs" this point amongst other infinite governed points in the world; this is an issue at play in the writing of writing (in imagining that writing has its own imaginative life), or the conduct of life as a life writes-writing.[2]

Scenario two

In Michel Foucault's lecture from February 17, 1982, one in a series of 24 lectures given as a course titled "The Hermeneutics of the Subject", he talks about the care-of-self in relation to knowledge-of-self, and this knowledge necessitating what he calls a return to (one)self. This return is an ancient return, and care is not "care" as commonly understood; rather, it is a type of preparation for this world, for the self who is in "this world", and for the self who must be free to leave "this world":

1 Leonard Cohen's lyrics for "Anthem", from the 1992 album *The Future*, includes: "There is a crack in everything / That's how the light gets in."; Hélène Cixous writes, "The ark has a crack, where the worms that chew our lives during our lifetime come in. I caulk it" (2011: 76).

2 I am touching upon the work here of James Hillman (2007).

> It is not just a matter of attending to yourself, of focusing your gaze on your self, or remaining alert and vigilant with respect to yourself, as in the ... "naked" idea of the care of the self. It involves a real shift, a certain movement of the subject with regard to himself, whose nature we will have to investigate. The subject must advance towards something that is himself. (2001: 248)

I was already wondering who was writing this text at the time of coming again to Foucault's lecture. The wondering, initially, was not so much "who", but "how": how is it that writing, a writing, comes to be what it is; where does it begin, for how long has it been coming, and in the wake of what pleasures and displeasures and their conscious and unconscious affects; that is, what is a writing's passage, what is its life before life, as it comes to life, into the rhythms of phenomena, of things and conditions; what is it in the minuteness of its substance, in the face of the vastness of existing writing, and what am I in its eyes.

One absorbs the loss of oneself in the writing-topic; one ignores or side-lines one's self (out of sight and sound, feigns one's disappearance) for the produced-thing. Soon one forgets that one has vanished for the "interests" over one's own live body (one has died right before one's work). And yet, only I can be the one writing, the one enmeshing in the process of conjuring words, of trying to remember me, as I pass before my own eyes on the page. This remembering is, in the relationship (or return) to self (me), an act (however small) to recall-to-memory what has happened, what is happening now – with the animals, the weather, the law, the food, the family, the garden; what is to-be remembered is to-be evident, to be the-person and to-be at-ease *(facilis)* in being the-person, implicated, and at various distances from what I see and what enframes me as a subject of subjectivity. This governing, of and by oneself, that comes into writing (as a fact of being part of many institutions) is compelling – and into the body as the "being" compelled – in terms of "history"; this governing might be vague or strident. Foucault writes:

> ... if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self. (2001: 251)

I negotiate (with) my *self* (in this body) in a complex field of infinite and unexpected powers, some sympathetic, others antipathic – this is the world close-by (in direct touch with the-person-me), this then is the world of myself (a continual affected body in radiating space); the-person that writes contemplates herself (watches herself search for words to extend sense here, and fail):

> We must [says Seneca, in Foucault] turn around to contemplate the self, in the very moment of flight ... It is the flight of time that is involved here, rather than the sage's flight or retreat. In the movement of time that carries us to the final point of our life, we must turn our gaze around and take ourselves as the object of contemplation. (2001: 263)

This "turn" would require practice, or a (creative) practice, an activity, to contemplate with (in the company of its material needs and limitations), to be in concert with, so as to watch (to experience) my/self as "something" making "something", to see how I "do my work" in time, as time passes; to watch making, to watch my/

self in "the flight of time". This "turn" is turned (around; it is pivotal; it circles, or faces the other way) in gravity; practice might entail moving through and against the forces of gravity – like an athlete or a dance (or a writer; or in the act of ordinarily walking, running, jumping) – everyday practices of attention to the tiny "bones" and soft "tissue". Practice is learning, turning (going around) is, as well, a movement of the soul as well as the development of freedom and calmness to "depart".[3] There are techniques to learn – systems and arts, complex labyrinthine knowledges notions and concepts (like recipes and formulas for magic (the transformation of energies: the seeing of colours, shapes, ghosts; the hearing of trees, animals, stones) – for mind and body's imagination, its image-making heart-role, during the brief time given to create "self" and the tiny space "self" occupies in the world.

Scenario three

I began this writing before the two scenarios above; that beginning is now later in the paper and begins with a sentence I was trying to resolve *as* a sentence: "Alchemical moments; the alchemy of writing; that is, not 'the writing' but the activity, the mixing and stirring, the waiting." I meant that writing is not, as a text, alchemical – although eventually it is (in its taking place somewhere in time-past) – but that the *labour* of its production is alchemical. I was "trying" to write an underside or a thin (convoluted) skin or an interior space (something that is usually hidden or at least unsaid); trying-out, attempting, endeavouring.[4]

I was trying, in the sentence, to connect the doing of "writing" to another old practice that puts various substances together, in various proportions and strengths, through a long process (of ritual, spell, heating, cooling) to make them something else, unimaginable even: I was putting a story into a sentence. Now this "story" is later in the text, below the scenarios, or substances. "Trying" is a practice, an endless attempting, in this instance, to write with a technic-without-technic tracing-movement (small moves toward/with small moves; perhaps then, "a scenario" is a small-event, or a small-shape, in history). However the beginning of the second half of this text – influenced by Francois Jullien's *The Silent Transformations* – (about the slow cumulative changes that turn love into hate, strength into weakness, light into dark), and, as mentioned, Michel Foucault's lecture of "17 February 1982, First Hour" – *made* possible a pause, a suspension, as someone (I remembered) was writing the writing, and was therefore a "topic" with the topic being written about (writing); there was silence, memory-without-memory, forgetting-without-forgetting.

Scenario four

The writing that begins with the alchemy-sentence is aware of Scenario One and Scenario Two although it was being written before the scenarios, to some degree. Initially, the text aimed to write about the writing of Hélène Cixous as a-life-writing, a-life-in-history, a land/personscape, a transforming-selfscape; this emerges in non-linear time, in fractal "figures"; shards of thought and feeling are caught, like dust, as they flow (onto and through matter) like dreams (not great big jumps, but tiny shifts as if "turning":

> How limited the imagination is. 'Go with him to the last train' had just taken the place of the last hour, now put off to the station, and never had I felt so poor in spirit so dried up, so lacking in great and admirable ideas, so ill served by memory, vain regrets needled me, I haven't prepared for the exam, nothing comes to mind, ah if only I could reread Plato,

3 "This is to say, we should seek our objective, happiness and ultimate good in ourselves, in our minds, in the quality of our soul ... what is important is to be free to depart, to have the soul on our lips. ... and being ready to die" (Foucault 2001: 265).

4 The Macquarie Dictionary, 3rd edition, The Macquarie Library Pty Ltd., University of NSW, Sydney, 1999: 2270.

> Montaigne, here we are, a reprieve is granted me, I mean Him, a day is rendered deific, and in advance unforgettable, and there I am thwarted by the advent of a delay which fills me on the one hand with archangelic bliss, on the other hand and at the same time with the inertia that prefigures death. (Cixous 2011: 18)

These "shards", as they come-and-go, create "circumstantial" writing that forms and unforms. However, I returned to self (perhaps though not to the "real-self") via making, like objects – vaguely imagining the four sculptural works below, from a series by Louise Haselton, titled "Veto Group 1 & 11"[5] – Scenarios 1, 2, 3 (& 4) to see if I could see what I become in writing, or have already come-to-be; writing though writes beyond me-subject, far ahead.



Fig. 1 Louise Haselton, *Veto Group 1 & 11* (2011) [selected objects].

Second half, many lines

Alchemical moments; the alchemy of writing; that is, not "the writing" but the activity (the labour, labouring), the mixing and stirring, the waiting.[6]

What I'm "trying" to come-to in writing is unscripted (as a form), is unintended (as an outcome), and is a compound body, impermanent, probably excessive and emotional and dependent.

The text, in its making, becomes always-other (in its passing), being momentarily here, and in a sense, "plastic", having form that bursts its own form, and yet is also a resistant (having visible and invisible attributes and subsequent laws).

This writing is an artwork (painting- or drawing-like, only suggestively so) rather than an informational vehicle for a "topic" – it represents itself as itself and is

5 Extracted from Louise Haselton, "Veto Group 1 & 11", in the exhibition titled *Errand Workshop,* Contemporary Art Centre of South Australia, Adelaide, July 2011; materials include: coral, straws, sea sponge, clay, rubber, cork, brass, bronze (see also, footnote 7).

6 The use of the word "alchemy" here is intended in the spirit of its common-sense: any magical process of transmuting/transforming; with "magic" meaning an act, an activity, of producing effects by supernatural agencies or forces (or irresistible influence), a reality outside "reality" (extra-real, magic-realism), and of course "reality" is a realm at issue; "chemical" plus "al" (the) = the-chemical; "chemical" from the Greek base *kheo,* to pour, flow, melt; and from the Greek *khumos,* the juice, an infusion: the-mix of juices that become other than themselves; substances touched by substances. See: Taussig 2011; Antonin Artaud's spell-casting in Derrida and Paule Thévenin 1998; Brian Massumi 2011 for fine sprinklings/ripples of the magic of processes of life throughout – via Alfred Whitehead, William James and Gilles Deleuze: "You have to open [things] back up. You have to give the thing its distances back … [Deleuze] quotes Francis Bacon: you have to make a Sahara of it. You do this, in Bacon's words again, as a "matter of fact". Not as a matter of principle. Not as a matter of opinion. … Not to represent. Not to reflect. Instead, as an event. In a drop of lived relation that has a style all of its own, that exemplifies its own singular-generic logic, and is as really appearing as it is infinitely expansive."

its own subject; in that mode it seeks and keeps company, it is sociable – words, thoughts, sentences, orders, punctuations, senses, appearances, times, contexts.[7]

The care of the life of the "thing/text/self", of its movement toward, or away from, what it "is" (in that it already is on or within a trajectory, acknowledged or not) is an art (better perhaps to say "fiction" or "poetry" or "space") – the establishing of a *tekhne* (a set of practices, that are dependent themselves upon the actual state of the self) for which a sense of health is primary, whether robust or fragile.

Writing moves from one point to another, traveling, traveling, negotiating as if aiming for a place, somewhere unknown and temporary. This shelter, or port, that is sought is a home (a home on the way home). This invokes the setting-out, the writing, to be something of an over-the-sea-passage, exhausting, time-consuming, and hopefully funny and joyful, a longing for arrival/rest. It is simultaneously a trip for the self:

> ... this idea of navigation [I have used the word 'negotiation', thinking less of destination] ... this dangerous journey to the port [of the self advancing towards something that is (her)self] ... implies a knowledge, a technique, an art, in order to be undertaken well ... a complex, both theoretical and practical knowledge, as well as being a conjectural knowledge, which is very close ... to the knowledge of piloting. (Foucault 2001: 263)

The use of these ideas ("navigation", "piloting") might help glimpse another sort of life; a life that doesn't give-up "the self", as a requirement of engagement (and value). Tension gathers around the task of navigation/negotiation, amidst the conditions of political power, and of remembering the relationship with oneself that includes the things one thinks about, imagines, and makes (often to the governed beat of a governed drum).[8] Can writing learn about itself, discover *what* it is (or how it might otherwise-be) and *how* it can conduct its life, so as to "... investigate what ought to be done ... [rather] than what has been done" (Foucault, quoting Seneca, 2001: 269); what does writing turn to (or away from) so as to best spend its life (so as to be ready to die); to live then, for-life: "... an enterprise of [delicate] health ...", writes Deleuze (1997: 4); be/fore life perhaps, writing that is just before oneself, just before one gets to oneself as life, there, it leads, but is also that which is right before/under one's nose (or eyes). A writing that, in its coming to be, becomes writing: "The ultimate aim of [writing] is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of health or this invention of a people [to which I must belong], that is, a possibility of life" (Deleuze 1997).

Writing works with form (it works into form, it works in the community of forms), it appears, is visible, has affects. If we keep repeating, to more or less degree, the same form, then what "idea" or "limit" or "prejudice" are we blind to (blind in that we cannot see we cannot see), in that the form as the "acclaimed" form, hides within it a way of structuring knowledge (or living), a way of constructing meaning in terms of particular framings of time and of space (linear (beginning, middle, end) or circular (with a centre, a receptacle), tenses, organisation, clarity, etc). How, asks Catherine Malabou, can we "... think form itself in a more subtle and supple manner?" (2010: xviii). Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy (and others) conceive of time as spacing ("the becoming-time of space and the becoming-space of time") (Malabou 2010: xxi); a way opens for thinking around "plasticity", around the materiality of form (and not opposing and matter), a plasticity that is both elastic and resilient, explosive and proliferating. Writing materially, in terms of plasticity

7 Louise Haselton's objects in her exhibition "Errand Workshop" (see footnote 5) provide the visual occurrences for this "sociality" – they are purposeless, yet fascinating, they give pleasure. Michael Newall asked Haselton: "Reappraising the cast-off and overlooked seems a kind of strategy in your work. Is that right? It seems at the root of many of the pleasurable surprises and uneasy moments your work delivers." Haselton responded: "Re-presenting the overlooked is important in my work. I'm interested to see if the simple act of presenting something cast-off can be restorative. It's very satisfying to scrounge for unloved materials and objects and then resuscitate them. That can be simply through giving them new company, by combining a rock with some packaging, say, or some shells with chain; to point to another life or function something could hold. The potential of things can lie latent and be animated through a simple act" *(Extracting Response: Michael Newall In Conversation with Louise Haselton,* in *Louise Haselton, Errand Workshop,* Contemporary Art Centre of South Australia, Adelaide, August, 2011: 22).

8 "... what I mean is this: if we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more general question of governmentality understood as a strategic field of power relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self" (Foucault 2001: 252).

– giving, taking, shattering – is a branching or diverging endeavour; Derrida, in the foreword to his book on Jean-Luc Nancy, sets out this way:

> Hypothesis: it's going to be a lengthy tale with mythological overtones – 'One day, once upon a time …' Pruning, omitting, retelling, lengthening, with little stories, with a succession of touches touched up again, off on one tangent and then another, that's how I'm going to sketch the recollections of a short treatise dedicated to Jean-Luc Nancy that I have long been dreaming of writing [on Aristotle's *On the Soul*] – a murky, baroque essay, overloaded with telltale stories (wanting to spell trouble), an unimaginable scene that to a friend would resemble what has always been my relation to incredible words like 'soul', 'mind', 'spirit', 'body', 'sense', 'world', and other similar things. (2005: 7)

It's endless; writing becomes un-enclosed and not re-enclosable, spaced-out, deferential – awaiting more life-living, awaiting the blossoming of a different brain; a writing that is inconsistent (and re-worked and re-edited, re-cycled, re-composed). From Cixous's writing I feel how life moves *within* thought; I feel the movement of thought in writing as writing comes to live in the world; I feel how the world moves through the circumstances of a body at the time of its time, in writing. The philosophy/poetic of writing orients her writing from within (inside-out); her writing writes orientation, slips and slides over-the-seas of languages, tenses and sensations.

Writing like Cixous (or anyone else) would be unproductive, and would miss the purpose of "circumstantial" writing, a writing that must always be itself, in relation to the one-writing; each writing is then of its "own-itself", a "re-presentation" as a presentation unlike any other presentation – that is, *how* something is (uniquely, personally) seen, *what* it *is* (the seen) as "remains", as marks, as traces; for example, what have I been told/read, why was it told/written like that, how (with my disposition) do I then tell/write?

When writing writes (as if) fiction-writing non-fiction, when writing re-calls, calls-out, it is humble, as it gathers ground, bit by bit, inside the idea or/and the self; it can't keep its distance from demons, ghosts, secrets, pain, murder, loneliness, ecstasy, love, birth, death, addiction – from the hauntings, from the heart and soul, from being unstuck. Cixous writes:

> … I don't stick to the side of conceptual reasoning, even if there is a certain capacity for abstraction there. In my text everything remains stubbornly concrete. The material for any text of mine is the raw stuff of everyday life. There are cars and very specific makers of car[s], saucepans, jam jars, plane tickets – all the accessories of life, both as common objects and as metaphors. (2009: 9)

This writing is spread-out, close to the ground, and in-memory of its subject, and of the subject who-writes. Derrida, writing on the death of his friend Paul de Man, and on his use of the phrase in "memory of", writes that "… any name, any nominal function, is 'in memory of' – from the first 'present' of its appearance, and finally, is 'in virtually-bereaved memory of' even during the life of its bearer" (Derrida, in Royle, 2009: x). Writing is in-memory of others and their memory of memories (of others).

Writing emerges in writing by differing speeds, textures, inserts, erasures, coming into shapes and forms one after the other, as "objects", as "entities", with their own internal qualities and durations, and affected by their specific close-encounters (their place in the writing's arrangement). The text alive, a world of space and time in which strange situations and events can arise and dissolve.

If the text looked back, what would it be as a creature/world (at every new appearance); what would look at me (and with what type of eye), and what would it see; if I looked into its gaze what would I see, and what would I be in that turned-back gaze; in the meantime there is this arrangement, a preparation for trying-again – lines *making* (for care) pockets, receptacles, cavities, of lineages; linings in/for the world.

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(re) Findings: Discovery and memory in the architecture and legacy of surrealism

Michael Chapman

> It is in discovery alone, that one recognises the marvellous headlong rush of desire. It alone can enlarge the universe, causing it to relinquish some of its opacity, letting us discover its extraordinary capacities for reserve, proportionate to the innumerable needs of the spirit. Daily life abounds in exactly this sort of small discovery ... You only have to know how to get along in the labyrinth. (Breton 1987: 15-16)

Historicity, specifically the construction of images and their subsequent remembering, has a special relevance for the endeavours of Dada and surrealism, two movements which sought to reconstruct the everyday through a disassembly of images and their values. The architecture of the city was an important part of this process. It was celebrated by the surrealists for its residual qualities that not only evoked historical time but spatial and lived experience more generally. While studies of architecture and surrealism have focussed, to a large extent, on the "objects" that they selected to substitute for buildings, there is an equally rich counter-current within surrealism that used memory and the *found object* as a strategy to dismantle the homogenising forces of modernist architecture. Within this is a re-discovery of the historical trace and its power as a polemical tool in the construction of images and their dissemination.

This paper investigates the role of the *objet trouvé* within the activities of the avant-garde, with an emphasis on the theoretical discourse that was attached to surrealism in the 1970s. The *objet trouvé*—literally "found object"—became a fascination for both Dada and surrealism in the 1920s. Both movements used the discovery of objects (and the associated psychological displacement) to challenge bourgeois conventions of the art object and contemporary expectations of lived experience. In the 1970s there was, for the first time, a dedicated discourse on avant-garde practice which set out to diagnose the specific practices of the historical avant-garde and the philosophical motivations underpinning them. If modernism was characterised by the autonomy of the artistic object in this discourse, avant-garde practices in this period were defined by the conflation of art and life in artistic production and the rejection of aesthetic categories more generally. In this sense, the avant-garde can be seen as a distinct trajectory from modernism: a fact that has been made explicit in the theoretical positions of both Hilde Heynen (1999) and Andreas Huyssen (1986), amongst others.

The "discovery" of images is an important aspect of this discourse and central to the avant-garde project. There are numerous examples of the way that "images" of the city function in the reconstruction of memory. They are replete in surrealist fiction. The "Tour Saint Jacques", for instance, becomes the "psychological fulcrum" (Krauss 1981: 33-34) in Breton's *L'Amour Fou*, where the poet's fear of an unknown woman turns to lust. The tower also functions to trigger memories of an earlier poem that the poet had forgotten—reignited by the site and his pursuit of romance across it. Interestingly, an iconic photograph by Brassai records (or reconstructs) this "moment", and was published with the text at the time. The confluence of words and images that is constructed in *L'Amour Fou* was replicated

throughout the surrealist journals, supplementing the texts of the primary poets and artists with visual proof of the experience. One characteristic of this visual material is the continual presence of architecture and the city as the backdrop to surrealist experience and, inadvertently, the reconstruction of surrealist history.

The exact nature of an *architecture* of the historical avant-garde remains contested, especially in relation to Dada and surrealism where, despite the scholarly interest in the topic, there is a virtual consensus that architecture was not their primary concern (Vesely 1978: 138). Numerous authors retracing the connections between architecture and the historical avant-gardes have lamented the failure of Dada and surrealism to *produce* architecture,[1] or have focussed on architectural objects that are historically (rather than definitively) surrealist.[2] As early as 1978 Vesely had argued that the surrealists were "not particularly interested" (1978: 138) in architecture and by 2010 had concluded that architecture "did not become an integral part of surrealist endeavour" (2010: 31). Frampton, in Vesely's edited volume on the subject, had maintained that "the surreal in architecture does not exist" (Frampton 1978: 98), while Thomas Mical, in his later volume on the same subject, argued that architecture is the "unfulfilled promise of surrealist thought" (2005: 2). Even Anthony Vidler conceded that "architecture did not apparently play an extensive role in surrealist concerns" (2003: 1). The surrealists' preoccupation with the work of Cheval, Gaudi and even Guimard has further tended to narrow investigations in this field, providing a stylistic model that the philosophical concerns of Dada and surrealism can be accommodated within but without any deeper scrutiny of the architectural possibilities that lie beyond it.

Given this, there is a failure in the scholarship of Dada and surrealism to place an appropriate emphasis on *negation* in avant-garde activities, especially as it relates to architecture and the construction of images. Vesely acknowledges the role of negation in Dada and, like many scholars of art history, sees Duchamp as a pivotal figure on this path, instrumental for separating the independent trajectories of modernism and the avant-garde (1978: 88). Evoking Walter Benjamin,[3] Vesely quotes Breton, who identifies a "line of demarcation between the two [positive and negative] spirits that will tend to oppose one another more and more in the very heart of the modern spirit" (Breton 1978: 14). However, for Vesely, negation functioned in a productive capacity in surrealism, transforming the conventions of life *through* imagination and experience. Vesely argues several decades later that: "the relation of surrealists to architecture was limited almost exclusively to the discovery of buildings and places appreciated as a result of objective chance (*objet trouvé*)" (2010: 40). This aspect of Vesely's argument has a particular overlap with aesthetic theories of the avant-garde, and particularly those of the Frankfurt School.

It is clear that the historical avant-garde already understood and articulated the psychoanalytical aspects of the *objet trouvé* and its transformative qualities. In 1905, Freud had written in his *Three Essays on Sexuality* that the "finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it" (255) and, in the 1930s, Breton had compared the act of discovery to the transformative experience of the dream (1987: 32). While Vesely acknowledges the role that discovery played in surrealist attitudes towards architecture, he neglects the transformative nature of this discovery, which indelibly altered the avant-gardiste work of art and shifted the emphasis onto an unprecedented *spatiality* in creative production. Given this, it is productive to further explore the role that architecture plays within broader theories of avant-garde production, with a particular view towards the role of memory and image in the architectural fascinations of Dada and surrealism.

1 The exception is Kurt Schwitters' *Merzbau*, which has attracted a large amount of scholarly interest in the last two decades, especially in relation to its avant-garde credentials. See, for instance: Macarthur 2010: 283-300; Burns Gamard 2000; Dietrich 1991: 14.

2 Le Corbusier's house for Beistegui or Adolf Loos's house for Tristan Tzara are two clear examples (Frampton 1978: 138; Gorlin 1982: 58-60).

3 Benjamin's quote from *Passagenwerk* linking Breton and Le Corbusier captured this: "To embrace Breton and Le Corbusier ... would be to draw the spirit of contemporary France like a bow which strikes with knowledge to the heart of the present." (Benjamin quoted in Vidler 1992: 151; Vidler 2003: 12.)

Peter Bürger's argument in *Theory of the Avant-Garde* (1984) has not attained much traction in the scholarship of architectural history, despite its ready adaptability to architecture. Despite this, Bürger's short work is instructive for the scholarship of architectural history as it promotes an investigation of the historical categories of architectural production, rather than the aesthetic categories of architectural form. If, as Bürger asserts, the avant-gardiste work of art *negated* the aesthetic "production" of art, then it followed that the avant-gardiste work of architecture was, similarly, not linked to the production of architecture but to its rediscovery or negation. As the avant-garde *discovered* the *objet trouvé* and presented it as an affront to bourgeois aesthetics, Dada and surrealism drew upon a forgotten architecture, which was repackaged as an affront to the aesthetics of modernism, retaining the baggage of the nineteenth century, while simultaneously reconnecting the avant-garde with the experiential stimulation that they craved.[4]

Bürger had a particular fascination with surrealism. While his book is relatively brief, Bürger cites the works of Marcel Duchamp, the collages of early Berlin Dada and the evolution of montage through the lens of surrealism as the primary evidence in support of his theory. Of the limited illustrated examples in *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Dada and surrealism (including Duchamp, Magritte and Heartfield) account for half. While Bürger reads surrealism primarily through the genre of surrealist fiction,[5] there is an emphasis on the *objet trouvé* that permeates his work and analysis. This is also a recurring theme in the English language reception of Bürger's work, and especially in the investigations of the Octoberist critics. Architectural space is a perennial theme within this, as the dissolution of medium is made to intersect with a cultural "spatiality" that characterises the most recent reworkings of Dada and surrealist practice. Rosalind Krauss, for instance, has argued for a spatiality in the work of Duchamp which is antivisual in nature (1994) and Hal Foster has drawn attention to the *outmoded* as a spatial model through which to reposition surrealist practice (1995: 157-191; 2002a: 195-196; 2002b: 138-139). In both readings, architecture exists as a found context against which creative acts and works are projected and reconstructed.

As early as 1929 Walter Benjamin had argued that surrealism was an avant-garde not of the *new*, but of the *old*, radically repositioning the outmoded objects of everyday life in opposition to technology and the rampant consumer fetishism that absorbed increasing percentages of the visual landscape (1978: 192). For Benjamin, architecture—understood primarily through the work of Giedion (1995)—was a critical but overlooked aspect of surrealism that had been instrumental in articulating its radicalised relationship with history (see Mertins 1999: 196-221). Giedion (1995) returned to this theme after Benjamin's death and, in his postwar discussion of the collages of Ernst (whom he knew personally), Giedion concluded that: "drops from the nineteenth century flowed in his veins" (1969: 361). This outmoded revolutionary "nihilism" is a significant theme in the work of Bürger who demonstrates that Adorno's (1997) theory of modern art has an *overdependence* on the category of the new.[6] Historically, as in the case of Greenberg (1971),[7] the new was entwined with the concerns of the avant-garde and central to its definition and interpretation. Negating the influence or value of the outmoded, Adorno's 1956 essay on surrealism had argued that it was "paradoxical for something modern, already under the spell of ... mass-production, to have any history at all" (1991: 88).

For Bürger, however, the new was not a characteristic of modernism but a prerequisite of all historical epochs. and it was of little use in explaining the tactics of the historical avant-garde as they were radically outside of the established

4 In this regard, Jane Allison (2010: 21) refers to a *maison trouvée* as a surrealist trope.

5 Focussing primarily on the literary works of early surrealism, Bürger's prior book (from 1971) is, four decades later, still awaiting translation into English (Bürger 1971). Subsequent works by Bürger have addressed surrealism and Dada directly and with some authority (1985-86; 1992; 2002).

6 Bürger is primarily concerned with the passage at the start of *Aesthetic theory* where Adorno explains the new as a dialectical opposition to tradition (Adorno 1997: 45). In an extended analysis of Adorno's theory in relationship to the avant-garde, Peter Osborne (1989: 23-48) has argued that Adorno constructs a theory of modernism divided between dissonance and the new.

7 See, for instance, the contemporaneous "Counter avant-garde" (Greenberg 1971: 16-19). The focus of both Greenberg and Michael Fried (1982: 217-234) was "presentness" which was indelibly entwined with the new.

traditions against which the new could be evaluated. Poggioli makes a similar argument, several years earlier than Bürger. In the final section of his own *Theory of the Avant-Garde*, Poggioli argues that: "[w]hat characterises avant-garde art is the myth of the new ... There is no great difference in the concrete concept that the ancients and the moderns have of the new; but there is an enormous difference in their respective evaluations of it" (1968: 214). Pre-empting Bürger's position, Poggioli concludes that: "nothing is more new and modern than the modern cult of the new" (214).

By placing unprecedented importance on the sublation of art and life as an avant-gardiste preoccupation, Bürger inadvertently provides the dialectic through which a theory of architecture in the historical avant-garde can be established. Architecture, as the predominant frame of social praxis, is connected to art not as *art*, but as a fragment of *reality* that becomes a recurring strategy of both freedom and constraint. The Dada assault on the institution of art was not simply a critique of aesthetic production, but an exhibition of the architecture in which art was displayed, as well as its spatial operations and prejudices. Architecture was interrogated for its attached "bourgeois" values in some contexts as much as for its social and functional symbolism in others.

The systematic negations of Dada and surrealism challenged the autonomy of the architectural object but at the same time embraced the experiential and symbolic characteristics of nineteenth-century commerce, allowing Habermas to argue that the sublation of art and life that the avant-garde intended was ultimately ineffective due to the limited sphere in which its influence was felt. Referencing the work of Bürger, Habermas asks whether the "failure of the surrealist rebellion" is symptomatic of a "farewell to modernity" and equally a transition towards post-modernity (1981: 11). The work of Habermas is centred around a basic faith in the idea and implementation of modernism and the modern project, characterised by the articulation of independent spheres—science, art and morality—which are, for the first time, isolated and "autonomous". In Habermas's critique (1981: 11), he argues that the activities of the avant-garde, while radical, were only ever directed at one of these spheres—the sphere of art—and as a result their impact would never amount to a universal collapse, but purely to the collapse of this one distinct field. This is contrary to the way that the surrealists saw their activities, especially in regard to architecture and the city.

Architecture and life

The argument presented here is that for the surrealists, architecture functioned as a contextual backdrop to the praxis of life. Operating outside the concerns of both aesthetics and the institution of art, architectural space was deployed for its oppositional relationship to these categories and primarily in the visual frameworks of collage, montage, film and photography. There is no doubt that these categories – defined to a large extent by the stewardship of Breton and formalised in the scholarship of both Vesely and Bürger – are contested and imply an artificial harmony to the highly diverse activities of the avant-garde. Current scholarship, however, under-appreciates how architecture functions as a recurring motif in all these activities. Throughout the avant-garde's broad range of aesthetic production, architecture appears as an *objet trouvé*, used selectively (but strategically) to reconnect aesthetic practices with life processes. The emergence of these techniques, in the years immediately after the First World War, provides a critical moment in framing a theory of architecture within the avant-garde. This is indelibly entwined with the cultural history of the image.

Bürger's writing on the tactics of Dada and surrealism (1984: 109n) places a specific emphasis on the time period that spans between the origins of Dada (primarily in the readymades of Duchamp) and the migration to early surrealism as the period in which the claims of avant-gardism were first formulated and pursued. This timeframe – characterised by the emergence of distinctive avant-garde techniques and especially those of collage and montage – was one of productive invention where the traditional strategies of artistic production were radically challenged.[8] Contained in an extended footnote, Bürger provides an important passage that synthesises his theory and the extent to which Dada and surrealism are the principle examples of it. Bürger writes:

> The concept of the historical avant-garde movements used here applies primarily to Dadaism and early surrealism ... A common feature of ... these movements is that they do not reject individual artistic techniques and procedures of earlier art but reject that art, in its entirety, thus bringing about a radical break with tradition. In their most extreme manifestations, their primary target is art as an institution as such as it has developed in bourgeois society. (1984: 109n)

Vesely, on the contrary, denies the relevance of the "avant-garde" period of surrealism in architecture, arguing that "Surrealism does not begin in 1919 or 1924, but much earlier, in the romanticism of the nineteenth century and, to some extent, even earlier in the esoteric hermetic traditions of the Renaissance" (1978: 89). For Vesely, *surrealism* needs to be considered outside of the doctrines that were produced by "Surrealism" and its most prominent members[9] and be regarded as a philosophical and psychological strategy for seeing the world, rather than a specified historical phenomenon. Vesely argues that:

> ... attempts to reduce surrealism to a set of principles and goals—such as automatism, objective chance, transformation of the world and life—do not reveal the primary goal of the movement: to reach an absolute point of reconciliation of dream and reality. (1978: 87)

At stake is the schism between the aesthetic direction of Breton (towards a tightly defined and strategically aligned movement) and the divergent directions of its individual members which challenged all forms of overriding theoretical dogma. Despite this, Vesely sees the relationship between Dada and surrealism as part of a historical framework, whereby the negative tactics of Dada were transformed, through surrealism, into positive affirmations of life. For Vesely, the nihilistic tendencies of Dada, which figure centrally in the dialectical approach of Bürger,[10] predate the primary concerns of surrealism and are disconnected from the real world and the experience of life that structured much of surrealist doctrine. This is antithetical to Bürger's reading, which sees the negation of art process in Dada as the direct conflation of art and life (and the origins of avant-garde radicalism). As both authors acknowledge, there is a tension between the discourse of the 1920s and its often accidental and frequently conflicting practices.

Arguing for surrealism as a sublation of dream and reality, Vesely contends that architecture was not a primary concern of Dada and surrealism as it was "so much embedded in every-day life" (1978: 91). Vesely observes that "reality was always a bitter encounter for the surrealists" and that, while the mediums of poetry or painting could achieve this sublation in the viewer's consciousness, architecture was unable to transcend its status in the real world, marginalising its relevance as a disciplinary activity. However, this neglects the fact that architecture was

8 Dada and surrealism are, by nature, difficult historical paradigms. A number of the historiographical issues in relationship to surrealism are central to recent scholarship (Baker 2007: 25-64).

9 The capitalisation here refers to the Surrealism Movement, officially led by André Breton and whose membership is restricted to the signatories to the various manifestoes of Surrealism.

10 Bürger (1984: 22, 53, 56) evokes Dada as the most extreme manifestation of the avant-garde on a number of occasions.

a powerful and recurring "dream-image" within surrealism and it provided an important and structural role in organising the visual fantasies of the key proponents. This is far more significant than any of the built structures which are the legacy of much of the scholarship in the field.

While accepting the formative emphasis that Vesely places on reality in Dada and surrealism, there are a number of aspects of this position that are underdeveloped. By focussing on architecture as a solitary medium—independent of drawing, painting, the readymade or literature—Vesely imbues architecture with a privileged (built) status that was far from representative of the merging of experimental strategies in the period or, for that matter, the evolution of visual techniques where architecture was fundamentally entwined. In this sense, Bürger's work is critical, as it not only stresses the dissolution of autonomous techniques (and their merging into hybrid and fragmented forms of each other) but it also proselytises the sublation of art and life through the avant-gardiste work of art, demonstrating that "reality" and "functionalism" were specific strategies of the avant-garde assault on bourgeois aesthetic conventions.[11]

While Vesely is sceptical about the role of architecture in the formation of explicitly avant-garde aesthetic strategies, he does illustrate the importance of the readymade object to the historical relationship between architecture and surrealism. Vesely demonstrates that the readymade provided a bridge between the negations of Dada and their positive redemption in the surrealist object and functioned as "[a reminder] of the link which once existed between the spirit of Dada and surrealism, between negation and [the] positive exploration of the new" (1978: 89). As may be clear, Vesely's emphasis on the exploration of the new as a surrealist strategy for overcoming the nihilism of Dada is not without its problems. The category of the new, as Bürger concludes, is both "too general and nonspecific" (1984: 63) and ties interpretation to a particular development of technical ability that is counterproductive in relationship to Dada and surrealism specifically, and art history at large. However, it is not just the dialectical relationship between old/new (Dada/surrealism) that is problematic but the attempt by Vesely to redeem surrealist practices in the name of the new. New architecture was subjected to continual ridicule by the surrealists, especially by Breton and Dali. Breton had famously listed contemporary architecture as the most ineffective of the creative practices and refers to modern architecture as "the most violent and cruel automatism" (1972: 259).[12] At no point was this "a positive exploration of the new". If the theoretical discourse of surrealism and its associated artistic production were frequently misaligned, they operated in unison on this issue.

While Vesely is aware of this ancestry, what he considers the "exploration of the new" was in fact an exploration of the old because, as Vesely is also aware, it was historical and ruined architectures that became the primary inspiration for surrealism and the source of much of its imagery. However, there is also a deeper distinction that needs to be made and one that is critical to the relationship between architecture and the avant-garde. Although the strategies that are associated with the avant-garde are historically tied to the first decades of the twentieth century, they are distinct from the history of modernism and frequently a negation of modernism itself.[13] The historical characteristics of modernism emerge in the wake of the Enlightenment and it is customary to associate the *project* of modernity (to employ Habermas's terminology)[14] with a series of transformations that first began in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. The avant-garde, by contrast, occupies a much tighter historical focus and, more significantly, has its own internal historical forces that, while overlapping with the historical

11 After diagnosing the avant-garde tendency to conflate art and life, Bürger (1984: 50) also articulates the dangers of this process, including the loss of criticality that art assumes with the collapse of its autonomy.

12 A famous example occurs in Breton's "Surrealist situation of the object" (1972: 259). Dali also launched a reclamation of art nouveau architecture in opposition to modernism (Fanés 2007: 90-91; 162-164).

13 The emphasis on Bataille in contemporary readings of surrealism is testament to this. His anachronistic position, celebrated disproportionately in French poststructuralism and American critical theory, is as much a critique of modernism as a radical attack on morality (Spiteri 2009: 1-27; Sulieman 1994: 61-79.

14 First raised in his influential "Modernity: An unfinished project" (translated as "Modernity and postmodernity"), the paper has been the source of ongoing debates concerning modernism and the avant-garde (Passerin d'Entréves & Ben-Habin 1997; Bürger 1985-1986: 5-33).

development of modernism, are essentially unique.[15] In this regard, the emphasis that Bürger and Adorno place on negation is significant, defining the extent to which avant-garde practice is differentiated from modernism (Calinescu 1977: 140).

In architecture, in particular, there is evidence of an alternate consciousness to history outside of the hegemonic structures of academic scholarship, which reveals a deep-seated relationship to avant-garde practice. It is with this "historical consciousness" in mind that an expanded critical framework binding architecture and the historical avant-garde can be constructed. Despite being generally opposed to the inclusion of negation as a strategy of surrealism,[16] Vesely does hint at the prospect of architecture operating as an *objet trouvé* in surrealist practice, shifting concerns away from the *production* of architectural form and towards the creative reappropriation of its fragments. It is this aspect of Vesely's historicisation of Dada and surrealism that, when framed in regard to Bürger's theorisation of the avant-gardist work of art, forms an important trajectory in architectural history particularly in regard to the mechanics of memory and discovery. Given this, the experimental period of Dada and surrealism that Vesely dismisses (1912-1924) is of primary importance, as it is in the discovery of the strategies of the readymade, collage, montage, drawing and photography, that the role of architecture becomes explicit as a central concern of avant-garde activity. Through the construction of highly-structured and deliberate spatial practices, surrealism developed a radicalised architecture to connect the visual and the lived. It is with an understanding of the importance of this transformation that the historical relationship between Dada, surrealism and architecture can be recast.

15 One of the primary limitations of Poggioli's theorising of the avant-garde is its inability to apply a more precise differentiation between the broad history of modernism and the narrow moment of the historical avant-garde. For a critique of this, see Jochen Schulte-Sasse's "Theory of modernism versus theory of the avant-garde" (1984: vii-xv).

16 Again dispelling the nihilism of Dada, Vesely argues that "Surrealism, unlike Dada, exploited the results of negation for its own positive goals, developing and cultivating the technique of surprise and bewilderment toward [the] surrealist crisis of the object" (1978: 91).

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Spinoza's Geometric Ecologies

Peg Rawes

Introduction

This article attempts to examine the material and conceptual relationship between the latest evolution of digital architecture, its turn towards "parametric" languages and materials, and the claim that these methods also establish new environmental characteristics in computation.[1] Set within the context of increasing global pressure for architecture to address environmental issues of sustainability, resource-depletion and pollution, the digital design community has developed a vocal set of agendas through which contemporary high-tech computational architectural design allies itself with environmental interests.

I ask if geometry can indeed be ecological, and if so, for whom, and how can it be of value to architectural design in the twenty-first century? I question the seductive rhetoric of the new parametric discourses to ask if their digital geometric techniques really benefit *diversity* in the architectural community and, more broadly in society, whether they sufficiently address the need for nurturing ecological biodiversity, together with the cultural wellbeing that global and local communities seriously need. I examine a historical example of "geometric thinking" to ask if a "deeper" environmental, conceptual and material mode of analysis exists which can contribute to these debates. Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677) provides an interesting early-modern example of an unusually "ecological" form of geometric thinking in which rational yet *biodiverse* social, cultural and material realms help to question some of the assumptions that the new geometric architectures claim, including whether more democratic design authorship, material difference and ecological relations are possible.

1. Self-same digital parameters

For designers who work with the new "relational" geometries generated by software such as Rhino and Grasshopper, questioning the relationship between geometry and nature may seem a redundant exercise, since "parametric" technologies have been defined as the means through which to achieve complex and self-evolving digital algorithmic or "biological" morphologies. Patrik Schumacher has defined it as a style that:

> ... finally offers a credible, sustainable answer to the drawn out crisis of modernism that resulted in 25 years of stylistic searching ... As conceptual definition of parametricism one might offer the following formula: Parametricism implies that all architectural elements and complexes are parametrically malleable. This implies a fundamental ontological shift within the basic, constituent elements of architecture. Instead of the classical and modern reliance on ideal (hermetic, rigid) geometrical figures - straight lines, rectangles, as well as cubes, cylinders, pyramids, and (semi-)spheres - the new primitives of parametricism are animate (dynamic, adaptive, interactive) geometrical entities - splines, nurbs, and subdivs - as fundamental geometrical building blocks for dynamical systems like 'hair', 'cloth', 'blobs', and 'metaballs' etc. that react to 'attractors' and that can be made to resonate with each other via 'scripts'. (Schumacher 2010)

1 I refer to the most recent digital architecture discourses and practices, rather than earlier generations who developed digital architectures, such as Greg Lynn or Bernard Cache. Mario Carpo's *The Alphabet and the Algorithm* (2011) provides a clear outline of these developments.

Colleagues of Schumacher from London's Architectural Association, Michael Hensel and Achim Menges, have used the term "morpho-ecologies" to define a design "framework ... firmly rooted within a biological paradigm ... [and] issues of higher functionality and performance capacity" (Hensel & Menges 2006: 16). Alternatively, Susannah Hagan has proposed urban ecological parametricism, writing:

> Environmental metrics can be used to generate parametrics. Parametrics are now firmly embedded in experimental design, especially in the digital avant-garde. Here interest is divided between form-finding and the relationship between form and performance in the interests of a new and elegant economy of means. (Mostafavi & Doherty 2010: 462)

Lars Spuybroek's recent book, *The Sympathy of Things* (2011), attempts to generate a genealogical, and unabashedly romantic, account of nature, technology and biological evolution in design through Ruskin and nineteenth-century science. More objectively, Mario Carpo's genealogy of digital architecture defines parametricism as a "function which may determine an infinite variety of objects, all different (one for each set of parameters) yet all similar (as the underlying function is the same for all)" (2011: 40).

Yet for those who are concerned that this most recent fascination with the digital perpetuates the conviction that formal geometric design imperatives can indeed replicate nature, my discussion may also be perceived as misguided on two counts. First, because it appears to continue to restrict ecological architectural research to an idealistic field that falls foul of reductive and market-led, form-driven form-finding, and second, because discussions of advanced technology continue to ignore the *real* complex political, material, environmental and social concerns which *always* constitute the production and inhabitation of architecture. Also, given the fervour displayed in some uncritical claims for its "genetic" diversification and the close identification with ubiquitous technological progress (see my discussion of Antoine Picon below; and Carpo 2011: 142-3), feminist and ecological critics may see it as an obstruction to critically-engaged practice: for example, parametricism's seductive appeal to technocratic markets contrasts strongly with feminist or ecological design that promote low-fi resource recycling, collective authorship or client-led design. However, at a time when mathematics, geometry and computation are presented, yet again, as "new" universal forms of innovation, and when women make up 50 per cent of the students who train in the discipline which is increasingly determined by digital modes of design organisation in the office, a critical and engaged debate about these questions is still important. Below, I therefore also outline how feminist philosophers have *already* convincingly shown that complex material, social and cultural concepts of sexed relations and technicities exist in art, culture, and in science, which have far-reaching value for non-anthropomorphic design agendas. These theories of sexed, non-normative biological difference are necessary for digital architecture because it cites biological processes as the driver for computational production: for example, digital code and scripts are identified as computational "DNA" that "originate" new complex morphological design. Overwhelmingly, however, these discussions also expose the primary purpose to be the generation of new self-similar forms (whether they are topological or geometric). Diverse organic life is reduced to the self-same computational matter, and is frequently underwritten by links back to historical sources such as D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson's classicalal study of evolutionary biological morphology, *On Growth and Form* (1915), rather than sexed understandings that society and environment, mind and matter, are irreducible, coterminous and durational, relations.

Metaphorical alignments between digital code and biological DNA are taken as evidence that architects have now been released from the limitations of human authorship in design processes.[2] In addition, these supposedly bottom-up, non-anthropomorphic design origins are now being associated with materialist philosophies of Manuel DeLanda (2011), and the recent "speculative realist" and "speculative materialist" philosophies of Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who critique anthropomorphic thinking as negative human-centred perspectives and propose a return to objective "facticity".[3] The aim of these associations is to show that architectural design is further embedded in non-ontological meaning; i.e. non-human notions of production. However, although human responsibility, agency and environmental relations in the built environment are clearly urgent discussions, especially given the complexity of contemporary ecological inter-relationships between human-made "nature" (i.e. the built environment) and non-human nature (i.e. the "natural environment"), whether these particular philosophers' emphasis on scientific concepts of non-anthropomorphic complexity is the correct way, is not "a given". Rather, these philosophers can be accused of perpetuating logic that *still fails* to address other *modern* non-anthropomorphic realities, such as the facticity of capital in architectural design markets, or the depletion of non-replaceable material resources. (Digital architects also forget the long aesthetic and materialist philosophical history that has explored the human-nature versus non-human-nature conundrum since the seventeenth century, including Kant's theory of the sublime, and Marx's theorisation of human-nature relations.) More currently, the feminist philosophers I discuss below (including Haraway and Braidotti) have also shown that western, normative subject-centred philosophy does not address the reality that complex *other* "post-human" (i.e. non-anthropocene) relations and subjectivities have also always existed.

The architectural methods referred to here are therefore linked by the belief that recent computational advances originate new universal solutions for experimental and, by implication, commercial approaches to environmental design. But how can complex material and immaterial architectural or geometric difference really be generated out of these self-same definitions of "biological" and universal differentiation when they still clearly elide the *reality* that biodiversity is constituted in other kinds of difference, especially, sex difference? Surely, these approaches continue to ignore more sophisticated understandings about *other* kinds of geometric and biological thinking that may aid greater biodiversity in architectural processes, participants and products. Uncritical promotion of geometric or topological design technologies as *the* solution to the state of "authorship" in the profession, the structure of our built environment, and our environmental relations, needs to be seriously addressed by designers working in the field: not least because their own professional "ecologies" also need to become more complex and informed about understandings of real biological sex difference and the political realities that exist for today's diverse populations and societies.

Below, I explore how Spinoza's geometric ecology is a highly complex expression of natural biodiversity, common in all beings and entities: neither "designed" to anthropomorphically reflect the subject, nor reducible to universal forms or morphologies, genetic code or algorithms. Rather, these geometric and ecological relations generate absolute *alterity* for all: a special kind of technology – "technicity" (Loo 2011) – precisely because nature *and* the subject are conceptually and materially constructed "in process". Contemporary geometric parametric discourses are therefore distinct from the ecological geometry that Spinoza outlines, which resists the desire for instrumentalising "nature" into simple units of production as part of a utopian application of computational processes in the design process.

2 Carpo also warns against overstating the radicality of agency in the new software (and Web 2.0) technologies, since these have clear authorial hierarchies embedded into them (2011: 126).

3 Sanford Kwinter refers to parametricism and these ideas as either "atrocious" or "very interesting" (2011).

2. Processual geometric subjects and nature

Clearly, Spinoza's seventeenth-century conceptualisation of geometric thinking, subjectivity and environmental relations is not derived from our advanced capitalist, technocratic or global contexts. Nevertheless, his thinking is valuable because it challenges the traditional form/matter distinctions that persist in modern non-Euclidian geometries, for all the claims that digital morphologies break with this tradition. This is because his thinking is primarily concerned with the production of the *subject-in-process*, not with the production of idealistic or pure de-ontologised *forms* of knowledge.

Two key concepts form the geometric ecology of these powers: first, Spinoza's concept of "Nature" or "Substance", and secondly his concept of *conatus*, or self-determining agency. Spinoza's processual geometric ecology is derived from his radical notion of nature, which he calls Substance. It is a complex ecological term because it does not merely designate extended material beings, structures or relations: "Existence belongs to the nature of substance" (Spinoza 1992: 34). Instead, Spinoza employs it to construct a complex, immanent (i.e. divine) biodiversity of life in Nature, most strikingly, in the relation God-as-Nature. In conjunction with Spinoza's other wonderfully complex concept of life, "expression", Substance/Nature immanently constitute a plenitude of realities in different modes and scales: from the divine to the common, and from the non-anthropological entity or environment, to the scale of the singular being. Substance's productive power therefore constructs nature's diversity, its potential for change (*Natura Naturans*), and its various modes of existence (*Natura Naturata*) (Spinoza 1992: 51-2). Together, these powers generate a plenitude of ideas, bodies and entities in the world (cf. Darwin's genetic principle). Consequently, substance is a "univocal" concept of life in all its material (i.e. biological and physical) and immaterial (i.e. psychic and divine) manifestations. However, while constituting every singular and diverse entity, Substance is, in itself, infinite: it is *the* primary "cause" of all realities, or the immanent "life-force" in all things, including importantly, architectural and geometric processes.

So, in contrast to contemporary mathematical and geometric methods that classify natural processes under disembodied/non-ontological mathematical logics, Spinoza's geometric thinking is firmly constituted in sensory realms *as well as* in rational relations. All modes of life in this "natural" architecture are imbued with substance's irreducibly material and immaterial powers. In Part IV, for example, Spinoza explains, in forensic detail, how ordinary people express these qualities in their desires and fears, and in their everyday and common ideas (1992: 156-95). Also, interestingly, in the Preface to this Part, he explains how architectural design judgment is material (built) and immaterial (aesthetic) modes of substance (152-4).

> Spinoza brings all entities, whether they are naturally occurring or human-centred, into a special kind of biophysical process, in a manner that also previews important twentieth-century ecological and vitalist theories, including Arne Naess's "deep ecology", Gregory Bateson's "ecology of mind", and Deleuze and Guattari's "geophilosophy". Notably, this life principle is derived from the divine power of God/Nature, contrasting with computational architecture's scripts which are described as self-organised "genetic" code. In Spinoza's "natural" geometry, biodiversity calibrates all entities at all scales, but not reducible to a simple digit or unit of computational code. As a result, he underscores that human subjects and geometric figures are manifestations of *nature-in-process*.

> This ecological notion of immanent differentiation produces absolutely unique expressions of substance: such as, the specificity of trees, stones, horses or dogs; or the difference between feelings of delight, disappointment, rage or fear; the capacity of the emotions to generate action and transformation, or the diversity of physical and psychic expression in architectural ideas or designs. Spinoza's geometric ecology is therefore always inherently concerned with *diverse living* relationships, not just formal or material self-same relations.

Substance also has a complex ecological meta-structure because it expresses a unique triad of relations between the three special geometric "elements" that Spinoza invents – "attributes", "modes" or "affects", and "common notions". These powerful transitive relations also generate an intense diversification into further geometric elements, such as definitions, axioms, propositions, corollaries or scholia. In addition, this complex triadic ecology of relations between the attributes, affects and common notions is an important historical preview of Guattari's influential ecological thinking in *The Three Ecologies* (1989): "only an ethico-political articulate – which I call *ecosophy* – between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify these questions" (Guattari 2000: 19-20).

So, for Spinoza, geometric relations of, and between, bodies are not constructed by disembodied transcendental laws of reason (i.e. ratio), but out of the everyday, common and transformative expressions of body within its own singular environment or habitat. Consequently, we might also say that his attention to the habitus of the subject-in-process previews Haeckel's 1866 definition of the science of ecology that observes the entity in its home, habits, habitat or milieu, or Jacob von Uexküll's theory of *umwelt* (1909) a "biological semiotics" through which he theorised the coterminous existence of the organism with its specialist habitat (e.g. see Deleuze & Guattari 1996: 257; and Grosz 2011). Also, given my concern with a complex *corporeal* technical historicity of geometric expression in the living architectural subjects, architectural history has a significant tradition of examining geometric technologies of bodily mensuration; for example, Pérez Gómez's *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science* (1983), or Evans's *The Projective Cast* (1995) and *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (1997). Evans, in particular, also finds everyday alterity in these "technicities", but Spinoza's project is distinct even from his analysis, because of its attention to the sense-based differentiation that constitutes the body in its habitat (Rawes 2012).

3. Duration, restraint and "sustainability"?

In a recent essay, "Architecture and mathematics: Between hubris and restraint", Antoine Picon has observed the shift from classical principles of geometry to modern mathematical forms of calculus in eighteenth-century European architectural design. Following Leibniz's and Desargues's respective innovations in calculus and projective geometry, he observes that technical advancements in architectural geometric design fundamentally changed power relations between nature, technology and generative design principles. After calculus, Picon notes, design institutes both the potential for "unfettered" invention and "hubris"; it is a loss of "restraint" which, he suggests, bears a resemblance to the contemporary issue of sustainability. He asks if we need a return to mathematic "restraint" in the face of pressing questions about resource depletion, and the need for architectural design which is not primarily determined by the perception that its "power" is located in principles of autonomous genetic digital production.

To conclude on this point, one may observe that this polarity, or rather this balance, has been compromised today. For the mathematical procedures architects have to deal with, from calculus to algorithms, are decidedly on the side of power. Nature has replaced God, emergence the traditional process of creation, but its power expressed in mathematical terms conveys the same exhilaration, the same risk of unchecked hubris as in prior times. What we might want to recover is the possibility for mathematics to be also about restraint, about stepping aside in front of the power at work in the universe.

> As Picon writes: It is interesting to note how the quest for restraint echoes some of our present concerns with sustainability. The only thing that should probably not be forgotten is that just like the use of mathematics, sustainability is necessarily dual; it is as much about power as about restraint. Our contemporary approach to sustainability tends to be as simplistic as our reference to mathematics, albeit in the opposite direction. (2011: 31)

Picon's scepticism of the supposed freedom that its proponents attribute to modern computational forms of geometric invention reflects my discussion about whether the power invested in these new digital processes really is new, effective, or even desirable for meeting the challenges that face the architectural disciplines and the planet today. His discussion also connects with my concern that parametricism repeats the long tradition of disembodied, neutral, or "unsexed" reason. Picon's argument opens up the much-needed space to ask if an-other ecology of geometric relations is possible. However, whilst his critique of the relationship between geometry, proportion, God/Nature and sustainability certainly reflects the key constituents in Spinoza's geometric ecology, Spinoza's notion of "divine" immanence is more radical than Picon's assessment of the ubiquitous modern geometries. In particular, this is because of the value placed on *an ethics of duration* in the constitution of reality.

Spinoza's unique human mode of existence which is immanent in all human endeavour, the *conatus*, generates geometric, aesthetic and architectural modes of expression, yet it is not a subsumption of substance's power to an instrumentalised or anthropomorphic kind of knowledge or power. Rather, Spinoza defines the *conatus* through an ecological imperative because it is durational and processual, for example, when he discusses the right of the entity to an ethics of duration: "the power or *conatus* by which it endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing but the given, or actual, essence of the thing" (1992: 108).

Spinoza's elaborate examination of the genealogy between the attributes, affects and common notions also shifts geometric understanding from disembodied logical deduction into a tripartite ecology that generates biodiversity within the living body, and in its transformative micro-scales of differentiation and sense-knowledge. He carefully explains how the emotions or affects produce the most nuanced and singular expressions of these ecological relations in the subject because they are expressed both psychically and physically: for example, at this micro-level, modes are singular, self-caused capacities of mind and body attributes, yet this relation is also expressed uniquely and variously in the affects, depending upon the specific habitat or circumstances. In Parts III and IV, Spinoza explains how the affects express the genetic plenitude of substance in detail. Crucial to the possibility of a self-evolving subject, the affects – such as happiness, sadness, passion, agency, activity, and passivity – comprise the unique *durational ecologies* (or ratios) of the individual's internal and external relations. Furthermore, when the affects

constitute the common notions, where the differentiated mind and body are in most "agreement", they establish the third stage of this durational ecology, that is, "sense-reason" (Rawes 2008). Here, the freedom (i.e. the capacity to self-evolve) accorded to the individual is generated out of a ratio or ecology that is genetic, natural, yet also, durational. These unique human powers constitute the continuously transitive subject-in-process that is essential for this durational ecology.

Hence, this immanence is not just an "unfettered" principle of plenitude, but is ecological *because* the relations are always durational. Also, importantly, when it is expressed in the common notions, this geometric biodiversity is accessible *to all*. Common ratios or equality are constituted in this third ecological level because these are common-place intuitions, ideas and bodies. Spinoza's natural geometry therefore produces common-place ecologies and common lives. Common notions are ecologies or "life-places" (Thayer 2003) of diverse human subjectivities and relations. Such biodiversity is not just a neutral or value-free materialism, but has the politics of equality at its core. This communal immanence does not inevitably result in unfettered anthropomorphic progress or unethical infinity, but accords with feminist philosophers' ethical biological, cultural and social ecological thinking *for all* (not just for those who can access these values through the market).

4. Sexed biodiversity

As indicated earlier, recent feminist philosophy addresses the productive multiple, aesthetic, political, and material realities of sex difference for *all* sexes (e.g. Irigaray 1994; Haraway 1991; Braidotti 2006; Grosz 2011). In parametric literature there are moments of acknowledging sexual difference, but this is generally just as a scientific biological material, rather than the more radical, bio-political matter: for example, Carpo cites Greg Lynn's introduction to *Folding in Architecture* (2004): "from the identical asexual reproduction of simple machines to the differential sexual reproduction of intimate machines" (2011: 130); and Spuybroek acknowledges sex difference in Ruskin's critique of Darwin's theory of evolution, but restricts it to a discussion of beauty (2011: 293-4). Thus, despite these brief discussions there is little evidence that it is has been actualised as a real "other" origin of self-determining agency in digital architecture's practitioners, cultures or artefacts.

It is also worth remembering that Arne Naess identified Spinoza's work as a precursor to his "deep ecology", especially for understanding the interdependent complexity of human, natural and built relations without recourse to instrumental or human-centred concepts of life:

> The specific thing to be learned from Spinoza ... is, however, to integrate the value priorities themselves in the world ... Spinoza was heavily influenced by mechanical models of matter, but he did not extend them to cover "reality". His reality was neither mechanical, value-neutral, nor value-empty.
>
> This cleavage into two worlds ... [of facts and values] can theoretically be overcome by placing, as Spinoza does, joys and other so-called subjective phenomena into a unified total field of realities. (Naess 1995: 253-4)

Spinoza's theory of Substance/Nature therefore generates not only absolute biodiversity or alterity in all beings (whether they be women, men, animals, trees, stones, geometric figures, etc.), but in his commitment to a "deep" rather than "shallow" value-specific biodiversity, which can be interpreted as a kind of proto-sexed theory of difference.[4] Feminist philosophers Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd, and Rosi Braidotti have previously explored how Spinoza's affirmation of otherness is indeed a precursor to sex difference (Gatens & Lloyd 1999; Braidotti 2006). As such, its political and materialist biodiversity is a valuable historical example where ecologies of geometry, sense, reason and sex are reconfigured, and which may have valuable consequences for architectural design, especially those practices and theories engaged in geometric thinking. In the *Ethics*, then, geometric ecology might even be a sexed technicity: its psychic and biological modes of differentiation constitute a special kind of technicity for generating ecological biodiversity *in* the individual, society, the environment, and *in* contemporary architectural design processes. Spinoza's thinking resists the reduction of difference to simple human-centred (i.e. anthropomorphic) or instrumental understandings of nature and otherness. His affirmation of complex irreducible difference is essential and common in all entities, human and other; although he does not explicitly describe or identify these as sexed (i.e. *not* gender-neutral) differences. More recent feminist philosophy that develops this sensibility in *critical* anlayses of advanced technology, such as digital architectures, includes Donna Haraway's "sympathetic critiques" of advanced technologies (1991), Rosi Braidotti's digital "ethics of care" (2006), Elizabeth Grosz's feminist analysis of Darwin's theory of sex difference (2012), and Lorraine Code's socio-biological ecological thinking (2006). However, if digital geometric practices continue to remain oblivious to political material and immaterial (i.e. psychic) realities, including sexed difference, their claims for innovation are, paradoxically, limited by weak concepts of production which are seriously out-of-date for the needs of *all* twenty-first-century architects, and their societies' *umwelts*, right across the planet.[5]

5. Geometries of wellbeing

Spinoza's geometric method is also relevant for discussions of "happiness" or, in the current parlance, "wellbeing", again resonating strongly with contemporary discussions about aesthetic, ethical and environmental relationship between the subject and his or her lived habits and habitats – be they socio-economic, cultural or ecological. In this sense, then, the *Ethics* is also a psychotherapeutic text that explores our capacity for relationships and relations through an examination of ecologies of mind, body, nature, action and rest, in all modes of reality and for *all* entities, be they human or otherwise (other-wise).

In Parts II and III, this capacity for wellbeing is explored in the union of body and mind in detail. These geometric relations demonstrate his principle of ecological ratio; for example, the "proportionate" activity of the body that is reflected in the mind of its accompanying body to generate an ecology between the body's affections and its physical expressions (Spinoza 1992: 71). Again, this is an ecology of sense and reason and Spinoza's attention to the ecology (i.e. ratio) between the mind and body reflects current attention to wellbeing which has become a new biopolitical zone of value: think, for example, of the current governmental and policy focus on "happiness" in driving architectural agendas, together with the need to address space-ratios in modern housing (see, for example, the New Economic Foundation's (Un)Happy Planet index (http://www.happyplanetindex.org/), or the RIBA's 2011 report on affordable housing space allocation, "The Case for Space" (RIBA 2011)).

Spinoza's geometric ecologies are therefore not driven by formal values, but by the capacity for the singularity to exist in and through its everyday habits and habitats. Unlike traditional understandings of geometry as disembodied forms of intellect/reason, this sustainable duration in the individual (i.e. wellbeing) is formed through an ecology of sense and reason. Natural geometries, or ecologies, are constructed out of the transitive nature of human emotions, enabling agency or self-knowledge in the individual.

6. Sexed biodiverse geometry and architectures

Biodiverse sexed geometric ecologies are also significant because of the continuing split between matters of "reason" and technology, versus "sense" and subjectivity politics, in many debates about ecological architecture. If current script-based geometries continue to reinforce the neutral/value-free universalism of western thought, and ignore "other" modes of subjectivity that are not restricted to simple models of anthropomorphic nature, matter or life, they perpetuate the self-same identity of neutral architectural identities, processes or histories from which they claim to break. Without a conversation about biodiverse sexed geometry, histories and theories of biodiverse ecologies and technicities that embed real difference will continue to be ignored, and technological and ecological values will continue to be seen as at odds with each other.

This discussion also reflects my concern about the way in which feminist theories of relations still often oppose the possibility that sexed ecologies and technologies can exist together, relying upon the essentialist division between sense "as female", versus reason as an exclusively "male" concern and consequently always negative forms of rational thought. In this formulation, sexed ecologies are effectively consigned permanently to understand ecology as anti-reason (e.g. Irigaray's outright rejection of technology; Irigaray 1993). Without addressing these schisms, feminist architects (male and female) will continue to be consigned to a-technological realms, rather than offering alternative notions of sexed technicities. The issue of ubiquitous technology versus the political, self-directed agency of the subject in environmentally responsive architecture has also been clearly established since the United Nations' 1987 Brundtland Report prioritised economic sustainability, enabling the architectural marketplace to generate sustainable development through anthropomorphically-driven "shallow" or "instrumentalised" technological remediation. Yet feminist discussions of nature and architecture which continue to view technology as *always* damagingly instrumental or alienating to society also perpetuate this exclusive split. However, thinkers such as Braidotti, Haraway and Grosz have offered more challenging accounts of sexed technologies and science which are of value to those in architecture who really desire building truly biodiverse ecologies.

Spinoza's commitment to a technical sense-based ecology firstly therefore enables building new geometric ecologies in the discipline, and consequently, for the societies, and the human and natural environments in which we live and work. Secondly, it enables a re-activation of the relationship between technology and reason *for*, and *by*, sexed subjects, and to question the reliance that feminist ecological critique has placed upon the relationship between sense, sex and the environment, yet to the exclusion of sexed reason and technology from these debates. Ecological difference, then, for Spinoza, is not just concerned with the production of a universal world composed of unique, rational, singular beings. Rather, this geometric biodiversity is unique within the history of geometric ideas for reconfiguring disembodied self-same geometry into biodiverse sexed ecologies.

4 Fritjof Capra writes: "Shallow ecology is anthropocentric. It views humans as above or outside of nature, as the source of all value and ascribes only instrumental or use value to nature. Deep ecology does not separate humans from the natural environment, nor does it separate anything else from it. It does not see the world as a collection of isolated objects but rather as a network of phenomena that are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent" (Sessions 1995: 20).

5 The forthcoming collection, *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, (Rawes 2013) addresses the need for socio-economic, cultural and sexed concepts of nature in architectural and spatial disciplines and includes chapters by Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz, Lorraine Code and Verena Conley.

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Invited paper

Shotgun Houses and Housing Projects: Architectural typology and memory techniques of two New Orleans reconstruction scenarios[1]

William Taylor

This world has never been short on disaster. Nevertheless, given recent events and trends in scholarly literature and popular media, one can argue that urban disasters are acquiring new and complex meanings. This situation is partly due to the global expansion of urban societies where–in "the city"–the impacts of disastrous events are most clearly recognised (Davis 2002: 360-99; Schneider & Susser 2003). The topicality of disaster is also most likely partly due to the mix of seemingly universal 24-hour television news coverage, remote sensing and digital and novel social media that create new and ever larger publics and possibly public 'demand' for catastrophic events (Ashlin & Ladle 2007). Making for an even more complex picture, the growth in disaster studies, drawing on these and other sources, brings an array of conceptual frameworks and concerns (like risk and urban vulnerability) to the fore. The growth in number and authority of agencies responsible for the delivery of disaster relief, mitigation and planning, and for directing reconstruction efforts, has come to impose different agenda and interventions on disaster-struck populations. These include multiple levels of government, corporate and private agencies, and NGOs.

To this *mélange* of different ways of knowing, representing and managing disaster, architects, planners and allied design professionals bring their own varied perspectives. Their expertise is often in competition with other authorities, with commonplace reasoning and popular belief on the best course of action following a disastrous event and, increasingly, with so-called 'community-led' design and reconstruction initiatives. Community-led design and reconstruction is problematic, practically and ethically, at the best of times (Taylor & Levine 2011: 174-7) and made even more so when rebuilding involves different kinds of communities, and mixed public and private interests. While the stock-in-trade language of architectural and urban form may sometimes provide for common ground between these different authorities and interests, there is nothing to guarantee consensus on any single vision, urban plan or building type for the re-emergent city. This is not surprising given that all such plans are value-laden and unavoidably fraught with ethical decisions at virtually every stage.

This essay enlarges on the connection between reconstruction discourse and renewal of typological analyses. In architectural history and theory, the utility (but also imprecision) of typological methods was acknowledged by its early proponents among Enlightenment scholars and architects (Leach 2010: 62). More broadly, opportunities for categorising and formally describing material artefacts like buildings in a number of ways speak to the epistemological confines of empirical understanding in an indeterminate field. Knowledge of distinctive building forms and reasoning used to relate building types to historical and performative contexts is generated (though not always sharpened) by catastrophic episodes in which urban fabric and 'normal' ways of inhabiting it are made tenuous or entirely destroyed. Typological analysis and reconstruction strategies initiated by ascertaining the 'right' architectural forms with which to rebuild invariably highlight aspirations for civil society and these are invariably mixed. These aspirations are as likely driven by wishful thinking, false memory and hopes as by sound design plans based on competing values.

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This essay outlines one set of case studies: two "typologies of Katrina" that informed debate over the reconstruction of New Orleans. It questions the roles that architectural type, community and memory play in these two reconstruction scenarios. Arguably, Katrina introduced a new genre of dystopia into popular and political thinking, where the failure of a society was written large. Katrina was distinctive insofar as it was less a natural catastrophe (due largely to flooding, etc) than it was a largely preventable social and political one–driven and made possible by poor decision-making (engineering, social, political/ethical) before, during and after the event. Equally, given the scale of Katrina's devastation and impact on the social imaginary, the building types proposed for the city's reconstruction acquire an even greater utopian–and hence, propositional (also 'unreal')–character for manifesting beliefs about how people are supposed to live. Historically, in Western discourse, utopian and dystopian thinking were often intertwined–the idealism of the former was seldom far from an alternative reality of seemingly insurmountable challenges–and this holds true when contemplating these two scenarios.

Design for traumatised communities

The broad literature of disaster studies suggests there are significant historical and cultural circumstances that make each disastrous episode unique. Nonetheless, historical research can articulate broad patterns of perception, reflection and choice that are characteristic of particular settings and times. When looking to recent developments, much disaster commentary–at least in Western media–has come to resemble a set of problems organised around the needs of traumatised communities. This is an object of governance and planning conceived in different ways. On the whole, it is presupposed to be an organic unity that connects urban populations, their past and place in a meaningful and socially significant manner (for example: Furedi 2007; Glavovic 2008). In August 2006, one year after Katrina, the *Journal of Architectural Education* dedicated a special issue to New Orleans and its reconstruction. The opening editorial includes claims presupposing enduring links between a community conceived as an organic unity, its building heritage imagined as a mnemonic vehicle, and the city's unique setting. Though largely unsupported (and perhaps unsupportable, as they are fundamentally existential assertions), the following proposition would likely find agreement across the range of disaster studies and resonate in commonplace reasoning:

> The culture of New Orleans is unique. It is a mix of ancient heritage with layers and adaptations added by successive generations, resulting in a singularly beautiful cultural mosaic of elements. Hurricane Katrina destroyed buildings–though not in the city's historic core–and displaced hundreds of thousands of people, but it cannot wipe out the memories and spirit of the citizens. (Allen 2006: 4)

Allowing for civil liberties to enter this mix of ideas, the journal's editor, Barbara Allen, adds, "It is necessary to enable every citizen to come back to this exceptional city if they so desire." (2006: 4) Given that such memories and desires are not univocal–and indeed they both often contain competing visions of what was and should be after a disastrous event–it is not surprising they should result in competing expectations for reconstruction efforts.

The "right of return" for New Orleans refugee residents featured in heated debates over the city's future, alongside concerns expressed for the possible violation of rights behind what was regarded by many observers as the hasty and possibly

unwarranted demolition of thousands of storm and flood-damaged houses during the first year after the storm (Allen 2006: 4-5). The situation of poor tenant-occupiers was in many ways even worse, their dispersal and diminished political voice making it difficult to re-assert a community's voice into local and national decision-making.

For housing activists, the situation of many New Orleaneans made for the environmental and bureaucratic (both governmental and corporate) equivalent of 'urbicide'. This is a term which circulated in the 1990s to describe the systematic destruction of urban communities and places as a strategy of war. It is typically reserved for places like Sarajevo, Mostar and Fallujah, but has a lineage reaching back to 1960s North American precedents when it signified the destructive effects of modernist urban renewal schemes (Huxtable 1972; Graham 2003). Herscher writes:

> Resuscitated in the context of post-Yugoslavia's violent conflicts, however, the destruction signified by urbicide radically expanded. Against the idea that post-Yugoslav cities were destroyed because of military necessity or through collateral damage, urbicide posed the target of destruction as the city itself–as an ensemble of architecture, a community of citizens, a medium of collective memory, or even the site of civilization as such. The concept of urbicide provided a new category to conceive of political violence, a violence that could be framed as at once urban, deliberate, and illegitimate. (2006: 18)

What is intriguing about claims such as Allen's and the concept of "urbicide" is a common, underlying intellectual project that subsumes psychological and sociological domains of reasoning under a distinctive experience of community, place and memory. In other words, the common belief that memory is an intrinsic part of the human condition of shock and loss gives form to a theory of how urban communities experience disaster. This seems to be problematic as it invites thinking that it is largely anachronistic, in that communities are believed to be formed partly by memories of a place, but memory is neither a collective faculty nor is it necessarily geographically bounded. Whose memories are included and whose are not? Are these truly memories of one place or do they also draw on other real or imagined places?

The shotgun house

The first typology of Katrina speaks to the ambiguous place of official histories in post-disaster reconstruction and the tendency to justify rebuilding projects as restoring communities by somehow reinstating building fabric. Writing on New Orleans rarely fails to mention the distinctive character of its timber-framed houses, including its elongated "shotgun" houses, one of the city's more ubiquitous residential building types. The shotgun has long featured in writing on the towns and rural landscapes of the southern United States, particularly the Delta region. This tendency contributes perhaps to a prevailing and overly-romanticised view of the region's past in accounts that risk downplaying some aspects of the building's history–for instance, its association with slave quarters and the slave-holding plantation system. Painting an idyllic picture of Delta life in his account of southern rural architecture (specifically, the country store), historian Thomas Clark described towns where "There was no wiser spot on earth than the porches which jutted out from the long shotgun buildings." (1944: 56) Writing in 1974 on the state of race relations in the South, a correspondent for *The Times* (of London, January

14: 12) begins by confirming a popular caricature of the region: "The American South is still unmistakably southern: words with the edges rounded off, magnolias in the front yard, grits at breakfast, blacks living in shot-gun shacks, locals nodding hello to strangers."

Scholarship on New Orleans architecture commonly emphasises the provenance of the building in the unique circumstances of the city's history and culture, and the alluvial environment of the Gulf Coast states–though varied reasons are given why so many of the houses were built there. For much of its history the Crescent City was an entity bounded, physically and conceptually, on all sides by water, with swamps and marshlands encircling only limited buildable land, particularly before the arrival of technology in the 1920s that allowed large-scale draining of wetlands and other technical, socio-economic and political developments that facilitated outward suburban development. This was where, in times past, cut from indigenous cypress forests long since buried by suburbia or from the pine woods that still stretch far to the north, reserves of timber were available to build these narrow forms that fit restricted building sites. Variations on the type, owing to the circumstances of site, family size, the measure of wealth or the personal tastes of residents, add to assessments of the city's architectural heritage. New Orleans is a place where most likely every native can distinguish between a "double shotgun" where two dwellings are attached, a "camelback shotgun" where a second floor is added at the rear of the plan, and a shotgun with a wraparound porch (Vogt 1985: 22-23).



186 KNIFFEN—LOUISIANA HOUSE TYPES [Dec.

ward-facing gables and one-room depth, in addition to its two storeys. The second and numerically less significant two-storey house is square with a pyramidal roof.

6. *Shotgun.*—The folk-term here employed is commonly used in Louisiana to designate a long, narrow house. It is but one room in width and from one to three or more rooms deep, with frontward-facing gable (Fig. 9). Additional data will very likely suggest several sub-types.

FIG. 9.—Shotgun type.

7. *Bungalow.*—Like the preceding this type belongs to the general group of houses possessing frontward-facing gables. It differs in having a width of two rooms. It is two or more rooms deep (Fig. 10). The type appears

FIG. 10.—Bungalow type.

to be recent in Louisiana, and if it has roots in older folk types of the state they are not obvious.

Fig 1. F. B. Kniffen, (1936). Louisiana House Types. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers 24 (4)* (December), p. 186

Histories accounting for southern regional and New Orleans architecture commonly yield a partial or undiscerning view of the shotgun house. They render it as both an inherently functional building type and autochthonous or organic, growing from the roots of longstanding tradition–hence, its adoption and interpretation as a vehicle for memory. In his now classic paper "Louisiana House Types", geographer, anthropologist and folk historian Fred Kniffen constructs a typology of the state's vernacular buildings, in post-European settlement (Fig. 1), and a qualitative and quantitative mapping of its built environment he described as "culturogeographic" (1936: 179). While Kniffen's paper accounts for the number and distribution of nine Louisiana house types across the state, its descriptive narrative and maps were also, in the end, aiming to arrive at "an [aerial] expression of ideas regarding houses–a groping toward a tangible hold on the geographic expression of culture" (1936: 192). However, without a historical accounting of the sources for and history of this culture, the paper merely outlines their geo-spatial diffusion (Vlach 1976: 47-49). Seventy years after Kniffen's paper was published, designers of post-disaster housing for New Orleans searched for such a tangible "expression of culture" in their appropriation of the shotgun building type.

Fig. 2. Lower Ninth Ward, New Orleans. [Photo: Kukame McKenzie (July 2010)]

Fig. 3. Project for Make It Right Foundation (MIR) in the Lower Ninth Ward, New Orleans. Trahan Architects. The architects' description of the project on the MIR website begins: "The shotgun typology is a resultant of site constraints, environmental conditions and efficient planning. The approach to the project was to identify these main characteristics and represent them in a more contemporary fashion." [Photo: Kukame McKenzie (July 2010)]

Reconstruction plans for the city's flooded districts included assorted allusions to, copies of and reinterpretations of the building type (Figs. 2 & 3). The design competition brief for 150 new houses in the Lower Ninth Ward (where approximately 4000 houses were destroyed) sponsored by American actor Brad Pitt and his "Make It Right" foundation allowed for only two models to be emulated: single-family detached units derived from the shotgun type and "the duplex", a multi-family home. Results show wide-ranging formal interpretations of these models with added features, making both building types "modern": aesthetically innovative, and responsive to demands for ecological sustainability and twenty-first century environmental risks:

> The thirteen architects who contributed to single family home designs all hewed to the traditional New Orleans shotgun house format–simple, narrow and fashioned to fit the long skinny lots in the Lower 9th Ward. They also all include porches–a feature highly valued in the neighbourhood that places a premium on sociability and connectedness to the community. All of the homes have more complex floor plans, solar panels, rain water collectors and other green features. (Make it Right 2009: 'Building Green')

As Stephen Verderber (2010) explains, the origins of the New Orleans shotgun house may owe more to contingencies of cultural importation than any obvious and necessary organic link between a people and a place. Consequently, the building type's re-interpretation in the Lower Ninth Ward could be viewed as historically anachronistic, fundamentally impractical (particularly in Katrina's

wake) or possibly self-indulgent on the part of its architects and sponsors. Verderber cites John Vlach's 1976 study of the shotgun that challenged received wisdom regarding the building type's origins and argued that:

> ... in the development of the shotgun house we find an Afro-American artefact that has been adopted by Whites and effectively incorporated into popular building practices. The significance of this postulated cultural borrowing cannot be overlooked for it represents an important contribution of Afro-Americans to the cultural landscape. (Vlach 1976: 47)

This connection to African-American identity and the building type's likely historical provenance in places far removed from Louisiana, like Haiti and other Caribbean islands, does not in itself render the shotgun irrelevant as a model for reconstruction (at the time of its inundation and near complete destruction the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans was largely black, supporting one likely argument for the building's legitimacy). However, the building's ambiguous provenance does raise questions why one should accept *prima facie* the iconic status of the shotgun and privilege its continued use as a model when other features of the Ninth Ward's sociology and urban morphology were so radically altered by Katrina and the *tabula rasa* that followed in its wake? While many of the former residents wishing to return to New Orleans may still speak in words "with the edges rounded off" as the reporter for the *Times* observed in 1974, is it ideal they now be obliged to live in "shot-gun shacks" reproduced in such exotic variety?

Historical anachronism aside, there are at least two problems, neither one strictly architectural (or subject to a designer's control), with outcomes from the Make It Right scheme that are wrong for New Orleans–that work against the design brief's aspirations for "sociability and connectedness to community". Firstly, the protracted pace of reconstruction coupled with an overall redevelopment drive that must be recognised as ad hoc has resulted in the replacement of only a small number of the 4000 houses lost in the Lower Ninth Ward. Designs by international architects and competition winners sit alongside the few additional houses built by other means and the greater number of vacant, neglected and weed-ridden lots, resulting in a community that appears spread too thin and proves hard to service with public utilities, fire prevention and police services. Secondly, in the absence of agreement on a strong, centralised planning regime for the entire region–of the kind able to undertake a full range of initiatives, including the permanent depopulation and ecological restoration of some areas if necessary–commendable, but nonetheless piecemeal efforts such as Brad Pitt's will continue to apply band-aid remedies to a gaping wound. These problems render any appeal to memory as the basis of placefulness and heritage particularly tenuous.

Housing projects

The second typology of Katrina raises questions more about the buildings that are destroyed *after* a disastrous event and histories forgotten or only partially remembered, than about models for rebuilding per se; it raises more fears for the purposeful erasure of history than the past's reinstatement. A curious aspect of post-Katrina reconstruction was that while efforts were being undertaken to devise and build new building types responsive to the heritage of the place and its venerable stock of residential architecture, remnants of the city's public housing still standing after the storm were being torn down. At a time when much of the pre-storm population was unable to return home owing to the shortage of

habitable accommodation, both activities–the building of neo-shotguns and further destruction of housing and its replacement by quasi-traditional buildings–were justified as means of restoring community.

Targeted for whole or part destruction before the storm, four of the city's biggest public housing estates dating from the 1940s and 1950s provided accommodation for about 3077 families. Some residential units in some parts of the older estates were subsequently flooded, but otherwise survived intact, or so it seemed to outward appearances. The solid-looking forms and brick walls of the residential blocks provided a rallying point for housing activists and some former residents protesting their demolition at a time in which emergency housing was sorely needed. This outcome figured in broader debates over the likely political alienation of the city's African-American population if the public housing estates were to be destroyed (Gardner, Irwin & Peterson 2009). Circumstances surrounding the demolition of one estate, the Magnolia or C. J. Peete Projects located in the 11th and 12th Wards of New Orleans, are indicative of conditions impacting on the other sites.

Originally named for the tree-lined street along its northern border, the Magnolia Projects was built in 1940, then expanded and nearly doubled in size in 1955. It was one of six public housing projects opening that year and one of four (along with the Calliope, Lafitte, and St. Bernard projects) designated for black tenants in accordance with segregationist practices of the time (the other two projects, St. Thomas and Iberville, were reserved for low-income white residents). The Magnolia Projects was conceived as part of a nationwide program formed in the 1930s aimed at alleviating the deplorable living conditions experienced by many of America's low-income residents. On the site of the Magnolia Projects, knowledge of prevailing design standards and functional relationships for attached, single-family dwellings, coupled with cost-effective building methods and planning and construction practices exercised by national and municipal housing authorities established (in the 1930s) for the purpose, resulted in a total of 1403 standardised residential units accommodating approximately 2100 people. Mahoney writes that:

> The early New Orleans projects were some of the most attractive and best constructed in the nation. They were designed as a mixture of townhouses and apartments in 2- and 3-story buildings, arranged in courtyards built around grassy lawns. Some had curving driveways. On most of the sites, trees had been preserved. (1990: 1268)

Located in an uptown district commonly known as Mid-City, the site contained a significant African-American, but nonetheless mixed, population. The historical urban morphology of Mid-City was characterised in many areas by smaller-scale housing typically occupied by poorer citizens (and in some places grouped around a neighbourhood cemetery), with larger and more elaborate houses surrounding these and finally, mansions for the city's wealthy elite lining the avenues and boulevards that connected one district to another. New Orleans was racially segregated from an early date–socially, culturally and politically. *Spatially*, the dispersion and mix of races and classes was commonly more finely-grained than in other cities, though this heterogeneous condition was dynamic and variable. It was affected, for instance, firstly, at the larger scale of the New Orleans metropolitan area by the phenomenon of "white flight" which gained speed in the 1960s. Secondly, localised developments like the Magnolia Projects altered the racial composition of urban districts–including perceptions of the character of resident populations–providing sites for the further formation of racial and socio-economic identities as well as racial prejudices.

The construction of the public housing estates in New Orleans contributed to a more pronounced racial, spatial and symbolic order in the city. Conceived largely as an internalised domain, the building of C. J. Peete furthered what would subsequently be called by urban sociologists the "ghettoization" of urban space. Site planning resulted in the closing of thoroughfare streets and the creation of linear parks and common yards around which the new residential buildings were grouped.

By the 1980s and 1990s, the worsening physical condition and deteriorating infrastructure of the development, as witnessed in many public housing estates across the United States, was coupled with high rates of crime and chronic unemployment among residents, alcohol and drug dependency and a host of additional social problems. In the years just before Katrina, crime rates there had become legendary. Plans to partly or wholly demolish and then redevelop the project for local residents were initiated in the 1990s, though by 2005 only the 1955 expansion had been razed. Many of the remaining buildings were vacant and fenced off when the hurricane hit and the city's failed storm defences flooded the area with between two and four feet of water and water-borne contaminants.

C. J. Peete was initiated in 1941 with an act of "slum clearance" but ended up providing rubble for a second wave of urban and social reform. By 2007, when an "Environmental Justice" report commissioned by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development delivered a comprehensive assessment of the project's physical state and future potential, the elusive goal of social reform had become further complicated. It was broadened to accommodate not only updated design standards, but ruling neo-liberal expectations for market-led redevelopment. The report found that:

> The C.J. Peete Housing Development suffers from high density, overpopulated units, deteriorated buildings and infrastructure, obsolete building components, hazardous building materials, and building envelopes that are not energy efficient. Demolition and reconstruction of the Development will convert a conventional public housing development into a new, mixed-income and mixed-use community that includes

Fig 4. Harmony Oaks (formerly C. J. Peete) housing estate, January 2012 [Photo by the author]

> rentals and home ownership units in New Orleans. The final Master Plan must create a blueprint for a successful, stable, diverse, safe, attractive and sustainable mixed-income community. (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2007: 12)

In a move suggestive of the marketing common in much commercial residential development, but also highlighting the desire to distance the new complexes from their impoverished, crime-ridden pasts, the four public housing estates were re-named. C. J. Peete, having acquired its name through re-christening in honour of its African-American manager who administered the estate from 1952 to 1978, was made-over a second time and called Harmony Oaks (Fig. 4). Expectations that the resulting design should satisfy multiple demands for relatively low-cost housing and market desirability, security along with consumer choice and the aesthetic trappings associated with "community", resulted in a neo-traditional architectural style common to commercial projects throughout the United States. This was sanctioned by government authorities, including the requirement that all proposed construction design have prior approval from the Louisiana State Heritage Preservation Office and the American Council on Historic Preservation. Guidelines required the "Louisiana Vernacular, Victorian, and Classical styles ... in a combination of single, double and small apartment buildings" (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 2007: 12).

A back-cover advertisement appearing in the New Yorker by investment firm and financial backer for Harmony Oaks, Goldman Sachs, reveals only part of the story behind the project:

> After one of New Orleans' oldest public housing developments was devastated by Hurricane Katrina, we invested in rebuilding it from the ground up. Our Urban Investment Group partnered with an experienced developer, McCormack Baron Salazar, as well as former tenants, neighbourhood organisations, and state and local housing agencies to enable families and businesses to return home. Today, Harmony Oaks is a community where neighbours can come together–on their new front porches, at the local community center or the nearest playgrounds. (June 6, 2011)

While the condition of much New Orleans public housing was truly deplorable by September 2005, its dereliction was only partly due to Katrina and the impact of stormwater and floodwater on building fabric. Its redevelopment, though generally praised as delivering positive social outcomes (residents are reported as experiencing greatly reduced rates of crime and other improvements improvements, see Reckdahl 2006), has failed in other regards. However, this failure is not so much a consequence of physical infrastructure, or the availability of consumer "choice" allowed for by buildings for purchase or rent that are clothed in a range of historicist styles, but rather a broader range of circumstances.

Fig. 5 Columbia Parc (formerly St. Bernard) housing estate [Photo: author, January 2012]

By August 2011 many residents had not returned. Among the former residents of the "Big Four" public housing estates, roughly half–1512–of the 3077 households there before the storm had returned to the city. Roughly seven percent of these original families have returned to the four sites, including 70 families to Harmony Oaks (Reckdahl: 2006). The new developments may look historical, but they cater to the modern reality of private car ownership to a far greater degree than their predecessors on the sites. Thoroughfare streets have been re-established in some places while the rear areas of some residential zones have been formed into large parking lots (two design features which also facilitate enhanced surveillance and policing). Resembling many "New Urbanist" projects across the US, tenancy in Harmony Oaks requires adherence to regulations of a kind commonly found in more upper-class gated communities and aimed at controlling "anti-social" behaviour. Following interviews with returned residents, one observer reports on the outcomes, both positive and negative:

> For instance, they said, at Harmony Oaks, residents can't use outside water to fill a kiddie pool or let their grandchildren run through the sprinkler. Nor can they dig up their backyards to plant gardens, a source of frustration for the sisters, who grew up helping their mother pick crates of strawberries and hampers of beans. But, on Saturday, just as Jennings worked up a head of steam about other nettlesome rules, including one that limits how many people can sit on a porch and when they can do it, a granddaughter toddled up to her, removed a pink pacifier and puckered her lips for a smooch. (Reckdahl 2006)

Crime, though considerably reduced on the estate, has returned–and by some accounts has equalled or exceeded pre-storm rates–across broader swathes of the city. Arguably, in terms of this one indicator of community security and well-being, New Orleans has itself become "The Project" within which Harmony Oaks and the other housing estates (Fig. 5) are an ideally conceived and just partly realised reserve of relative tranquillity (Naughton 2006: 230).

Conclusion

The destruction of large parts of New Orleans in 2005 sparked interest in reviving historical building forms, with many, like the timber-framed shotgun house, having been destroyed or hastily condemned after the inundation. However, questions arise over just what was being revived. Does the attention given to a single building type, row of shotgun houses, or a sprinkling of homes designed as contemporary "updates" on vernacular or historicist styles, ignore bigger issues relating to the reconstruction of entire urban districts, the return of their inhabitants and the accommodation of diverse needs and desires for community? For instance, is it historically anachronistic and possibly irresponsible to focus on rebuilding districts like the Lower Ninth Ward, when their abandonment and rehousing of former residents elsewhere is more likely to reduce overall urban vulnerability and enable communities to develop their own distinctive character, free from longstanding risks?

There are not only practical aspects to these and comparable efforts to revisit or adapt historical building types in order to restore urban infrastructure after a disaster, but also ethical or moralising agendas, in which notions of history, individual recollection and public memory are freely–and often unthinkingly–mixed. There is often an underlying imperative to repair shattered lives and restore historical continuities disrupted by catastrophic events; there is accompanying rhetoric describing elusive goals to facilitate individual emotional recovery and social cohesion by making the built environment 'whole' again.

Conceivably, one of the effects of this tendency is to highlight, but also obscure, boundaries between domains of social and psychological reasoning, so that memory becomes something less than precise–less amenable to analysis by one or other theory of the past, cognition or collective mnemonics. Rather, in these instances memory provides a humanist gloss, more or less explicit in reconstruction plans, that substantiates a range of ideological, economic and/or political agenda served by rebuilding.

Arguably, the wide variety of possibilities, concepts and terms for describing an architectural or building type–like such comparably abstract entities as community, place and memory–accounts for the conventional status of such terms in urban, architectural and disaster reconstruction discourses. Clearly, when urban disaster strikes, ambiguity may accommodate a mixture of motives for re-building, commemoration and social engineering. In the context of post-Katrina New Orleans, efforts to revive or reinstate and adapt the forms of historic housing were not only varied as aesthetic interventions (to revive, to adapt, etc.). They were also mixed in terms of underlying motives and social outcomes. Some efforts called upon the architectural history of New Orleans, in the attempt to restore or reinvigorate what was presumed to be the organic link between the city, its cultural heritage and built environment. Others called upon images of shotgun houses, French Quarter townhouses or Garden District cottages for their popular appeal or marketability, or for their connection to New Urbanist ideals and other prevailing planning movements. In each case, typological analysis (being a manner of descriptive classification) slides quickly into topological assertion: the study of places and the assumption that each place has a distinctive character that is potentially generative of building forms. Topology was once understood as, "The art of assisting the memory by associating the thing to be remembered with some place or building, the parts of which are well known." (Oxford English Dictionary 1989) Observing the ambivalence of these terms and analyses raises possibilities for aesthetic, ethical and political criticism of particular recovery settings and scenarios.

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Non-refereed Papers

Deranging Oneself in Someone Else's House

Hannah Lewi

Image credit: All images in this paper by the author, Manning Clark House visit, 2011

> Such a house, killed by its very emptiness and the superstitions that have built up in the region, is a haunted house [*une maison visionee*]. The devil comes there in the night. (Anthony Vidler 1992)

The following piece of writing is part of a larger project that reflects on iconic or significant houses that have, in some mode or another, been transformed into a genre of image-object that architecturalises and disseminates historiography, primarily through the art of mnemotechnics. The research asks how we come to know and experience houses that are not necessarily our own, but that we have more than limited access to because they have been retained as embalmed objects of shared interest? Of particular concern to my study are twentieth-century houses that have been preserved in a suspended or memorialised state of semi-newness because of their importance to the historiography of Modernity: a history intimately bound up with elevating the domestic and the private to the realm of architectural significance. The writing teases out claims made about the potency of shared memories residing in museum-houses, and the roles they play as document-objects.

I have set myself the research program of attempting to stay for extended periods in a range of these modern heritage or museum-houses. The rationale is to chart the unfolding experience of sites that are on the one hand still homes, yet also acknowledged as public places. These houses are therefore somehow familiar yet also strangers. J. G. Ballard imagined in his story *The Thousand Dreams of Stella Vista* (1962) a psychotropic house equipped with sensory memory cells that could adjust the ambient mood of the house to the pleasures or anxieties of those who inhabited it. However, even without such wizardry, houses are potent domestic sites of embodied histories, memories and experiences that also frame our own inner identities, anxieties and memories.

What follows is a story about coming to know such a house as an "image-object": the house where the Australian historian Manning Clark lived in Canberra for his later life. It is written in part as a travel diary documenting personal experience,

in part as a theoretical explication, and in part as notes towards an unfolding three-episode play. Although perhaps unconventional, this mode of writing seems appropriate for heritage interpretation which, as a mode of history-telling, borrows heavily from the dramatic genre to create displays that are part "real" and part "fabrication". By self-consciously exploiting alternative narrative voices, this piece contributes to the exploration of topologies of memorialising the past that are sensory, gestural and imaginary, and that perhaps uncover some glimpses into the psychic character of such museum-houses for the architectural historian. The writing is intentionally fragmented and episodic, and retains all the awkward bumps of personal experience and revelation. The writing wants to dangerously stray across academic territories: history, biography, and architectural documentation. As John Docker has advised on the writing of history:

> ... to potentially derange texts from the usual kinds of treatment they receive – one has to take risks – one has to derange oneself, make sideways moves, go over the top and keep going, journey deep within oneself. One has to cultivate method as a kind of madness. (2000)

EPISODE ONE: first impressions

I held no particular regard for the now somewhat infamous historian Manning Clark before this visit. I was more interested in his house, designed by Robin Boyd in 1952. Navigating my way through the ring-roads of Canberra I arrive outside the discretely engraved Manning Clark House sign in Tasmania Circle in the suburb of Forrest, the original heart of Walter Burley Griffin's plan of the southern residential area of the city. There are other small signs of organisational formality not usually found in a private house: a poster of upcoming Manning Clark Foundation events; a portrait of Clark; a visitor sign-in book on the entry table.

I drop my bag and laptop on the rug inside the door. Through the glazed hall I see a man sitting at a wooden table in the courtyard on the other side of the house. He is reading with a large pot of tea in front of him. He gets up and shakes my hand enthusiastically, and introduces himself as one of Manning Clark's sons: "Would you like a quick tour of the house?"

What is *he* doing here?

Does *he* live here?

Do I have to share my weekend with *him*?

He tells me that this outside courtyard is a long-time favourite place to sit and catch some northern sun. Interspersed between staccato questions about who I am and what I am doing here, he offers to show me around the house before he needs to catch his bus back to Sydney. At a quick glance the house uses a familiar Boyd palette: lightly bagged brick walls, pale painted timber frames, expressed raked ceilings and timber floors. I tell him of my interest in Robin Boyd, so he obliges by talking a little about the architecture.

Why Boyd? Well, so the story goes, his mother Dymphna Clark had already noticed Boyd's work in *Home Beautiful* magazines. And then Manning came home from a party in 1948 saying he had just met a marvellous architect, and that if they ever built another house he would be the architect they would use... "Yes, dear,"

said Dymphna, with skilled indulgence. Axel Clark described Boyd as a "fastidious, thin-lipped man who despised beer drinking, mateship and the crudity of so much that passed for culture in Australia".

We start with the Manning Clark Foundation's office which was originally Manning and Dymphna's bedroom, and then peek into two other single bedrooms – one he calls "the boys' room" and points to the ample built-in wardrobe space and built-in shelves that house the hundreds of books in each room.

BOOKS: Shelves in every room full of orderly labelled collections of literature, Australian history and geography, bibles, art books .... some 10,000. Benedict Clark recalls: "Dad was always buying books ... Mum would see a pile of books come through the door and she'd sort of faint, then go around and show him the place on the bookshelf where he already had them all."

These books already begin to give an uncanny feeling of another family home – a creeping hunger that overtakes the children's bedrooms. And this feeling grows and adds to my disquiet over the duration of the weekend.

We tour the bathrooms and I try to sound knowledgeable by pointing out Boyd's characteristic layered combination of glass louvres, fly-screens and breeze blocks. I am then directed down the hall, past many family photos and two busts of Manning and Dymphna sitting on a dresser, and invited to climb with care the vertical ladder up to Father's study. Perched away from and above the rest of the house, it forms an eyrie.

My first impression is of a *full* room: full of work, full of books, objects, papers, and full of the egotistical presence of someone. On the bookshelves are rows of copies of various imprints of Clark's own books. And much space is devoted to Russian works of literature – Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky – displayed as a literary lineage or destiny, I wonder?

A large wooden desk overlooks the broad window with a view onto the garden. The "computer" is pointed out to me as the ink pen in the drawer of this desk. I am invited to "touch that":

> Father wrote just about everything he ever published at this desk – ink stains seeping through into the wood-grain – there is a smooth patch on the desk, where father's hand always rested while writing ... One PhD student who stayed here had to turn the desk away from the window so she could get any writing done.

It is not possible to take in this room at first glance and I make a note to myself that I must return if I want to get to know this house at all. We climb back down the step-ladder. The kitchen still has all original cabinets and old cooker. It is modest and cheerfully domestic with blue spotted curtains, blue and white crockery and glasses on show. It is welcoming and easy, not like the study.

Boyd wanted dark soft red for the living room ceiling. Dymphna settled for galah pink. He wanted as much light as possible. She worried about the 10-square-metre glass window in the living room, and the bagged interior walls, and the brick outside which she thought would need to be painted too often. Boyd reassured her: "bricks look good when the paint is peeling off". The house was surprisingly

expensive for the early 1950s, but it was very unpopular with the neighbourhood when first built because of its bald modern design and materials. Modest, comfortable, liveable and architecturally transparent – it is a series of simple skillion boxes set on the slope and linked by a glazed entry hall that joins sleeping and living wings, with study perched above to form the only striking vertical element.

Later, when on my own, I begin the process of letting the house, its architecture and memories, unfold through my experience of being there and asking it to accommodate to my domestic routines. And through my photographing of it by roaming in a series of ever increasingly intimate cycles: house as container; house as lived space; house as *my* lived space?

Also I come to know it better through the reading of a small monograph written on the house that gives a rich biographical story that no experience of the place alone could reveal. In this book, Manning Clark's research assistant for the last 20 years of his life remembers the family in the house. She peoples the garden with stories of vegetables, pets, and cricket on the lawn. She directs the reader to go up to the small kitchen area, remembering: "Once the orders for the day had been completed, I was told to go downstairs and put the jug on for a cup of tea. This was shared with Dymphna if she was at home." And in the evening late-staying guests such as Nolan, Boyd and Humphries assisted Dymphna with the mountains of washing up. Or go up the step-ladder to Clark's study for a memoire of struggles with health and personal demons, and sparring matches with Patrick White.

EPISODE TWO: some haunting dreams

This house is getting a bit overwhelming so I leave it and go out to a twilight viewing of the Ballet Russe exhibition of costumes at the National Gallery – including the famous ballet "Le Pavillon d'Armide". So the story goes, during a storm, a young Vicomte René de Beaugency seeks refuge in a castle owned by a magician. He spends the night in the room of a castle where a tapestry hangs on the wall. While asleep he dreams that the tapestry comes to life: the figures become animated around him in his room. The beautiful Sorceress Armide dances before him and gives him her scarf. When he awakes in the morning he finds he still holds the scarf, and Armide's likeness that is woven into the tapestry no longer wears the same scarf. René collapses with horror.

I am slightly dreading my first night of sleeping in this house, of dreaming of Manning Clark and in the morning finding his familiar hat has gone from its hook in the kitchen. I don't believe in ghosts but I lock the door to the bedroom just in case. In the morning I go to check the hat is still hanging in the kitchen. As the bedroom door shuts I realise I have locked my keys inside the bedroom and myself out. I fight my way through the overgrown bushes on the side of the house with a plastic chair and climb back through the bedroom window – always with the thought of being watched.

Breakfast: the kitchen drawers are deceptively shallow, and the contents of one spills on the kitchen floor. I hurry to carefully replace it – always with the thought of being watched.

Bedtime: the shower sets off the smoke alarm with the escaping steam. I de-alarm it by standing naked on a chair with the book step-ladder in hand – always with the thought of being watched.

Peter Freeman writes:

> I still expect to see them both when I come into the house. Manning sitting in that old brown chair with the reading light switched on, listening to the ABC news or to his music, or reading a book or a newspaper. Dymphna up in the kitchen area, either preparing food (always wearing an apron) or working at the typewriter. And I also expect to see Axel there too, making cups of strong coffee in the kitchen in the morning. Axel died in October 2001 of a brain tumour. (2002)

Uncanny houses?

Haunted houses?

What makes them so? The heritage home slips between genres, all the more so when spending time in the slightly illicit occupation of eaves-dropping on the intimate memories of the deceased that are powerfully bound up in a home. Familiarity and unfamiliarity make for the uncanny experience. Not easily translatable – not direct terror or mysticism. More a sense of what Vidler describes as lurking unease: "an uncomfortable sense of haunting rather than a present apparition". The heritage house as an uncanny house? A dead home, a house as crypt for domestic routine?

By the third morning I have established a few of my own domestic routines in an attempt to create a small space of living in the present. But the only place that feels comfortable is perched at the table and chairs in the courtyard – half outside. After three days, though, I do start to think presumptuously of the house possibly becoming my own. I daydream of occupation by expunging away layers of previous inhabitation by cleaning and renovating away vestiges of the house's quirks and mannerisms.

Julie Myerson, writing on the historical biography of the many occupants of her own home, puts it better:

> Most of us live in our homes knowing we're not the only ones to have done so. But we rarely confront those shadows in any significant way. Why should we? This is us and that was them. Their clutter, their smells, their noises, and their way of doing things is long gone. We've painted, plastered, demolished and constructed or converted … Our moments have blotted out theirs. Maybe this is a necessary element of domestic living – maybe it's the only was we can co-exist comfortably with each other's past lives, each other's ghosts. (2005)

But here, in this preserved object, you must creep between those quirks and mannerisms. It reminds me of staying in my own former family home that carries an emotional burden around which the quirks and mannerisms must be endured because they are partly yours. All the while mindful of updating your own strategies for keeping memories contained and isolated from the everyday of here and now. All the while mindful of future strategies for managing this container of objects and memories. Does this act of staying in someone else's home illustrate the divide between memory and history? Do occupation and duration open receptivity to memory rather than history?

Bachelard says that houses are experienced not from day to day, but through dreams. And only after we inhabit a new house do memories of other places we have lived in come back to us. We are never real historians, but through poems we touch the ultimate poetic depth of the space of the house. Well, here I think I am doing something else: capturing domestic functionality by *use* not by poetry: boiling the kettle, having tea and biscuits in the son's bed, climbing through windows and listening to the old stereo. The resurrection of mundane rituals seems to unlock my memories of other homes. In Bachelard's terms, staying in this house in contrast to touring this house unlocks a "topoanalysis"; a more systematic psychological study of sites and intimate lives.

EPISODE THREE: climbing the stairs

As Robin Boyd was leaving Canberra at the airport, Manning shouted to him across the tarmac: "Robin, is the house going to be single storey with my study in the basement?" After a moment's thought Boyd shouted back "Single storey with the study upstairs." And so it was prophesised that a lot of books would indeed be written in this room of great intellectual labour. History is the staging of events to a dramatic script.

It is a drizzly Sunday morning and by this third day I conquer the fear of the vertical extremities of the house and summon the courage to climb the steep step-ladder designed to discourage "frivolous visitors" to the study – always with the feeling of being watched. Clark says: "The historian was like a person looking out of a window at the last. What he saw was human chaos. Like God he imposed order on the chaos." Looking out of this picture window, I see only the white cockatoos squawking in the trees.

Sitting at the desk, I fit my hand into the worn patch of grain on the desk and I set myself the task of transcribing some of Clark's words into my own hand-writing in the way that Le Corbusier used to incessantly trace over and re-trace, in his own sketchy hand, views taken from photographs and postcards as an act of immersion and appropriation. A good place to start seems like an abridged version of *Manning Clark's History of Australia*. For Clark, the exploration of other voices – at times deranged – was done as a covert operation. Clark believed that in order to tell a story well, the historian needed to create what he called indirect narrators. But he also admitted: "now I want to write history as a story – as an art".

I look around the study again. It holds to the illusion of having been barely disturbed since 1991. Yellowed and curling paintings and photos of Russian writers, Australian explorers and family members, all framed and pinned like specimens behind the door. Kept some 20 years after death like a furtive shrine or memorial to descendants and mentors and survivors. Clark admits to a series of "reading binges" here – Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Shakespeare, Hardy and Dickens. By sitting here Clark takes ghostly shape as an active protagonist in the tragedies of his own writing. Paul Carter suggests that, "What Clark gives us, in fact, is a series of stage directions in which historical heroes are actors … author included." Clark said: "The historian puts sinew and flesh on the dry bones of the dead. He performs the miracle of breathing life into dead bones."

Is this house haunted?

Yes, in the last years of her life in the house Dymphna found it so: "it was as if something was springing from the shadows". Clark was everywhere in the house. Dymphna had changed it little since he had died, and facing her own death in the same house she felt Clark's presence more than at any point since his death. Myerson suggests that: "Past, present, and future collide in a single family house." This may be so in a "normal" house, but in museum-houses there is no hope of a future. In their uncanny state of suspended display, these houses attempt the impossible – to hold the dying breath of home for eternity and posterity.

In conclusion, I agree with David Malouf, who writes about attempts to open this door to collective memories and histories in any house as inevitably reaching limits – limits on how far we can or cannot physically penetrate as a witness. But we can open some door in ourselves. The taking up of slightly deranged, autobiographical writing in this piece is revelatory of an uncanny house experience, and an unexpected unlocking of a kind of topoanalysis. Whether this mode of documenting personal experience holds the key to the unlocking of other museum-houses remains to be tested more fully through more extended weekends!

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Birth, Death, and Rebirth: Reconstruction of architecture in Ruskin's writings

Anuradha Chatterjee

Reconstructions: a brief overview

The emergence of the practice of restoration in eighteenth-century France and Britain was a response to the destruction of buildings due to fire, war, revolutions, and neglect, complemented by the desire to consolidate cultural heritage, and thus national identity. John Ruskin (1819-1900) responded to the erosion of the historical fabric in European cities, particularly in Venice, which suffered significant damage to its built fabric during the six-month siege and aerial bombardment of the city by Austrian forces in 1848 (Mallgrave 2005: 121). It is well known that whilst Ruskin vehemently rejected restoration, he advocated preservation; in this his influential diatribe was simultaneously radical and conservative. Development of this approach can be found in his earlier writings on art, for example in *Modern Painters* (1843), as prefaced in the five dense pages of "Lamp of Memory" fronting *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (1849), and followed up in his 1854 pamphlet titled "The Opening of the Crystal Palace". The following passage from *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* is indicative:

> Accept it as such, pull the building down, throw its stones into neglected corners, make ballast of them, or mortar, if you will; but do it honestly, and do not set up a Lie in their place. And look that necessity in the face before it comes, and you may prevent it ... Take proper care of your monuments, and you will not need to restore them ... Watch an old building with an anxious care; guard it as best you may, and at any cost, from every influence of dilapidation ... bind it together with iron where it loosens; stay it with timber where it declines; do not care about the unsightliness of the aid: better a crutch than a lost limb. (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 244-245)

The recommendation to delay physical deterioration was to be complemented by parallel practices of collection and documentation. This was exemplified by Ruskin's own engagement with writing as word painting, drawings, producing and collecting via the then-new photographic technique of daguerreotypes, and the taking of plaster casts of architectural details and ornament (Figures 1 and 2). As he argued, if the "evil day [of dilapidation] must come at last; [...] let it come declaredly and openly" (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 245). In the meantime, he proposed, the combined acts of care, accurate observation, and material recording via different documentary techniques would compensate for the eventual and anticipated disappearance of historic buildings.

Ruskin's views on restoration have been characterised as falling into two distinct critical realms: firstly, one based upon commentary that upholds the "sublimity of the rents, or fractures, or stains, or vegetation ... [that] assimilates the architecture with the work of Nature", and thereby focused on ruins and the picturesque (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 249).[1] The second critical concern was with an overarching pursuit of truth and authenticity. This informed William Morris' interpretation of Ruskin and was influential in the establishment of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB), which in turn fostered the uncritical truism that new work cannot replicate or supplant older work, promoting what came to be known as the Anti-Scrape philosophy.[2] Nevertheless, these perspectives miss the fundamental anti-materialism of Ruskin's views.

1 Lowenthal (1985) and Hunt (1978) reiterate the importance of ruins in the picturesque aesthetic and Ruskin's appreciation of this view (157, 796).

2 As Maximilian L. Ferro explains: "'Antiscrape,' a word actually coined in the late 1870's to describe the newly-founded Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB 1877), is symbolic of the attitude that historic buildings should be left alone." Ferro further explains that this practice entailed the rejection of the earlier practice of restoration advanced by George Gilbert Scott, which "involved the scraping of plaster to re-expose interior stonework, and [hence] 'scraping' became synonymous with restoration" (1985: 22).



Fig. 1 John Ruskin (1819-1900). Ornaments from Rouen, St. Lô, and Venice. [Source *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, 6th edn, George Allen, Orpington, Kent, 1889, plate 1, p. 27]



Fig. 2 John Ruskin (1819-1900). Pierced ornament from Lisieux, Bayeux, Verona, and Padua.
[Source *The Seven Lamps of Architecture*, plate 7, p. 95]

It is argued here that Ruskin's views on restoration are reflective of deeper concerns with the notion of life. By this reading, buildings did not merely go into a state of ruin or disappear – they passed away. Mark Swenarton notes that this was due to Ruskin's aligning with German Romantic thinkers like Goethe, who perceived that "art was the expression of the creative human spirit and the work of art was matter endowed with spirit" (Swenarton 1989: 3). Accordingly, in *Stones of Venice* (1851-1853) Ruskin notes, "art is valuable or otherwise, only as it expresses the personality, activity and living perception of a good and great human soul" (1989: 10). Unlike Romanticism's allusion to elusive and often invisible signs of life, Ruskin viewed life as having a stronger corporeal energy and presence. *The Seven Lamps* characterises ornament as the "written or sealed impression of a thing sought out [hence ...] it is the shaped result of inquiry and bodily expression of thought" (1849/1903-1912:155). In fact, Ruskin believed that nations and societies that did not have an enduring material culture, for which architecture was exemplary, could be said to "die daily" (1849/1903-1912: 224).

The notion then that a building dies was not merely allegorical. In *The Seven Lamps*, Ruskin urges: "Do not let us deceive ourselves in this important matter; it is *impossible*, as impossible as to raise the dead, to restore anything that has ever been great or beautiful in architecture." (1849/1903-1912: 244) He adds: "You may make a model of a building as you may of a corpse, and your model may have the shell of the old walls within it as your cast might have the skeleton." (244) In another instance, he notes "that architecture and painting can be restored" no more than "the dead can be" (1854/1903-1912: 429).

Even though a classical idealisation of the human figure and the nineteenth century rationalisation of the living body are sustained in Ruskin's writing, the emphasis is on animation, not figuration. Hence, restoring a dead building was inconceivable, for the issue had little to do with a reconstruction of the physical, but with the sustaining or reviving of the spirit. Zombie-like, the restored building risks manifesting a form of architectural uncanny, as it hovers indeterminately between animation and lifelessness, between historical and present time.

Architecture's demise occurred due to what could be considered cosmetic damage. Ruskin rarely noted the structural failure or damage to key internal parts of historic buildings, and his account of surface decay outweighed his observations of these failures. For him it was the disruption of the surface that was most calamitous. As he put it, "What copying can there be of surfaces that have been worn half an inch down? The whole finish of the work was in the half inch that is gone." (1849/1903-1912: 242) The removal of ornament and cladding from the building was akin to the mutilating blows to the fleshy surface of the body that prompted its eventual demise. In fact, as he further added, the death of architecture was reversible: "That which I have above insisted upon as the life of the whole, that spirit which is given only by the hand and eye of the workman, can never be recalled. [However a]nother spirit may be given by another time, and it is then a *new building*; but the spirit of the dead workman cannot be summoned up, and commanded to direct other hands, and other thoughts." (1849/1903-1912: 242) He is suggesting that the cladding and ornamentation be completely ripped off and the structure re-clad. In this way the building is 'reborn'. To the extent that a different building, a new building, would emerge, at stake for Ruskin, clearly, were questions of spiritual, not biological life.

Ruskin's theory of spiritual life owes a debt to Scottish satirical writer, essayist, and critic, Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881). As Herbert Sussman explains, for Carlyle, "England's mechanisation appeared bound to philosophical mechanism, the occupation with material means rather than spiritual ends." (Sussman 1968: 15) In "Signs of the Times" (1829), Carlyle noted the blossoming of physical sciences paralleled by the disappearance of metaphysical and moral sciences (103). He argued that the physical sciences are concerned with the "material, the immediately practical, [and] not the divine and [the] spiritual" (111). As the body is colonised by empirical knowledge, the only way the soul is able to overcome its subjection to material measure is through the expressiveness of clothing. In his parodic novel *Sartor Resartus,* Carlyle went on to explore how clothes express a hidden inner idea. Regarded as the precedent of modern dress studies, *Sartor* notes that clothes are the "grand tissue of all tissue" and is what "man's soul wears as its outmost wrappage and overall" (1833-1834/1983: 2). Beneath this, "his whole other ... tissues are included and screened, his whole faculties work, his whole self lives, moves, and has its being" (1833-1834/1983: 2). Significantly, clothes are given, not just a corporeal quality, but an importance greater than the body. Apparel attributes meaning and, therefore, life to the body. Through it the soul finds direct, exterior, and autonomous expression.

Applying these notions from Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus,* Ruskin not only undertook extensive documentation and study of drapery and draped figures, he also suggested that architecture too could be understood to have a body and a soul. Ruskin notes that like the human body, architecture too consists of a lower (body) and a higher (soul) element. The lower, bodily element is comprised of the "technical" or the "constructive" aspects of the building. The higher, spiritual element is given by the "imaginative" or the "reflective" components found in the veneer of ornamentation. As such it masks and transforms the bodily foundation of the building while giving play, in the manner of a textile fabrication, to its essential character (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 20-21).



Fig. 3 Ca' d'Oro (Palazzo Santa Sofia), Grand Canal, Venice. [Photo: author, 2004]

Across Ruskin's writings, the recasting of ornamental veneer as drapery and textile was a recurrent theme. For example, as Ruskin saw it, the polychromatic surface of the Baptistery of Florence turns the attention of the viewer away from the structural elements, the organisation of space, and the building's daily use, expressing instead a pointed disparity between surface dressing and the bodily form. Screens, tracery, openings, inlaid surfaces, and low relief ornament in medieval buildings like Ducal Palace and Ca D'Oro (Figs. 3 & 4) are similarly recast as woven and knitted fabrics. Through the use of descriptive metaphors like cutting, lifting, shrinking, and gathering, Ruskin effectively converts the tectonic language of architecture into a language of tailoring and upholstering.[3]

Fig. 4 Chequered cladding and window opening, Ducal Palace, Venice, Piazzetta side. [Photo: author, 2004]

Moreover, this dress-like veneer was understood to be infused with life through the creative labour of the craftsperson, who simultaneously invested body, soul, and intellect into its material expression. Yet in Ruskin's theory of creative labour it was the creativity of men that was privileged, for it was only through male hands that the imagination was synthesised with the strenuous and controlled action of a muscular body. The hand alone bestowed masculine authority and signature effects into building materials. Hence in architecture, what Ruskin sought was the residual traces of the "toil of manly hand and thought", the "life and accent of the hand", and the "masculine handling" of malleable material form (1849/1903-1912: 104, 214, 216). Only through the intervention of the venerated craftsperson does the "inert substance" of architecture receive its "dignity and pleasurableness in the utmost degree", and only through them is a "vivid expression of the intellectual life" of the building given (Ruskin, 1849/1903-1912: 190-191).

Ruskin's emphasis on the mind and the hand of the male architect/craftsperson that moulded and ordered the building material can be considered through feminist thinking on the disavowal of sexualised matter in procreation and discourses of creativity. To this end, Ruskin's theory of creative labour is reflective of the male desire to view his image in the mirror of the female body.[4] This image becomes legible through the rather elusive trace of imperfection of finish and inaccuracy of detail. The trope of masculine creativity was also associated with the Victorian drive to "construct a new form of manhood and a new masculine poetic for the industrial age" (Sussman 1995: 1).

It was not enough merely to leave a trace. Its boundaries needed to be policed and ownership defended. As Ruskin prompts in relation to the built remnants:

> We have no right to touch them. They are not ours. They belong partly to those that built them ... The dead still have their right in them ... What we have ourselves built we are at liberty to thrown down; but what other men gave their strength and wealth and life to accomplish, their right does not pass away with their death. (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 245)

In the encounter then between old and new work, a violation of this right was considered far more destructive than actual physical deterioration. Repairs were hence termed "fatal" because they were considered to be the "most total destruction which a building can suffer: a destruction out of which no remnants can be gathered" (Ruskin 1849/1903-1912: 242 & 1854/1903-1912: 423). More than material, the destruction at stake was a shattering of the toiled privilege of the authorial male self by the imposition of another's vision.

3 These ideas are discussed in detail in Chatterjee (2009a), and the argument of Ruskin's adorned wall veil is developed in Chatterjee (2008).

4 For a discussion of Ruskin's feminisation of architecture, see Chatterjee (2009b: 146).

Reconstructing theoretical radicalisms

Taking into account recent recontextualisations of Victorianism within the broader cultural history of modernity, Ruskin's rejection of restoration shows itself to be, not just conservative and reactionary, but advances at least three prominent cultural ambitions, which in conclusion can be summarised thus:

Firstly, Ruskin's views suggest an aversion to mortality by seeking out novel forms of immortality. In *Lectures On Architecture and Painting* (1854) he noted that the "dead" had intended their works for "immortality" (1854/1903-1912: 99). In "Review of Lord Lindsay's Sketches of the History of Christian Art" (1847), he notes that the spirit is the "immortal principle", and it is in the integrated and cooperative application of the three faculties of the body that it is able to become "worthy of eternal life" (1847/1903-1912: 178, 179). Architecture represents a conditional and contingent kind of immortality. Whilst it exceeds the duration of the human life that brought it into being, it also eventually dies a natural death. Ruskin's theory imparts to the building a palpable living presence (albeit fleeting), whilst establishing immortality, and re-defining the new purpose of architecture as that of fostering the act of living.[5]

Secondly, Ruskin's criticism of restoration takes ornament as more than a supplemental object. Thought as a mode of craft – not as the action of design – was seen as the representative of lapsed time. This recognition refigured ornament as a living practice, seeing in it a discrete, non-replicable event, one that could only be succeeded by a subsequent event. In locating the essence of architecture in ornament, the rejection of restoration belatedly promoted new work and instigated the notion of architecture as event. These ideas find resonance with recent considerations about the performativity of gender, class and sexuality, indeed identity, in Victorian culture. They no less foreshadow contemporary interest in architecture *as* performance. By placing this particular emphasis on the role and performance of temporality in built work, Ruskin's views subtly challenged the materialist orientations that dominated nineteenth-century philosophical thought.

Thirdly, Ruskin's writings eschew any recuperation of the authentic, seeing such a quest as both undesirable and impossible. As Ruskin claimed, "however careful, however laboured, an imitation still, a cold model" (1849/1903-1912: 243). Moreover, Ruskin's criticism of restoration was not simply aesthetic, but in essence philosophical. It foreshadowed Walter Benjamin's argument that the "presence of the original is the prerequisite of the concept of authenticity", and hence "authenticity is not reproducible" (1955/1968: 220, 243). Ruskin too favoured the mechanical reproduction of buildings (via daguerreotypes and drawings) over manual reproduction (as the questionable labour of restoration). Ruskin's allegory of life, death, and rebirth, meant reaching past the impasse of the authentic, the original, the true. The possibility of the return of the original is disabled forever. While the authentic could not be reproduced, it could at least be created anew.

5 For discussion of the architectural body in Arakawa and Gins' works, see Kennedy (2006) and Danto (1997).

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After the Aftershocks

Tom Daniell

In November 2010, I was asked by the chief editor of *Volume* (a Dutch-American architecture journal for which I'm an editorial advisor) to contribute a short text based on my spontaneous, unconsidered response to a swatch of pale blue he had sent to me by e-mail. Many other people received the same request: artists, architects, graphic designers, writers, philosophers, and so on. To me it simply suggested the sea – not a particularly original reaction, to be sure – and I sent him this paragraph:

> Spending most of my life on island nations (New Zealand, Japan), I'm always close to a coast. On the best days, a tessellating, coruscating field of blue stretches from your feet to the horizon, then curves back as a smooth canopy gradually deepening in hue. The ground shakes violently from time to time, as if suspended in a precarious equilibrium, and then you watch for the horizon itself to rise – the ironically named Pacific Ocean always threatening to return everything to blue.

The collected responses were published the following month, in *Volume* issue 26. On March 11, 2011, the Pacific Ocean did rise and inundate part of the northeast coast of Japan. There is no cause and effect here, obviously. It was (is) always just a matter of time, but nonetheless the timing gave me a chill. I was in China that day, reaching the end of a month-long design studio at a local university. As I walked into the room for the final review, the students immediately told me a large earthquake had just hit Japan, measuring 8 on the Richter scale. I didn't yet know the epicentre, but I knew the potentially horrific implications of that number if it was anywhere near a city (in fact the magnitude was later determined to have been 9 – a barely conceivable 10 times stronger – and considered the most powerful earthquake ever to have struck Japan). At that point, there was nothing to be done. We began the review. Within 24 hours I was back home in Kyoto, having flown on a half-empty plane, waited in an almost non-existent queue for the "Foreigners" desk at immigration, and encountered a series of sober but admirably good-humoured airport staff, train passengers, and taxi drivers.

Only a few weeks earlier I had spent several days making and fielding phone calls and e-mails reacting to the Christchurch quake. I now did the same regarding Japan. To avoid clogging the overburdened phone lines, Facebook and Twitter became ideal ways to check on the status of acquaintances closer to the disaster area, their updates letting us know about the situation in real time, as well the simple fact that they were alive. As the death toll headed into the tens of thousands – entire villages erased from the earth – it became terrifyingly clear that the real problem was nuclear. A cracked reactor at Fukushima was releasing unknown quantities of radiation into the air and sea. Even amid the panic and misinformation of those early days, it was obviously going to be a profound catastrophe for Japanese society, and a long-term problem for the entire world.

Since then, in almost every lecture, every email, every conversation, I am asked to comment on the situation in Japan, my home for the last 18 years. Of course, it's impossible for me *not* to say something, but in a sense it's also impossible for me to say anything at all. By that I mean: words are inadequate to capture this level of



Katsushika Hokusai (1760-1849). A version of the Kanagawa wave from the 36 views of Mt Fuji [Wikimedia Commons]

devastation and tragedy. Every description, no matter how it's phrased, seems too weak or else trying too hard, like disaster-movie advertising copy. Our vocabulary for such events is irredeemably clichéd. I'm reminded of the author Martin Amis, who has spent his career in what he calls "the war against cliché" but in his memoir *Experience* makes the very insightful remark that – I'm paraphrasing from memory – you know you are experiencing a transformative moment when tired clichés suddenly regain the power that they must have possessed when first formulated.

Hundreds of kilometres away in Kyoto, we experienced very little hardship in the weeks following the quake. There were occasional shortages in the supermarkets and temporary quotas on bottled water as supplies were redirected to the survivors. Via television and the Internet, we tracked the aftershocks and followed progress at the Fukushima reactor as a small group of workers diligently tried to staunch the leaking radioactivity, exposing themselves to levels that effectively meant committing slow suicide for the sake of the nation. In conversation with an American friend, I described them as heroes and their behaviour as quintessentially Japanese. He agreed that they were heroes, but insisted that you would find a similar group of volunteers in the United States if something similar happened there. True enough, but I suspect that American (Western) heroism emerges partly out of a desire for personal, and possibly posthumous, fame – and is no less admirable for that – whereas Japanese heroism emerges from a sense of anonymous humility and solidarity.

Indeed, one of the recurrent clichés about the aftermath is the orderliness, cooperativeness, and stoicism of the people. There was no rioting or looting, almost no opportunistic crime of any kind. As with the Kobe earthquake in 1995, there is a surreal quality to seeing a nation in which everything seems so precisely controlled overwhelmed by brute natural forces. But Japan has always lived with imminent disaster: earthquakes, fires, floods, typhoons, tsunamis. The natural world is regarded with awe and fear. Japanese traditional culture's reputed "harmony with nature" – one of the most persistent clichés – is in many respects a sophisticated attempt to filter and tame the unpredictability of nature. The aestheticisation of the natural environment (bonsai trees, landscaped gardens, the

rituals associated with seasonal change) is intended as symbolic control of essentially uncontrollable wildness. Long-term survival depends on social harmony, discipline, hierarchy, loyalty, and consensus. And, all too often, on the willingness of individuals to sacrifice themselves for the good of the collective. For better or worse, this set of attitudes is, I think, the source of Japan's incredible resilience and inventiveness, its capacity to constantly rebuild itself, even redesign itself.

The aftershocks continue sporadically even as I write. In a sense, this has all been one long quake varying in intensity over many months. Sooner or later Japan is guaranteed to experience something similar all over again – and again, and again. Elsewhere and differently, perhaps, but inevitably. The northeast coastline of Japan is dotted with "tsunami stones": megaliths up to three metres tall and six centuries old, engraved with warnings to run inland the moment an earthquake hits, or not to build any closer to the sea than where they are embedded. Over the centuries, the latter warnings had been increasingly ignored, sea walls and modern communication technologies supposedly making them redundant. With the 20/20 hindsight of an armchair expert it's easy enough to criticise the complacency and willful ignorance, the unpreparedness of the populace, the shocking vulnerability of the nuclear facility, and so forth. At the same time, we shouldn't lose sight of the astounding *lack* of earthquake damage to buildings in Tokyo and elsewhere, the minimal loss of life due to the earthquake alone.

A year on, the degree to which the afflicted regions have recuperated is astonishing and moving, though not altogether surprising – recall that the Hiroshima branch of the Bank of Japan was open for business within two of days of the atomic bombing in 1945. So, what to do now, once the mess has been cleaned up, the dead buried, and the survivors housed? The crucial issue, or at least the one most under human control, is nuclear power. Following the meltdown, many of Japan's nuclear plants have been shut down pending safety tests, while Germany, for example, has vowed to permanently close down all its plants within 10 years. Statistics may attribute more deaths to coal mining than nuclear energy, but coal-mining deaths are almost entirely confined to the miners themselves, with no impact on the wider public, no long-term poisoning of the environment, no genetic damage to children in the womb. To be sure, we are bombarded with radiation constantly – a transatlantic flight supposedly exposes you to more radiation than a visit to Tohoku today, and Rome on any given day is still more radioactive than Tokyo after the quake. Debates among the experts about the relative dangers of nuclear power leave laypersons with little option other than to subscribe to the view that best fits their own prejudices. But no matter how sophisticated our defensive measures become, there is always going to be a tsunami bigger than any sea wall, an earthquake stronger than any building foundation. In Japan, and elsewhere, all that can be done is to create architecture and infrastructure that demonstrates intelligence in its construction, respect for its users, and humility toward the blind forces of the natural world.

Interview with Taira Nishizawa

Andrew Barrie

Since opening his Tokyo studio in 1993, Taira Nishizawa has established himself as a leading figure among his generation of Japanese architects. Nishizawa's work, which ranges from small houses to large sports facilities and makes particular use of innovative timber structures, has attracted numerous awards, including the prestigious Japan Institute of Architects Young Architect of the Year Award in 2005, the *Architectural Review* Emerging Architecture Award, and selection by *Architectural Record* as one of the world's 10 "Design Vanguard" architects.

A practitioner, academic and critic, Nishizawa teaches at a number of universities in Tokyo and has lectured and exhibited internationally. His work has been the subject of two monographs: *Taira Nishizawa 1994-2004* (2004) and *Taira Nishizawa: Wooden Works 2004-2010* (2011).

Nishizawa lectured in Auckland as part of The University of Auckland School of Architecture & Planning's annual *Communiqué* lecture series. Supported by NZ Wood, he also lectured in Wellington and Christchurch. On May 24, 2012 he gave a seminar to students at The University of Auckland School of Architecture & Planning, of which this text is an edited transcript.

Taira Nishizawa and Andrew Barrie in conversation, The University of Auckland, School of Architecture and Planning, 2012. [Photo: Melanie Pau]

Barrie [to the audience]: During my student days, it struck me that it wasn't terribly helpful to learn how to design exceptional buildings like museums or concert halls. What I needed to know was what to do next – how to use my time at university, how to land a job, how to get established as a young architect. It's often difficult to learn about the early days of the architects we're interested in, so the intention of this seminar is to carry on the series of interviews we've done with architects focusing on their youth, and to ask Nishizawa-san what advice he has for those starting out on their architecture careers.

Barrie [to Nishizawa]: When did you decide to become an architect? What influenced this decision? Any particular architects or buildings?

Nishizawa: Actually, I haven't decided yet. [Laughs] Maybe around the time I turned 40, I realised I was no longer able to do any other type of job. That was my final decision. During my high school days, I was kind of a "small genius" in mathematics. I really loved maths. Other science subjects like physics and chemistry

bored me – they weren't creative enough. For me, maths was the most creative field among human intellectual endeavours. Then I met a great "small genius" – he was one of my high school classmates. I realised then that I wasn't enough of a genius, and changed my direction. Until then, I hadn't had any understanding or knowledge of architecture, but in comparison to physics or information science or chemistry it sounded a little bit interesting, so I decided to study architecture. I met a certain Japanese professor called Kazuo Shinohara. He'd actually switched his career from mathematics to architecture in his early 20s. I was surprised to hear of someone who'd made such a conversion. After meeting him, I started studying architecture seriously.

Barrie: So you met Shinohara at university?

Nishizawa: Yes, when I was 19 years old.

Barrie: When you'd already started studying mathematics?

Nishizawa: I stopped dreaming about maths, and began to concentrate on architecture. I was lucky because Shinohara was very famous in Japan. He'd built many beautiful small houses. He was not modernist – he was anti-modern – but his houses were beautiful and he had a certain kind of charisma. Shinohara was, for instance, a great idol for Toyo Ito and Kazuyo Sejima. He was a very influential and important person. When I was studying architecture under him, I didn't have much knowledge but I knew that this opportunity might be important for my life. This was during his last three years before retirement from the University, so he wasn't serious about giving reviews or lectures to his students, but I wanted to talk to him about his thoughts about architecture. I wanted to check out his performance. I thought about how Shinohara was old and must always go to the bathroom. So... I always waited for him in the bathroom at the university.

In the mornings, I didn't go to the studio but to the bathroom on his floor. I would sit on the toilet and read his books. [Laughs] When he came in, I'd say, "Good morning, Professor. What do you think about modernism?"

Barrie: You had conversations over the wall of the toilet cubicle?

Nishizawa: Sometimes. [Laughs] I'd ask, for instance, "What do you think about Aldo Rossi?" [Laughs] But you students – don't do that!

Barrie: As a student, you were in Shinohara's laboratory?

Nishizawa: Yes, the lab of Shinohara and Kazunari Sakamoto.

Barrie: You were taught by them both?

Nishizawa: Yes, Shinohara was a famous architect so he invited important Japanese architects such as Fumihiko Maki, Yoshio Taniguchi, Arata Isozaki, and Shiro Kuramata to give lectures. I was lucky.

Barrie: Were there any particular experiences during the design classes that were important for you?

Nishizawa: The most impressive thing was that we were always reviewed by three architects – Shinohara, Sakamoto and a visitor such as Maki or Isozaki. These

three guys would give us comments that were different – absolutely different! It was so confusing, but it was interesting. I thought it worthy of really thinking about. That was a good experience.

Barrie: When you graduated, how did you go about getting a job?

Nishizawa: That was during the middle of the 1980s. During the mid-80s, Japan was in the midst of an economic bubble, and in those days we were rich! So most of my friends went to big architecture firms such as Takenaka or Kaijima, but I didn't want to go in that direction. I wanted to learn more. I wanted to go to a small architecture studio to learn about how to design and how to control a construction site. When I was 22 years old, during my last year at university, I read a certain interview between Shinohara and a publisher. The magazine wasn't a normal architectural journal but a construction company magazine. Shinohara's answers used the specific idioms of Japanese construction sites, and I couldn't understand any of it. I discovered that I needed to learn how to control and to communicate with carpenters, and so on. If I went to a big firm, that would be difficult. You can learn about the management of people – designers, consultants, and so on – but you can't talk directly to builders or craftsmen.

In those days, Toyo Ito and Sakamoto were Shinohara's supporters, but they were almost the same age as I am now – around 45 or 46 years old. This was the time of the economic boom, so their studios were already too big – they employed more than 10 or 12 people. I thought that would make it difficult to learn quickly and directly as there were many experienced senior staff. In such offices, you must work for a few years before managing a project. So, I tried to find someone from a younger generation. Kei-ichi Irie is about 10 years older than me and had studied in Shinohara's laboratory. I asked many of my Shinohara laboratory *senpai* who the best young architect was from our lab.

Barrie: To explain for the students – a *senpai* is an older student of the same professor as you. They're a kind of classmate, but even if you've never met them they are your *senpai*.

Nishizawa: Everyone suggested Irie, so I went to his office and spent seven years there. I was lucky. I was the studio's first member of staff – the rest were three or four foreigners – so I could be a project leader. It was a good time for Japan's economy, so there was lots of work, lots of chances to build. I gained good experience with every type of building - private houses, public projects, huge private housing developments, private clients, huge companies, government. Everything except cheap construction and poor clients! [Laughs]

Barrie: So what were your important memories working from that office? What did you learn?

Nishizawa: My first goal was to learn how to draw sectional details. To me, sectional details look fantastic, but at university we'd traced them. We couldn't learn enough to think about or to create new types of sectional detail. Our education was inadequate for learning how to protect against rain and moisture, or how to calculate structures. So, my first goal was to learn to draw those details, which I spent one or two years doing. We didn't have computers, faxes, or copy machines so we had to use our hands. Always. I drew so much, every day ...

Barrie: What made you decide to establish your own office?

Nishizawa: The biggest reason was that I'd experienced everything, meaning I'd experienced every situation and type of client. So I asked Irie to let me leave his studio. That was the day the Japanese economic crisis occurred. That was when I realised that the only thing I hadn't experienced in Irie's studio was a cheap project for a poor client. After establishing my own office I had to begin with cheap projects and poor clients. That was unexpected. [Laughs]

Barrie: So, you already had a project to work on when you left?

Nishizawa: I set up my office first, and then started meeting with people in order to get jobs. My first client was a good friend of my sister. It was a small private house.

Barrie: Was this process of setting up on your own and doing small houses common in Japan at the time?

Nishizawa: Yes, the small private house has always been important for young architects establishing their own office.

Barrie: A few years earlier it had been very easy for young architects. After the economic bubble burst, it became very difficult. How did you feel about that?

Nishizawa: My goal was not to make money but to keep thinking about architecture, so I didn't take the economic situation seriously. I felt as long as they were building something somewhere in the world, there was no problem. As long as they were building, they'd require new ideas to keep going. Basically, I was very optimistic.

Barrie: Did you feel that the work you were doing was moving with the times, or trying to react or criticise the architecture of the time?

Nishizawa: I belong to a certain generation in the Japanese architectural world. The generation just older than us were very commercial architects such as Kengo Kuma, Kazuyo Sejima, and Jun Aoki. Their work is nice, but it wasn't enough for me. For me, architecture is more frustrating. It has huge capacity to control everything, every aspect of the environment for the humans and for all other creatures. But these older folk always concentrated on small, aesthetic aspects of space. I wasn't strongly critical of them; it was just that they weren't interesting enough. I always thought, "Let's be different."

Barrie: What was your relationship with other architects in your generation? When Toyo Ito was here, he said one of his most important experiences was to meet with his friends to drink and talk.

Nishizawa: One of my classmates was Yoshiharu Tsukamoto of Atelier Bow-Wow. Tsukamoto is a nice guy. He's far from intellectual; he's an activist, going off to every possible place. His character is very interesting for me. We are good friends. Also, I have a brother named Ryue who's two years younger than me. He collaborates with Kazuyo Sejima – actually, I recommended him to Sejima. Mark Dytham came to Japan after just graduation following England's economic crisis in the '80s. He's also an old friend.

Barrie: At that time, were you interested in collaborating with those colleagues? Or just talking?

Nishizawa: No, not collaborating. Most of the important cultural trends happen not around one person but between two people. Thinking about rock musicians, Paul McCartney and John Lennon were a pair. They began something together - without McCartney, Lennon wouldn't have done anything. At the beginning of classicism, Brunelleschi had a good friend when he shifted from the Gothic style. He and his friend Donatello, a sculptor, suddenly became fascinated with ancient buildings and talked creatively about them. Finally, they escaped the guilds of Florence and went to Rome to study the ancient ruins. So Classicism began not with one person but two people. If Brunelleschi hadn't had Donatello, he wouldn't have done anything. Of course, Lennon and Brunelleschi had great talent, but talent isn't enough to begin something. If you have a good, deep friend, what you're thinking can be something of a reality between you. We need deep friends to think and to talk with.

Barrie: Do you have any advice for students who are just beginning to start their architectural studies?

Nishizawa: Stop clicking!! On the computer. You're better to use your hands. You have to! Every time. If you write or draw something – use your hands every time. This is the biggest difference between apes and humans. It's a very important influence on your brain. I've never met architects who just click, but I've met many who'll grab a pencil or draw with a pen.

Barrie: Mark Dytham loves his Apple products. He has an iPhone in one hand, a laptop in the other, and operates his iPad with his knees. [Laughs]

Nishizawa: I mean, you should control it. You should know how to use these instruments and tools, but just clicking is dangerous. You lose something. You must use your hands at the same time as clicking.

Barrie: I remember being very shocked when I started at Toyo Ito's office. His reputation was as the "architect of the electronic age", but he received email from his secretary in printed-out form. He'd then write the answer on the bottom in pencil and give it back to her. When designing, the staff would make a simple paper model and draw a diagram using a really fat pen - not a beautiful drawing, but something basic and simple so that the concept was really clear. I remember being shocked at this. We had computers, of course. I'd expected a very high-tech office but it was actually quite a primitive system...

Nishizawa: I think human beings are very weak against the influence of tools. If you use a mobile phone, you can't remember telephone numbers any more. It becomes a kind of "outside brain". So you can use new stuff, of course, but you'd better control it. Which part of your brain is outside and which part is inside is something you must control. Don't outsource everything. [Laughs]

Student: I've noticed a very progressive thickening of the roof and wall in your later wooden buildings. It seems to be quite progressive, from 400mm at the Itabashi House to 760mm at Church Sun-Pu. Was that multi-layering deliberate?

Nishizawa: It just happened. When I was designing the Itabashi House, I realised that if I used a thicker wall and roof, I could control the various qualities of the space. So after that, I began to concentrate on that thickness, its performance, or the way it influences the relationship between inside and outside. The Church

Sun-Pu required specific spatial qualities. Just thinking functionally about a church, it's not much different from a classroom. But the space must feel very different, so I needed a strategy to control that environment directly. I manipulated the performance of the external walls and roof to control the light and sound conditions, which are what distinguishes a church from a normal classroom or meeting place.

I'm always thinking about the natural environment. That is the big rival for architects. There are so many different varieties or types of environment in the natural world, but in comparison, within architecture there isn't sufficient variety. We should create different types of space in our buildings.

Student: Another young Japanese architect, Hiroshi Sambuichi, has a similar interest in the natural environment, but at a greater scale. How do you compare yourself to him, in terms of bringing the climate into your buildings?

Nishizawa: He is a nice guy. [Laughs] I like his personality. I like his work better than SANAA's because he sometimes alters his style to incorporate new things. Normally, an established architect has a defined style, but they then struggle to do anything outside of that. Selling your style is an effective way to make money, but it's the end of thinking or developing ideas. Sambuichi's style is not stable - sometimes he alters it or makes a mistake. It's a quality of leading architects not to have a style. So watch out!

I remember when I was 21 years old, in my third year of studying architecture. I was at the architecture library reading a French magazine that showed my professor Kazuo Shinohara's recent work. He sometimes changed his style drastically. It was the first time I'd seen his "last style" in a magazine. I couldn't read the French exactly - just the title and the architect's name. The model looked like his work, but it was quite different from what I'd known until then. I felt kind of scared. It was the moment when I understood how a living architect works. Living architects change day by day. Until then, all I'd known about were dead architects. We'd studied Le Corbusier, for instance, but he was dead so we knew everything, every style. But if you lived with Le Corbusier, he was always changing his style and you'd always feel scared. Well, not always, but he changed his style drastically several times. Can you imagine how you'd feel living at that time, in the 1940s or 1950s? You might feel some horror. That's a living architect. As a new architect, style is a little bit dangerous. Living architects don't care about style. They just care about how to keep going, how to reach out, how to extend the capacity of architecture.

Student: Where do you find inspiration?

Nishizawa: From nature. Nature is fascinating. The ability of artists can be compared with the performance of nature. I always feel jealous towards nature. It's a very important inspiration.

Barrie: So you're interested in outdoor activities such as hiking or skiing?

Nishizawa: No, I don't like those kinds of activities. [Laughs] But I mean what is happening in the natural elements – the effect of light, for instance. Even in the city, you can find many types of light and sound effects – noise, wind, humidity, everything. Those are all important for the space or environment. If we can gain enough control of them, we can create different types of space. Those kinds of natural qualities are interesting.

Church Sun-Pu, Shizuoka (2008). Taira Nishizawa Architects. [Photo: Hiroshi Ueda]



Fig. 4 Forest Hall, To-mochi, Kumamoto (2004). Taira Nishizawa Architects. [Photo: Hiroshi Ueda]

Forest Hall plan and section, To-mochi, Kumamoto (2004). Courtesy of Taira Nishizawa Architects



Interview with Manuel Aires Mateus

Marianne Calvelo

"Architecture is the art of permanence, not ephemerality. The principle it is subjected to can be eternal. Having a clear idea is essential in architecture." This was the last piece of advice the internationally acclaimed Portuguese architect, Manuel Aires Mateus, left his students with after an intensive two-week design studio this winter semester 2012 in the University of Auckland School of Architecture and Planning.

Mateus, following an early collaboration with architect Gonçalo Byrne in 1988, founded the office Aires Mateus & Associados with his brother Francisco. Their projects - variable in scale and characterised by an austere play of mass and materiality - have helped shape contemporary architecture in Portugal, and increasingly influence architecture globally. Known for translating traditional Portuguese forms into detail-free surfaces and for an emphasis on sculptural austerity, the work of the practice has molded the contemporary architecture of Portugal and has received numerous awards both nationally and internationally. Besides his professional activity, he has held professorial roles at prestigious universities including Harvard University, USA, University of Ljubljani, Slovenia, Accademia di architettura di Mendrisio, Switzerland (since 2001), Universidade Autónoma and Universidade Lusíada, Lisbon (since 1997).

Mateus' design approach always begins with the call of instinct. He firmly believes in working with what is already known and to hand: drawing from the existing, the now, the here, is of prime importance. Referencing an internal and self-reflective starting point while confronting the immediacy of the programme, the site, materiality, etc., in fact amounts to a search for permanence, and for Mateus this means resisting time. His is an architecture that seeks to both be in continuity with, and transcendent of, the now - something that gives his work a timeless quality.

Marianne Calvelo, a Masters student who took part in the intensive studio in Auckland, interviewed Mateus shortly before he left.

Manuel Aires Mateus in conversation, The University of Auckland, School of Architecture and Planning, 2012. [Photo: GKHC Photography]

How did you get into architecture? Was there a specific time in your life when you decided to become an architect?

My answer is not very interesting because my whole life has always been around architects. My father was an architect and my mother was a painter. There wasn't really a particular time, it just sort of flowed naturally. I started early – I made and sold my first model when I was 14. It was a model of stairs for the house of the brother of Gonçalo Byrne.[1] Many years after, he became my boss. I started working very early in an office, which was common at the time anyway. I have a very common background. I'm from Lisbon. I grew up in Lisbon. I studied in Lisbon School of Architecture. I started working in Lisbon.

How did you establish your office with your brother?

It was more or less obvious in the beginning, that we would share work together. I started to work with Gonçalo Byrne while studying, and it wasn't long until my younger brother Fransisco joined me. We were very lucky to work with such a generous man. When we had enough to work on our own, we moved out and opened our own practice. Even after we left, I continued to collaborate with Gonçalo on some other projects. He became a great friend, someone I would consider part of the family. We also decided to have two small offices, in order not to have a big office. The idea behind it was to have a common investigation in which you have two different physical places you can work. This allows you to move from one office to another to really focus on a particular project. In a way, the strategy worked.

With the architectural work you are doing, do you feel you are moving with the times, or trying to react to or criticise current architectural trends?

I think that we are always trying to establish a position in any given moment. We try to react to every single thing that is going around. It is also important not to accept that we have too much of a fixed position about anything. Of course, we have our principles and we live according to them. It is important to understand that every process taken on every project is always different to another. No two projects are alike. We like to work *inside* the possibilities of every project. We always try to understand the limits of each situation. It's sort of like working on the question or working on the problem. We begin by thinking about the underlying question in every project that gives rise to the need of architecture. We try to make it as clear and as defined as possible. It then becomes easier to arrive at an answer.

Where do you find inspiration?

I think architecture is driven by instinct. This notion of instinct is very important. We don't have time; we have to react to things. To have instinct is to have knowledge. We should have knowledge in many fields and understand that it is possible to use it in a free way. We combine theory and other technical subjects and pick from the fields we want and need and use it with a certain freedom. This is instinct. For example, I have no knowledge in cooking; therefore I have no instinct in the kitchen. If you put me in a kitchen, I wouldn't know what to do! [Laughs] I have an instinct only about things I know how to control. We are driven by instinct. Inspiration is instinct. But to have instinct we must have knowledge, and then we *react*.

Your projects are primarily characterised by materiality. Is this a deliberate theme in your works? How did you come to this thinking?

I think it is something you cannot avoid. It is a common mistake to avoid this idea – the need to build and define space by materiality. If you look back to the beginning of the 20th century, they were trying to achieve a limit where it was possible to define interior and exterior by the use of glass. But now we know, we can differentiate the two conditions of space through materiality. We have to use it as a sort of a field. We are not only dealing with the relation to the inside of space but also the relation to the outside. It is very important to understand that *architecture is about life*. It is about common sense. We have to design it from the centre, from the interior. Architecture is about living in it and is never just about the design. Too often, we place it by an idea of an interesting shape or mere design. We are always talking about *real life* in architecture – this notion is often neglected.

I am aware that you are a strong advocate of permanence of architecture although some could oppose that architecture has ephemeral qualities. Could you elaborate or further justify your ideas on its permanence?

This idea of *permanence* in architecture must be considered beyond the physical qualities of the building. Architecture moving from time to time, like fashion and its trends – does not make sense in this context! Architecture is about ideas that have a connection to things that do not move at all! The way we live or move is not so different from the way our parents or grandparents move. We are different in many aspects, but not in our basic use of space. We still sit and stand in the same way. But also at the same time, architecture is sort of a base, subject to new and unexpected things happening. We have to have an open field that allows many different things to happen at the same time. Its permanence often forces the building to take on different uses. It has an ability to respond to different demands making it timeless. A good building is a building that could be transformed by many functions. I believe that architecture is not really eternal, but its principles and ideas can be eternal or permanent. Architecture must be seen from this standpoint, where the ideas embedded in its architecture could last more than the physical aspect the building. *the permanence of idea*.

You've talked a lot about good architecture, could you now define for us a good architect?

A good architect would be hard to define. In reality, he or she is one who is able to resist time. One who is clear and always precise. As a result, one could create good architecture – that is clear, strong, logical and efficient. I think good architecture is always about an idea that we *all* could understand.

Which architectural movement do you think are you part of? Imagine 20 years from now, students who will be studying your work intensely, what period do you think you would belong to?

I hope it would still be contemporary! I hope I am still alive and making! [Laughs] Ideally, I would like to escape from this definition of time. I think once you define an architect being part of a certain time, you are already putting certain limits on

the architecture. Quality architecture requires resistance to trendy or fancy ideas of our own time. We have to understand that through history we have to make links and connections, and not simply aim to create a sheer iconic image, which will only be lost in a few years.

What advice would you give to students studying architecture? When you have young fresh architects applying in your office, what sort of person do you look for?

Well, for me the most important requirement for somebody to be part of the office is the commitment to working. Architecture is a profession that could allow you to live a wonderful life but it has to be done by being committed to it, done to the end. Otherwise it is a waste of time. This doesn't mean that we suffer, it simply means committing to something that is really important. You are all able to do extraordinary things. The most important advice I can give to you is to maximise your own capacities. Use your memories and your own experiences. Don't just combine things that everybody already knows! Aim to reach the maximised potentials of a human being, an artist, and create an identity for yourselves!

Leiria House Renders and Section, Leiria, Portugal 2008-2010. [Courtesy of Aires Mateus e Associates & Francisco Aires Mateus Arqitectos, with photography by FG+SG – Fernando Guerra, Sergio Guerra]



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Architecture and Violence

Bechir Kenzari (Ed.)
Review by Sean Pickersgill



Edited by Bechir Kenzari 2012 *Architecture and Violence*. Barcelona and New York: Actar.

At the outset it is worth noting the title of the book reviewed here. It is *Architecture and Violence*, not 'Architecture or Violence', 'Architecture for Violence', or even 'Violent Architecture'. The conjunction "and" tells us immediately about the conflicted and ambiguous relationship between the practice of architecture and the effect and events of violence. This is both the strength and the weakness of this book, but is probably a position taken with full knowledge of the difficulty in conjoining two forms of experience that are not conventionally, in an institutional sense, brought together.

As the editor Bechir Kenzari admits, or perhaps celebrates, in the introduction, there has been no attempt to thematise the content or to address issues regarding the varied nature of the two subjects. Instead he adopts a default position of sequencing the chapters alphabetically by author name. Whilst polite in terms of editorial control over the contributors, it leaves the reader with the task of determining the relevant thematic strands that may be gleaned from the individual chapters. Further weakening this approach is the uneven quality of the essays that are contained in the book. The nature of this I will discuss in the review only generally, but it is unfortunate for a topic which, as Kenzari notes in his introduction, seems to be particularly appropriate subject matter for contemporary architectural theory. In a period in which there are significant challenges regarding issues of post-criticality, the need for texts to bring academic precision and consistent, cumulative argument to a topic is especially important.

Violence itself is a topic that, by its immediacy, requires our attention since its relationship to questions of moral and ethical behaviour, and to culpability by unauthorised perpetrators, fill our daily lives. The question remains, of course, as to the scale and form of violence being enacted. Is it violence that has been carried out by an individual, by a group of persons, by a systemic organisation? Is it deliberate, is it accidental; is it destructive or creative; is it gendered, racially profiled? As you cycle through the variations possible on the thematics of violence, the term clearly points towards the idea that in each case, violence can be recognised by the manner in which particularly egregious events take place. The question remains, is it the consequence of random conflict or of organised hostility and antagonism? Perhaps we can assume that if a violent act takes place within an architectural setting, then the architecture is no more than a witness. But if the violence is the product of deep structural chauvinisms then architecture may well be a principal instrument of the employment of violence. In any respect, the need to clearly define "What is violence?" in any analysis of architecture and violence seems crucial. Perhaps if we are able to refine our understanding of these categories of experience, the effect of violence, and practise, the making of violent circumstances, it would seem we could understand how actions within one (de)constitute effects in another.

These questions should constitute more than an academic parlour game of demarcating meanings, particularly in a text that has cast its net as wide as *Architecture and Violence*. The essays range from: specific historical studies of events (Libero Andreotti on the Italian Fascist Exhibition of 1932; Dorita Hannah on the Chechen siege of the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre in 2002; Andrew Herscher on the use of contemporary satellite imaging in the analysis of war crimes; William B. Millard

on the New Jersey environment of the *Sopranos* television series; Sarah Treadwell on a Maori/English battle in New Zealand in 1864); critical analyses of architectural projects, including Annette Fierro on recent projects in London and Elie Haddad on the Beirut nightclub b-018; and also studies on immanent aspects of violence within the culture of architecture, with Bechir Kenzari on the idea of rivalry, Donald Kunze on immanent topographies in architectural thinking, and Nadir Lahiji on autoimmunity.

While the range of subject matter is broad, it is not clear whether the exercise of bringing such disparate subject methods and modes of analysis together is successful. If it were even possible to define the precise nature of how each of these authors collectively addressed the idea of architecture and violence, it is likely that the description would be so loose and indeterminate as to be inapplicable in other contexts. There are some consistencies, but these tend to reinforce the separation between specific studies and general observations. Kenzari, Kunze and Lahiji share an interest in the vicissitudes of thinking architecturally and critically. They, particularly Kunze and Lahiji, explore the recognition that the task of bringing architecture and violence together is problematic, not because it is fruitless to look for anything to say about architecture in this context, but because there is a surfeit of material to draw upon. To look at any specific example of architecture and violence is to recognise its rhetorical function in parallel discourses on hope, aggression, despair, stoicism, continuity, etc.

If, by contrast, we turn to the specific analyses to search for more focussed and demonstrative presentations of architecture and violence, the essays that address this (Andreotti, Hannah, Herscher, Millard, Treadwell) vary wildly in their application of the term. For Andreotti, violence is the inherent bombastic and bellicose imagery of Italian Fascism; for Hannah it is the conjunction of the Dubrovka siege, the significant number of deaths that occurred in the botched rescue and the ideas of Antonin Artaud; for Herscher it is the dehumanising recognition that the violence of war crimes can only be legitimated through remote sensing; for Millard it is the argument that a fictional series about violent New Jersey mobsters is situated in a real environment; and for Treadwell it is the employment of successful military defense strategies by the Maori in their wars with colonial trespassers. For Andreotti, Hannah and Millard, their argument is not of the same order as the other essays since clearly there are differences between actual events and their characterisation. Whilst the events of the Dubrovka siege were tragically real, and so too were the actions of the Italian Fascists and the actual New York Mafioso, the authors' attempts to connect these to a general theory of violence seems strained. I was not convinced of the need to link Artaud's theatre project to Dubrovka just because it occurred in a theatre, nor to see a Fascist exhibition as being inherently violent simply because of its subject matter (itself quite abstractly realised), nor to see how the fiction of *The Sopranos* contributed to a critique of New Jersey as an inherently violent landscape.

Herscher and Treadwell, at least, show how a particularly specific spatial and material strategy inherently recorded a pattern of violence, but these instances do not occur within an overall narrative within *Architecture and Violence* that demonstrated their relevance to an architectural practice that drew upon and developed military practice. Since we know there are clear architectural precedents in this field, perhaps their essays might have been situated in a meta-narrative that started with situated historical examples and finished with methodological questions on future study of the entwinement of architecture and violence. The essays by Kunze and Lahiji would serve admirably for this purpose.

Whilst I think there is a tremendous amount of excellent and provocative thinking, my criticism of the text is similar to the one that could be made of one of the precedents cited by Kenzari, *Architecture of Fear* (1987, Arbor House), edited by Nan Elin. Though *Architecture and Violence* has, arguably, more rigorous scholastic effort in its individual essays, both texts suffer from a lack of governing and contextualising narrative that would still allow the individual essays space to explore their hermetic interests. In particular, since the material in *Architecture and Fear* is more intellectually challenging in some instances, the need to connect between the different voices becomes even more crucial.

The presence of a meta-narrative, an introductory passage outlining the purpose of an essay that will follow and a summary reflection that draws parallels with other texts would have benefitted the essays individually and the book overall. As it is currently organised, the alphabetical listing isolates each of the essays within their particular scope of definitions, leaving them the task of presenting their individual idea of violence and architecture as conjoined states-of-affairs that share coeval beginnings. The subject matter of architecture as the site of violence, a record of its effects, and a model for emulation or avoidance is exceptionally important. Making the presumption that the goal of enlightened individuals is to avoid Hobbesian doomsday scenarios, it would be valuable to have a text that addressed some core issues in a logical fashion if only to describe how one would distinguish between historical, contemporary, metaphorical, simulated, etc. forms of situated violence.

There are two examples of the need for a systematic text of this order; each addresses a real and a simulated encounter with violence. In terms of a real encounter, the relationship between cities and violence are incredibly complex, and the ties between particular urban patterns and human behaviour are proper subjects for the range of intellectuals, officials, planners and strategists. When the Spanish-language website *Otrameric.com* asks why 41 of the 50 most violent cities in the world are located in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, it is clear that there are some consistencies at play here. Just as key works such as Eyal Weizman's *Hollow Land* (Verso, 2007) have scrutinised the spatial and military practices of recent events in Israel and Palestine in a systematic fashion, there is clearly a need to find consistent relationships between violence and urban/architectural form in these cities. In terms of simulated encounters, we should ask ourselves why there is no parallel investigation into the rehearsed violence of digital game environments whose very functionality, in particular in First Person Shooter examples, relies upon the design of architectural and landscape environments. Commercially successful games have finessed the relationship between violence, ontological engagement, moral behaviour, rewards and their environments. Though it may have been beyond the scope of *Architecture and Violence* to cover all aspects of these two examples, they remain notable omissions.

In summary, the book is a brave attempt to bring together a diverse array of scholarship on terms that inherently, I argue, need quite careful terms of reference for the observations to be meaningful. Those essays that force the relationship between architecture and violence confirm suspicions that there are no inherent relevant theoretical relations within architecture when it comes to topics of urgency such as violence, while those who understand the complexity needed the editorial framing to allow their depth to have sense within an overall narrative. The topic deserves this.

My Desk is My Castle: Exploring personalisation cultures

Uta Brandes and Michael Erlhoff (Eds.)
Review by John Walsh

Uta Brandes and Michael Erlhoff (Eds.) 2011 *My Desk is My Castle: Exploring personalisation cultures.* Birkhaüser, 2011 [ISBN: 978-3-0346-0774-2] [320pp]

In the late nineteenth century two young Oxford Egyptologists began excavating some middens west of the Nile, on the site of the Greco-Roman city of Oxyrhynchus. Bernard Grenfell and Arthur Hunt were looking for the lost literary masterworks of classical antiquity, and over the next few decades they did unearth some treasures – poems by Sappho and comedies by Menander, for example, and bits of plays by Sophocles and Euripides, along with Old and New Testament apocrypha (including the gospels of Thomas, Mary and James). But for the most part the vast trove of papyrus dug up by the dogged Englishmen recorded the quotidian intercourse of a bureaucratic society: wills and bills, codes and edicts, licenses and petitions, along with personal letters and horoscopes. Searching for the sublime, the trackers of Oxyrhynchus had discovered a load of old rubbish. If it was any consolation, Grenfell and Hunt could consider themselves pioneers in a new field. Detritus studies, it could be called.

My Desk is My Castle is an Oxyrhynchian type of endeavour. It's a rummage through the stuff, well, let's be honest, the junk that clutters up the modern workstation. The book's authors – 21 of them are credited – have pored over the items deployed on and around the desktops of wage slaves and salary men and women, counting and categorising the small, but often numerous tokens of office-worker self-assertion. As its subtitle says, the book is an exploration of "personalisation cultures", which means it's an expedition into behavioural territory lying somewhere between pathos and pathology. It's a landscape both all too familiar and easily ignored, for it is, sad to say, the environment in which many of us pass half our waking hours.

First, a note about the scope of the project. The contributors to this "international desk project" are affiliated with academic institutions in 11 cities around the world: Auckland; Barcelona; Cairo; Cologne; Curitiba; Fukuoka; Hong Kong; Milan; New York; Pune; and Taipei. In each place, teams of students were despatched to offices in four types of workplaces differently tolerant of personal idiosyncrasy: banks and insurance companies (traditionally uptight working environments); administration departments of unspecified but presumably generic enterprises (characteristically a little more forgiving of "personalisation"); call centres (vigilantly alert to any signs of individualism); and design studios (self-consciously permissive of spatial customisation).

The "methodological concept" of the exercise was "the interpretation of visual data". That is, the office visitors took photographs of desks and their accretions of objects and then the authors tried to make sense of this material, in part by sorting items into "clusters" – "toys and figurines", for example, "life accessories" and "plants and greenery", the latter also defined as "personal horticultural organisms". (Advertently or not, the book does have its funny moments.) Altogether, 686 desks were photographed, and 9246 "non-work related, two or three dimensional objects … were identified as private items".

The authors describe the desktop items as "telling objects". The problem is, they're talking in sign language, and that may be interpreted in many ways (all of them, the authors apologise, "Western-based"). Therefore, although the book has a method, it's not exactly scientific. The authors' practice of imputing meaning is directly related to the passive way in which information was recorded. Desks were photographed, but their users were interviewed in a very cursory manner. Only two questions were asked of the desk users: Which object on your desk would you miss the most if removed? And which the least? The answers weren't much help, the authors report: "To our surprise ... these short interviews added little-to-no additional information about the employees' motives."

It's not clear whether this tentative inquisitorial approach was the product of timidity or intentional disinterest. In a sense, the teams visiting workplaces were despatched as reporters, but any cub reporter returning to an editor as empty-handed as these researchers would expect an ear-reddening tirade. The fear factor certainly seems to have been a research impediment in New York, where office visitors encountered a typically abrupt Big Apple reception. On this note, one of the collateral pleasures of *My Desk is My Castle* is the book's rather ingenuous confirmation of stereotypes. In the book New Yorkers are rude, Aucklanders are laid-back, Milanese designers are obsessed with style, and office workers in Hong Kong and Fukuoka are terminally addicted to big-eyed furry toys. And it wasn't a total surprise that the book's most overtly sexual object – a dildo-shaped eraser – should have been found in the drawer of a German desk. (With a typically straight face, the text treats this bizarre discovery as "part of a peculiar and secret male gender narrative".)

The silence of the desk operatives has allowed the authors to speak volumes. As substantive explanations from object-owners were not sought or gathered by the teams carrying out the hit-and-run "research", the authors were free to speculate freely about object-deployment motives. Thus a plenitude of desk-top objects is linked variously "to the fear of poverty or at least of losing these objects and not being able to find them", to memories of deprivation in newer boom economies, to the constant threat, in some countries, of natural disasters that will sweep away any possessions except those close at hand, and in Hong Kong, to "a palpable degree" of post-colonial anxiety.

The ascription of motive occurs at an individual as well as a general level. For example, on the desk of a Taipei female employee, a figure of "a little man with white hair and a long moustache wearing a simple long robe with a mandarin collar" – a kitsch object, the authors declare, but "from a European perspective", they quickly add – "could express the desire to get married or the happiness about being married". But, "on the other hand", and rather disappointingly, "the little figurine might have sat there simply because its owner liked it".

Well, yes. Who knows? Ignorance isn't always a barrier to omniscience, however: "One male Japanese employee had prominently placed a Ferrari mouse-pad on his desk, alluding to his desire for mobility and, because it is not a Toyota, to his dream of travelling the world." Perhaps he just liked the logo? Or perhaps he's a fan of Formula One? And is eschewing a mouse-pad advertising Toyota – surely the standby brand of the world's rental fleets – really an expression of a yearning for international travel?

Talking of dream analysis, the leeway allowed by the book's untethered interpretive approach of course accommodates a Freudian divagation. This occurs in the chapter on "gender staging" and is prompted by a consideration of that ubiquitous desktop accessory of female employees, the handbag. To a Freudian, a handbag is never just a handbag. "Handbags are concave containers with a large 'throat'", the authors write, "that may evoke the fear of being swallowed up and that leads into a dark cave whose contents remain a mystery to the outsider." Male office-workers should be very nervous. Does the presence of so many handbags, with their capacious and "taboo-like" interiors, explain the counter-deployment of erect little action figures? And what's with all the bananas? Each desktop, it seems, is a potential battleground in the gender wars.

While the sight of a woman fossicking around in her "concave container" might be unsettling, there is an even scarier office scenario to contemplate. "If we look at all the stuff sitting on desks, as recorded in the photographs and studies in this book, the question arises as to whether these things might have a life of their own." The unknown author of this remark – mostly, it's impossible to know who wrote what in *My Desk is My Castle* – cites Marx's observation in *Capital* that in developed markets objects seemingly assume an autonomous existence, but he or she could just have easily, and perhaps more amusingly, referenced the folkloric trope of the secret lives of inanimate objects. From *The Adventures of Pinocchio* and *The Steadfast Tin Soldier* to *Toy Story* and *A Night at the Museum*, there's a long tradition of psychologically fecund tales of toys coming to life. There is a dark side to these stories but, my God, their nightmarish quality would pale against the horror show that would result if the battalions of figures in *My Desk is My Castle* leapt to life.

The book, in a way, is a victim of its own plenitude. Because it has so many authors its tone is uneven, and its focus skittish. Amidst the rather tendentious speculation there are some welcome ideas that promise to give the book a bit of heft. For example, an interesting comparison is made between the English focus on the protection of private space and the European struggle for public rights. It doesn't go anywhere, this discussion – there are no English desks in the book – and it doesn't do the rest of the content any favours, because it highlights its Lilliputian concerns. And that's not meant pejoratively: this is an account of small things, and small protests of individuality. The world of work is precarious, in these days of financial crisis, globalised out-sourcing and casualised employment. In response, office workers attempt to humanise their space – denied *lebensraum*, they try to create their own little *heimat*. It's an understandable reaction, but this reviewer had another one. After reading *My Desk is My Castle*, I promptly cleared all the crap from my desk. False consciousness is as precarious a defence against the realities of modern employment as a castle is against the realities of modern warfare.

Simon Twose & Andrew Barrie, "Familial Clouds" in *Traces of Centuries & Future Steps*, Palazzo Bembo, Venice, Italy, 2012. [Photo: Simon Twose]

Familial Clouds

An exhibition by Simon Twose and Andrew Barrie
Review by Tom Daniell

Familial Clouds, by Simon Twose & Andrew Barrie

Traces of Centuries & Future Steps – Collateral Event of the 13th International Architectural Exhibition, *La Biennale di Venezia*

Palazzo Bembo, Venice, Italy, August 29 to November 25, 2012

New Zealand has no permanent presence at the Venice Architecture Biennale, no national pavilion in the Giardini, yet in 1991 its first (and, until now, only) contribution was an incredible success. As part of an exhibition of selected architecture schools from around the world, Auckland was awarded the "Venice Prize" at the urging of Arata Isozaki and other members of the jury – no doubt to the shock and chagrin of all the inestimably more famous architecture schools favoured to win. Disappointingly, this wasn't enough to convince those with the authority to make such decisions that it would be worth funding regular New Zealand participation in Venice (though, to be fair, in recent years New Zealand artists have been showing in the "real" Venice Biennale, an international art show that alternates with the Architecture Biennale). It did, at least briefly, put the Auckland School of Architecture front and centre within the world architectural community's consciousness.

The demonstrable brilliance of the work proffered by Auckland in 1991 aside, one has to hand it to Isozaki. As a frequent juror for major architecture competitions, his insistence on championing the most radical, unlikely designs has led to the recognition (though not always the realisation) of some of the most influential projects of recent decades – Bernard Tschumi's Parc de la Villette, Zaha Hadid's Peak, Itsuko Hasegawa's Shonandai Cultural Center, Foreign Office Architects' Yokohama International Port Terminal, Toyo Ito's Sendai Mediatheque, for example – not only jumpstarting the careers of relative unknowns and allowing established figures to produce definitive works, but accelerating the evolution of the discipline itself.

Twenty years after Auckland's 15 minutes of fame, a few of the protagonists were back together at the 13th Venice Architecture Biennale in 2012. Isozaki was joined by Simon Twose and Andrew Barrie (members of Auckland's original student team, and now academics at Victoria University of Wellington and The University of Auckland respectively) in an exhibition called "Traces of Centuries & Future Steps", which included about 60 architects from 26 countries. Organised by the Global Art Affairs Foundation, a Dutch non-profit organisation that "aims to heighten the awareness about the more philosophical themes in contemporary art", this was described as a "collateral event of the 13th International Architecture Exhibition", one of several independent exhibitions that took place parallel to the Biennale proper. It was located in the magnificent Palazzo Bembo, a restored fifteenth-century aristocratic home facing the Grand Canal, a few steps from the Rialto Bridge and about 15 minutes by *vaporetto* from the Biennale venues.

The double title comes from the two centrepieces of the exhibition. On the lower floor was "Traces of Centuries" by Chinese artist Ying Tianqi, a multi-room, multimedia reflection on the modernization of China. On the upper floor was "Future Steps" by Arata Isozaki, showing his urban development proposal for Zhengzhou, China – an interactive installation that invites visitors to physically alter it, thus forming a trilogy with his 1962 "Incubation Process" and 1997 "Mirage City" exhibitions. The other 30 or so rooms contained projects from selected architects, each working in collaborative pairs or small groups. The exhibits ranged from conventional displays of architectural drawings and models to sound-and-light media installations, in some cases escaping their assigned galleries into the adjacent



Simon Twose & Andrew Barrie, "Familial Clouds" in *Traces of Centuries & Future Steps*, Palazzo Bembo, Venice, Italy, 2012. [Photo: Patrick Loo]

corridors or courtyards. All were invited as a result of an open call for proposals – Twose and Barrie were there on their own merits, not as representatives of a nation.

Nonetheless, the installation explicitly presented itself as a component of the wider New Zealand architectural scene and its historical development. Titled "Familial Clouds", the room was dominated by a large white plinth acting as a backdrop for a diagrammatic diorama of the historical lineages that weave through New Zealand architecture from the colonial period onward. Lineages of people, that is, not styles. Like a genealogical chart of marriages and offspring, we were shown working partnerships and collaborations, generational sequences of students and teachers, and the shifting relationships between employees and employers, all presented as a complex (and, Barrie admits, controversial) web of mutual influence. Well-suited to the 2012 Biennale theme "Common Ground", this was the latest iteration of research begun by Barrie in 2008, initially as a flow chart of names, now manifested as an array of labelled human silhouettes complemented, for more-or-less obscure reasons, with stylised trees, animals, furniture, flags, musical instruments, and so on. All the figures are black, with two exceptions: Twose and Barrie are both shown in red, the focal points of the display and the culmination of the lineages. In a characteristically Kiwi mixture of modesty and egotism, the exhibit is an extraction of their own disciplinary family trees from the wider New Zealand architectural community.

Even as straight documentation lacking critique or analysis, this has a certain value for future historians. Now that the circuitry is so revealed with such clarity, we can better address the information being passed along it: the ways in which the stylistic and technical evolution of New Zealand architecture has been facilitated and advanced by its substrate of personal relationships. A first step has been made here by the inclusion of simple paper models of key buildings standing next to the figures of their architects. Models of two designs each by Twose and Barrie blended in with the other artefacts. Twose showed a pair of award-winning

houses, one in Wellington and the other in Auckland. As well as models set on the plinth, they were dissected into hundreds of tiny pieces dispersed across the walls, showing the design processes and built results: a cloud of fragmentary models, 35mm slides, shrunken hand sketches and computer drawings, all set at odd angles and interspersed with tiny mirrors necessary for seeing some of the images. Barrie presented finely crafted models of two intriguing unbuilt projects. Though given nominal programs and locations, they were essentially experiments in using rationalised structural elements to achieve formal interest or surface articulation with minimal effort and resources.

That's a strategy that underlies the whole project. Twose and Barrie prefabricated most of the installation in Wellington and Auckland, then, like George Jetson's flying car, folded it into a parcel that weighed less than a kilo and carried it in their hand luggage to Venice. In both its content and method, the installation is an ingenious demonstration of the kind of nimble, unpretentious approach that can enable a small, often overlooked Pacific nation to participate in a global discourse. From some angles, "Familial Clouds" might be seen as a slightly discomfiting attempt to establish credibility through provenance rather than material results. Nonetheless, in emphasising the wider ecology and history of architectural practice in New Zealand, Twose and Barrie suggest the ways in which any individual design is constrained and enabled by being unavoidably embedded within a specific place and time. Ultimately, it's less a show of work than a presentation of evidence that work is being done.

Arata Isozaki toured the Palazzo Bembo before the exhibition opened to the public, and met Twose and Barrie. When he learned where they were from, he mentioned that many years ago he had been on a Biennale jury and found "one excellent project" deserving of the Venice Prize, an installation in the shape of a cloud from a school in New Zealand. To then discover that he was encountering new clouds from two of those original students was a small yet invaluable vindication for everyone involved.

Simon Twose & Andrew Barrie, "Familial Clouds" in *Traces of Centuries & Future Steps*, Palazzo Bembo, Venice, Italy, 2012. [Photo: Patrick Loo]

Bio Notes

Stephen Loo

Dr Stephen Loo is Professor of Architecture at the School of Architecture & Design, University of Tasmania. He has published widely on affect and the biophilosophy of the contemporary subject, ethico-aesthetic models for human action, and experimental digital thinking. His current research (with Undine Sellbach) concerns the connections between ethics, psychoanalysis and the space of the entomological imagination with forthcoming publications in *Angelaki* and *Parallax*.

Andrew Douglas

Andrew Douglas is a Senior Lecturer and Postgraduate Strand Leader in Spatial Design at AUT University, Auckland, where he teaches cultural history of space, philosophies of movement and urban history and theory. He has practised architecture in both Auckland and London and is currently completing a PhD at Goldsmiths, University of London, on Oedipus and observational walking in the cities of modernity.

Jeff Malpas

Jeff Malpas is Distinguished Professor at the University of Tasmania, where he works across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, geography and architecture. He is also Distinguished Visiting Professor at LaTrobe University in Philosophy and Creative Arts. He is best known for his work on place, space, and landscape, on hermeneutics and the transcendental, on aspects of contemporary ethics and politics, and on language, self, and mind. His most recent book is *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place* (MIT 2012).

Jane Madsen

Jane Madsen is researching a practice-based PhD at the Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL. She is a film and video maker, whose work includes experimental films, installation and documentary. She teaches at the University of the Arts London. Originally from Melbourne, she has lived and worked in London since the 1990s. She has exhibited widely and written and published on film, art and architecture.

Michael Tawa

Michael Tawa is an architect and Professor of Architecture at the University of Sydney. Between 2006 and 2009 he was Professor of Architectural Design at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. He has practiced and taught architecture in Alice Springs, Adelaide and Sydney. Recent publications include *Agencies of the Frame: Tectonic Strategies in Cinema and Architecture* (2010) and *Theorising the Project: a Thematic Approach to Architectural Design* (2011), both with Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Current projects include the web-based Design Lexicon and research on the concepts of emergence and translation in architectural design. He is currently editing a forthcoming issue of *Architectural Theory Review on Emergence and Architecture*.

Linda Marie Walker

Dr Linda Marie Walker is a senior lecturer in the School of Art, Architecture and Design at the University of South Australia, teaching both undergraduate and postgraduate students. She is a writer, artist and curator. Her research concerns writing as a non-instrumental and improvisational medium that informs and affects different scales and registers of sense and situations. Her writing is published in academic journals and artist catalogues.

Michael Chapman

Michael Chapman is a senior lecturer at the University of Newcastle in Australia where he teaches architectural theory, history and design and is the program convenor for the Bachelor of Design (architecture). He has recently completed his PhD on the role (and legacy) of Dada and Surrealism in twentieth-century architectural theory. His work has been widely published in journals and conference proceedings and, together with Michael Ostwald and Chris Tucker, he is the author of *Residue: Architecture as a Condition of Loss*, published by the RMIT Press in 2007. His design work has been published and exhibited widely, including at the Australian Pavilion of the Venice Architectural Biennale, BMW Edge at Federation Square in Melbourne, the Museum of Melbourne, and the State Library of NSW.

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Dr Peg Rawes is Senior Lecturer, and History and Theory Thesis Coordinator for the MArch Architecture (RIBA Part 2) at the Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL. Publications include: *Relational Architectural Ecologies* (Ed.) (Routledge, forthcoming 2013); *Space, Geometry and Aesthetics* (2008) and *Irigaray for Architects* (2007).

William Taylor

William M. Taylor is Professor of Architecture at the University of Western Australia where he teaches architectural design and history and theory of the built environment. Recent publications include *The Vital Landscape, Nature and the Built Environment in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Ashgate 2004) and a co-edited collection of essays, *An Everyday Transience: The Urban Imaginary of Goldfields Photographer John Joseph Dwyer* (UWA Publishing 2010). A co-authored book *Prospects for An Ethics of Architecture* (Routledge 2011) results from his collaboration with Professor Michael Levine (Philosophy UWA). He is currently researching the subject of architecture and transience.

Hannah Lewi

Hannah Lewi is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning at the University of Melbourne. Her research and publications include theoretical inquiries into heritage and conservation, the digital representation of architectural history and Australian modernism. She is currently the chair of Docomomo Australia, and has been the past president of the Society of Architectural Historians of Australia and New Zealand (SAHANZ), and the co-editor of the journal *Fabrications*.

Anuradha Chatterjee

Dr Anuradha Chatterjee is an architect, academic, and writer/critic. Through her teaching and writing, Anu is pursuing simultaneous research agendas of Ruskin studies; dress, body, and gender and architectural theory; cultural history of surface and vision through architectural theory; and emergent practices (Australia and Asia). She is the founding editor of *The Eighth Lamp: Ruskin Studies Today* (Rivendale Press), and the author of 'Ruskin's Theory of the Ideal Dress and Textile Analogy in Medieval Architecture' in *Persistent Ruskin – Studies in Influence, Assimilation and Effect*, edited by Keith Hanley and Brian Maidment, Ashgate 2012 (in press).

Tom Daniell

Tom Daniell is a practicing architect and academic based in Japan. He is currently Head of the architecture program at the University of St Joseph in Macau, Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong, Visiting Fellow at the RMIT Spatial Information Architecture Lab, and Adjunct Professor at Victoria University of Wellington. Widely published, he is an editorial consultant for the journals *Mark*, *Volume*, and *Interstices*. His books include *FOBA: Buildings* (2005), *After the Crash: Architecture in Post-Bubble Japan* (2008), *Houses and Gardens of Kyoto* (2010), and *Kiyoshi Sey Takeyama + Amorphe* (2011).

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Dr Andrew Barrie is an Auckland-based practitioner and Professor at the School of Architecture and Planning, The University of Auckland. After completing doctoral studies at Tokyo University, he spent several years as a project architect at Toyo Ito & Associates. On returning to New Zealand, he worked at Cheshire Architects in Auckland, and is a regular contributor to architecture and design journals. He is currently working on a book on Shigeru Ban's Cardboard Cathedral in Christchurch.

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Sean Pickersgill

Dr Sean Pickersgill currently teaches Masters Level Studio, Advanced Design Media, Theories and History of Architecture and Architecture and Modernity in the University of South Australia. His PhD artefact and thesis focused on the interrelationship between aspects of German critical theory and the idea of renovation/redemption in architecture. Currently he is exploring the use and implications of game engines in the ontology of digital architecture. As part of a group of experts, he has recently undertaken speculative design work for the South Australian government, looking at master-planning strategies for the city of Adelaide.

John Walsh

John Walsh is the communications manager for the New Zealand Institute of Architects. From 2002 to 2011 he was editor of *Architecture New Zealand*, and for several years was also managing editor of a stable of design titles, including *Urbis*, *ProDesign* and *Houses New Zealand*. He is the author of *New New Zealand Houses* (Random House 2007) and *Home Work* (Random House 2010), both of which were collaborations with architectural photographer Patrick Reynolds, with whom he is currently working on another residential architecture book.

Notes for contributors

Submission of written papers

Submission: All submissions should engage in, and contribute to, a wider critical context. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of the article does not guarantee its publication. Please submit the manuscript in the form in which you wish it to appear. We strongly encourage you to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.

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Refereeing process: All papers are read first by a selection committee. If considered suitable, they are then sent to two referees (blind reviewers) who will return a referee report with advice regarding suitability for publication, editing, reworking or development of the paper. The recommendations will be forwarded to the writers, with the expectation that the referees' comments will be addressed before the paper is accepted and edited for publication. Should the reports diverge, the issue editors may direct the author. Conversely, if authors are in doubt about a report's implications, they are most welcome to seek clarification with the issue editors.

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Submission: All visual submissions should engage in, and contribute to, a wider critical context. Their mode of fabrication, and its exploration and questioning, needs to be evident both in the visual and textual parts of the submission, and their relationship with sites and empirical or conceptual contexts must be articulated and made explicit. The work needs to demonstrate innovation or creative excellence.

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Abstract

Papers or submissions must be accompanied by a short abstract (100-150 words) on a separate page.

Length

Refereed written papers should not exceed 5000 words (including title, main text and endnotes). Non-refereed full papers should not exceed 2500 and reviews should not exceed 1000 words. The accompanying text of visual submissions should be approximately 500 words. Longer papers are only accepted in special circumstances.

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Include a short bio-note about the author(s) in a separate file (50-100 words, named bio_author name. doc). The inclusion of a contact email address is optional.

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Manuscripts should formatted as A4, with 2.5cm margins. Use standard fonts such as *Times* or *Arial* and format the text in 10pt. Please use only one empty space between sentences and do not use more than one consecutive tab for formatting. All titles and subtitles must be in Title Case (lower case, with Caps. for first word). Language format NZ or UK English.

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Layout **tables** on a separate page, with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text with a note [Insert Table 1 here]. Tables should be numbered in Arabic numerals with a clear identifying legend.

Use **endnotes,** not footnotes, in all manuscripts.

Graphics or images must be provided as **separate greyscale JPG files in publishable quality** (300dpi at high-quality compression rate, at approximately 1.5 times the size of the anticipated reproduction. At this resolution, an approx. 6Mb file would reproduce at an approx 20cm wide image; the minimum size for small images is approx. 1.2Mb). Please indicate their placement in the text – in square brackets: [Insert "filename.jpg" here, caption: "caption text"]. If you want to insert images into your original file, please ensure that you reduce their size for screen to keep the file size small.

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Fig. 1 Anonymous (1955). Margaret Barr's ballet "Strange children" [Photograph, State Library of NSW]
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Fig. 3 Vittorio de Sica (1948). Bicycle thieves [Film still, Excelsa Film]
Fig. 4 Office Santiago Calatrava (2004). Zurich Law Faculty Library, levels 0 and 6 [Section and plans. Courtesy: Corbin-Hillman Communications, NY]
Fig. 5 Interstice between library and pre-existing courtyard. [Photo: Author, 2011]
Fig. 6 Sir John Everett Millais (1886). Bubbles [Photo: Bob Swain, picasaweb]

Quotations: Use double quote marks around a quoted word, phrase, or sentence, and single quotation marks for quotes within quotes, as follows:

Heidegger would make this point very clear in later two essays, in which he introduces the "*primal* oneness" of the fourfold where "to be 'on earth' already means 'under the sky'" as a counter to a world in a process of planetary dissolution, in which "everything is washed together into the uniform distance-lessness" (1954: 149), and "airplanes and radio sets are ... among the things closest to us" (1975: 21).

If the quotation is longer than 40 words, it must be indented, without quotation marks around the whole quote. Quoted words inside the body of the 40 words are indicated in single quotation marks. e.g.

> The axonometric drawings of Sartoris can be considered ... the locus of a cognitive transcendence: in the finished perfection of the design, where geometry discloses its suprahistorical authority, the architect-theologian catches the 'philosophical and poetic matrix' of the new architecture in the mirror of the 'dreamt image', and anticipating the ends by the mastery of the means, prefigures a reality to come ... (Reichlin 1978: 91)

Note that if a word or group of words is omitted from the quotation then three stops are used with a space before and after; full stops and commas are not included in the quotation marks except if the sentence is included in full (see above).

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Examples:

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Leatherbarrow, D. (2009). *Architecture oriented otherwise*. New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press.

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Alberti, L. B. (1988). *On the art of building in ten books* (J. Rykwert, N. Leich, R. Tavernor, Trans.). Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press.

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Jolly, M., Tcherkézoff, S., & Tryon, D. (Eds.). (2009). *Oceanic encounters: Exchange, desire, violence*. Canberra, Australia: Australian National University E Press.

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Ministry of Education, Te Tahuhu o te Matauranga (2000). *The Arts in the New Zealand Curriculum.* Wellington, New Zealand: Learning Media.

Chapter in Book:
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Article in Journal:
Couture, J.-P. (2009). Spacing emancipation? Or how spherology can be seen as a therapy for modernity. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27*, 157-163.

Unpublished Paper:
Jackson, M. (2001). Radical gestures (Unpublished Paper). Auckland, New Zealand: AUT University

Newspaper Article:
Hattersley, R. (2002, Friday August 30). The silly season. *Guardian*, p. 18.

Thesis:
Yates, A. (2009). *Oceanic grounds, architecture, the evental and the in-between* (Unpublished Thesis for the Degree of Master in Design). Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand.

On-line References:
Jackson, M., & della Dora, V. (2009). "Dreams so big only the sea can hold them": Man-made islands as anxious spaces, cultural icons, and travelling visions. *Environment and Planning A* (advance online publication). doi:10.1068/a41237.

NOT BORED! (2007). *Detournements in Guy Debord's The Society of the Spectacle*. Retrieved from http://www.notbored.org/SOTS-detournements.html

Frascari, M. (2000). A light, six-sided, paradoxical fight. *Nexus Network Journal, 4*(2 Spring). Retrieved from http://www.nexusjournal.com/Frascari_v4n2.html doi:10.1007/s00004-002-0031-3

For further examples, please consult http://www.apastyle.org/ or http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

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



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